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Abstract

This study used structured group discussions (The Delphi Method) among three
groups of contracting professionals from the Air Armament, Aeronautical Systems, and
the Electronic Systems Centers in order to identify potential roadblocks to
implementation of Evolutionary Acquisition strategies. The Delphi groups also tackled
the problem of identifying and exploring potential business strategies that may counter
the identified challenges. Discussions revealed that current laws, regulations, and internal
processes pose challenges in an evolutionary acquisition environment. No single business
strategy emerged as the best way to implement the EA strategy. Participants suggested
that all three Centers concluded that robust business planning, pre-contract agreements
between the Government and the contractor, long-term relationships, and encouraging
team behavior are key factors. Participants from all three Centers are accommodating
evolutionary acquisition with current contract types. Multiple contract types are being
combined under one contract vehicle; award and incentive fees are being tailored to
motivate specific contractor behavior. The best strategy for an evolutionary acquisition
may be a strategy that is tailored to the specific requirement.

viii

A Delphi Expert Assessment of Proactive Contracting
in an Evolutionary Acquisition Environment
I. Introduction
Background
Reducing the time to develop and field new weapons and equipment is a critical issue
in determining the responsiveness and effectiveness of the acquisition system. According
to J. Michael Hanratty of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) “obsolescence risks are significant because technology cycle time,
sometimes on the order of months, far outpace weapon system development cycle time,
typically 8 to 15 years. By the time a system is fielded, supporting technologies are often
outdated -- the US. Military cannot afford to be 3 or 4 technological generations behind
what is available to the commercial market” (Hanratty et.al. January 2003).
Unfortunately, this is not a new issue, in 1986 the Packard Commission stated that "the
unreasonably long acquisition cycle is the central problem from which most other
acquisition problems stem…It leads to unnecessarily high development costs and
obsolete technology in our fielded equipment." (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management 1986:47). To exacerbate the situation further, processor speed now
doubles every 18 months while bandwidth doubles every 12 months (Waldo 2000:3).
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Therefore, any system that requires over 18 months to field is already incorporating
outdated technology.
Research has demonstrated that lengthy development cycles substantially impact
system life cycle costs. Sustainment costs for existing systems also rise as the
development cycles for replacement systems lengthen. Costs associated with
diminishing manufacturing sources (DMS) rise earlier in the project life, in some
cases like the F-22 Program, even prior to the beginning of production. Despite this
evidence of increased cost, the acquisition response times for our major systems
today often exceed the 8 to 15 years mentioned by Hanratty.
Several recent initiatives have attempted to address this problem. On January 19,
2002, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics), Mr. E.C.
“Pete” Aldridge issued a memo entitled “Cost-as-an-Independent Variable (CAIV) and
Spiral Development Implementation Plans” to each of the Service Acquisition
Executives. This memo specifically requests that 100 percent of the Acquisition Category
(ACAT) I programs consider incorporating an evolutionary acquisition or spiral
development implementation plan by the end of FY02. This memo states that
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) strategies reduce the acquisition cycle by fielding new
systems with some, but not all of their ultimate features, as well as adding new
technologies in increments as they become available. According to Aldridge (2002), in
only rare exceptions would EA not be the best strategy. In those cases, an explanation of
why, and what alternative steps are being taken to reduce the cycle time would be
necessary (Aldridge 2002).
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In his address to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Defense House
Appropriations Committee March 13, 2002, Secretary Aldridge set forth the plan to
reduce cycle times in weapons systems with the use of evolutionary acquisition and spiral
development in order to provide military capability to the warfighter faster. According to
Secretary Aldridge providing such capability faster is absolutely critical to
transformation. Evolutionary acquisition and spiral development will be the linchpins for
developing and fielding mature technologies faster for both hardware and software
(Subcommittee on Defense House Appropriations Committee 2002:4-5). This address set
evolutionary acquisition and spiral development as transformation cornerstones.
Subsequently, on June 04, 2002, Dr. Marvin Sambur, Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Acquisition) issued a follow-up policy memorandum entitled, “Reality-based
Acquisition System Policy for all Programs”. Specifically, this memo states that the
primary mission of our acquisition system is to rapidly deliver to the warfighters
affordable, sustainable capability that meets their expectations. All actions by any leader,
staff, or supporting organizations will support this mission. Dr. Sambur established
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) as the preferred acquisition strategy for achieving this
mission. Spiral development is the preferred process to execute the EA strategy
(Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition 2002).
The Reality-based Acquisition System policy memorandum also establishes two
overarching policy objectives: 1) shortening the acquisition cycle time and, 2) gaining
credibility within and outside the acquisition community. According to Dr. Sambur’s
memorandum, the old acquisition policy was highly prescriptive, while the new policy
challenges acquisition program managers to find better ways of doing business without
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telling them exactly what to do. Every action taken by individuals responsible for
program execution must map directly to, and further these two primary objectives.
Members at all levels of the acquisition workforce are expected to seek innovative ways
to achieve these objectives (Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition 2002).
General Lyles, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Commander, further emphasized
that Air Force acquisition personnel needed to get out of the checklist mentality and
eliminate from our processes all the steps that add time but are of little value (Lyles
2002). Contracting processes must therefore be tailored and linked to achieving these
objectives.
The push to deliver an initial capability less capable than the total warfighter
requirement is contrary to traditional acquisition practices. In the past, weapons systems
were developed based upon current and future technologies as well as perceived threat
environments. Traditional acquisition strategies took a number of years and did not
deliver any capability until design, manufacture, and test was completed for the entire
system. Under EA, a supportable initial increment with the ability to insert new
technology or additional capability is rapidly acquired and sustained. A modular, open
systems approach is developed that addresses how this initial increment fits into the
overall system architecture based upon what is known today. This architecture evolves as
both technology and threat environments change.
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Purpose
EA strategies may create unique contracting challenges and require innovative
business management solutions. Some acquisition professionals have implemented “EAlike” strategies in the past, while many others are experiencing challenges implementing
this latest direction. Discussions with these professionals may lead to codification of
lessons learned into a process where information can be shared with others through
education. This research formulates the basis for a contracting specific lesson in EA that
ultimately shares the challenges and best solutions with the contracting community.

Research Questions
I chose to explore the following research questions in order to identify the unique
contracting challenges created through implementation of the EA edict:
1. What are the actual and perceived regulatory and procedural roadblocks that are a
result of the implementation of an EA strategy?
2. What innovative solutions are being implemented that minimize the effects of
these challenges?
3. What contracting/business arrangements best support implementation of
evolutionary acquisition?
Although the purpose of this study does not include preparing a comprehensive roadmap
for contracting in an EA environment, examples of successful contracting arrangements
are included based upon the input received from the above questions.
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Scope
The Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) is comprised of three Systems Centers
with distinct system acquisition missions. The Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) at
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio focuses on aircraft and airframes. The Air Armament
Center (AAC) at Eglin AFB, Florida procures munitions and related equipment. The
Electronic Systems Center (ESC) acquires sensors, radar, command, control,
communication and other electronic systems. Although, the results of this study may have
implications to other commands in the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DoD),
a review of each separate command and service would require a greater amount of time
than is available for this research. In order to provide a thorough examination of the
research questions, this study is limited to assessing the contracting practices of programs
in AFMC actively engaged in implementing the EA edict. This research will investigate
the most pressing contracting challenges with EA and the proposed solutions for
overcoming these challenges as appropriate.
As previously mentioned, EA has been mandated as the acquisition strategy for all
ACAT I programs. No firm contracting guidance has been provided on how to
accomplish this task either at the DoD or the individual service level. This study
answered the research questions as they applied to the three individual Centers and their
unique missions to provide a basis of understanding for the larger audience. Both military
and civilian contracting officers involved in EA-like programs participated in this study.
The results of this study should not be taken as an exhaustive checklist for EA to be
rigidly followed but rather as a compilation of current practice that has produced
promising results in their given context.
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This study will serve as an investigation into the challenges faced by contracting
professionals in employing the concepts of evolutionary acquisition. It will provide best
approach examples that may be applied by contracting officers in systems level
environments for meeting the objectives of evolutionary acquisition. It will also provide
the basis for an EA training lesson specifically tailored to the systems level contracting
professional.
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II. Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter discusses the relevant literature reviewed for the purpose of this study.
First, the traditional acquisition process is reviewed. Second, the basic tenants of
evolutionary acquisition are described. Third, a brief overview of the funding process is
presented. Fourth, the traditional contracting methods are discussed. Finally, the chapter
is wrapped up with an examination of the types of contract arrangements that may aid in
the implementation of an EA strategy.
Traditional Acquisition Process
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) acquisition process is deeply rooted in the threat
environment of the Cold War. Weapons systems were designed, tested and produced to
respond to a specific known threat, the Soviet Union. The Post-Cold War era poses a new
set of political, economic, and military security challenges for the United States: regional
or limited conflicts; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and nonnuclear; risk to its economic well-being; and the possible failure of democratic reform in
the former Soviet Bloc and elsewhere (Perry 1994). The Department of Defense's (DoD)
Bottom-Up Review in 1993 provided the vision, and the blueprint, for meeting the
security challenges of the post-Cold War world -- responding to threats anywhere in the
world where U.S. interests are at risk. In today's environment the current process will not
always be able to meet the Department's need. DoD will not be able to carry out this
blueprint, without dramatic changes in its acquisition processes – from determining what
the Department needs, to logistics support and reutilization requirements (Perry 1994).
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The detailed procedures required by the traditional process are considered overly
prescriptive and do not constitute an acquisition policy environment that fosters
efficiency, creativity, and innovation (Deputy Secretary of Defense 2002). Traditional
acquisition strategies have taken 10 to 15 years and did not deliver capability until
design, manufacture, and test was completed for the entire system. This extended
acquisition time routinely results in a technology or weapons systems reaching
obsolescence before reaching the field (Colarusso 2002).
The DoD traditional acquisition process employs a step-by-step approach that
develops, tests, refines, produces and deploys a system in a linear fashion based upon
existing and future technologies. It is essentially a serial process where the completion of
an activity triggers a handoff to the subsequent activity (Colarusso 2002). Under the
traditional fixed, one-step, requirement approach, military planners prepare a complete
list of attributes for the system to include lethality, range, speed, payload and mobility.
Service acquisition officials then use the list to call for bids from defense firms, choose a
contractor, develop the system, conduct tests and buy completed systems for deployment
(Ratnam 2002). Contracts are usually awarded competitively covering a single system on
the basis of a complete defined requirement. This approach has been deemed the
“waterfall approach”, commonly illustrated as an irreversible flow down a series of steps,
from the original determination of objectives and requirements to the production software
that emerges at the bottom. The waterfall approach can be appropriate when the
requirements and development challenges are clearly understood but it can be disastrous
to commit to requirements up front, before their impact is clear (Carr and Cone 2002).
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The waterfall model, as presented at the 2000 Software Engineering Institute Workshop,
is depicted in Figure 2-1 (Rothenberg 2000).

Source: Rothenberg Briefing to SEI Workshop
September 2000

Figure 2-1 The Waterfall Model
Under the waterfall model, existing and projected threats and technology merge to
develop the requirements. This set of requirements then triggers the planning and budgetplanning phase. Once the planning and budgeting phase is complete and the program is
funded, a contract is awarded and the contractor begins development and testing for the
entire system. After the entire system passes the required tests, the contractor begins
production and delivers the weapon system to the warfighter (Rothenberg 2000).
Through operational use, desired capabilities are discovered which may trigger the
process to improve the system through modifications and block upgrades. Three of the
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processes used to improve the system will be discussed further: block upgrades, preplanned product improvements (P3I), and engineering change proposals.
Block upgrades permit significant technology advances in major weapon systems.
The block upgrade process is a technique that is used on major weapon systems to
introduce multiple product improvement changes on a periodic basis. On the C-17
program, this is called an annual configuration update, although there is discussion on
lengthening the block process to once every two years (Pike 2002). Under the block
upgrade concept, all products within a given block have essentially the same
configuration. This results in reduced sustainment costs by minimizing unique spare, tech
order, support equipment, and training requirements. Stable configurations within a block
of aircraft or products improve manufacturing efficiency and quality. Diligent
manufacturing development and transition planning is required to minimize production
line disruptions when introducing a new block with configuration changes (Pike, July
2002).
Pre-Planned Product Improvement, often referred to as P3I, is an appropriate strategy
when requirements are known and firm, but where constraints (typically either
technology or budget) make some portion of the system unachievable within the schedule
required. If it is concluded that a militarily useful capability can be fielded as an interim
solution while the portion yet to be proceeds through development, then P3I is
appropriate. The approach generally is to handle the improvement as a separate, parallel
development; initially test and deliver the system without the improvement; and prove
and provide the enhanced capability as it becomes available. The key to a successful P3I
is the establishment of well-defined interface requirements for the system and the
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improvement. Use of a P3I will tend to increase initial cost, configuration management
activity, and technical complexity (Defense Systems Management College 2000). P3I
detailed planning is usually conducted during the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development (EMD) phase and includes programming resources to accomplish an
orderly and cost-effective upgrade of a system’s capability after fielding. The whole idea
is to sacrifice some initial system capability in order to get a good system fielded in a
timely manner, and then facilitate system upgrade(s) through timely advanced planning
and funding.
Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) are proposals to the responsible authority
recommending that a change to an original item of equipment be considered, and the
design or engineering change be incorporated into the article to modify, add to, delete, or
supersede original parts (Defense Systems Management College 2001). The ECP, as
typically used in the DoD, makes a change to a contract that is out of scope of the
existing requirements. Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) identify need for a
permanent configuration change. Upon approval of an ECP, a new configuration is
established. These changes can result from problems with the baseline requirement,
safety, interfaces, operating/servicing capability, preset adjustments, and human interface
including skill level, or training. The ECP can also be used to upgrade already delivered
systems to the new configuration through use of retrofit, modification kits, and the like
(Defense Systems Management College 2001).
Block upgrades, P3I, and ECPs did provide additional capability and permitted
technology insertion over time under the traditional acquisition process. Prior experience
with system acquisition has shown that conventional acquisition strategies often led to
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unsatisfactory results (Defense Systems Management College 1998). The principal
difficulty with traditional acquisition activities has been that the time required to
complete the entire process has lagged well behind changes in requirements and in
capabilities provided by technology advances. Environmental changes within which
acquisition takes place may have exacerbated previous difficulties in maintaining
currency, both in military capability available and in technology used to provide it
(Defense Systems Management College 1998).
DoD’s traditional acquisition practices place a tremendous burden on the contractor
(Aldridge 2002). These processes require that the DOD and industry engage in a lengthy,
expensive, and often futile pantomime by which the cost to the government of a product
was evaluated, estimated, and then negotiated, often at the expense of the industry. So
burdensome have been the requirements of cost-based pricing, that often only the largest
defense contractors – those with large legal and accounting offices – choose to compete
(Aldridge 2002). The portion of U.S. industry devoted specifically to serving Defense
needs has been shrinking rapidly from over 15 major defense contractors in 1985 to less
than 5 in 2002. By 1995 only three major U.S. industrial entities remained capable of
producing complete weapon systems (Defense Systems Management College Press
1998). As the defense industrial base shrank, the acquisition cycle times for all services
have steadily increased over time. Figure 2-2 shows the respective acquisition cycle time
increases.
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Figure 2-2 Average Acquisition Cycle Times
Based upon the results of the traditional acquisition system and the rapidly changing
technology and threat environments, the need for a more flexible and responsive
acquisition process emerged. Systems can no longer be allowed to languish in the
pipeline until every possible bell and whistle has been hung on the frame. Programs will
now require the use of commercial, mature technology where possible to speed
development, while reducing costs and risk (Aldridge 2002). The new process must be
able to capture and incorporate existing and emerging technology while being flexible
enough to meet the changing threat environment of today. In response to these needs,
DoD employed the concepts of evolutionary acquisition.
Evolutionary Acquisition Process
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) and spiral development produce and deploy systems
based on mature technologies. Evolutionary acquisition is defined as an acquisition
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strategy that defines, develops, produces or acquires, and fields an initial hardware or
software increment (or block) of operational capability (USD AT&L 12 April 2002). EA
is based on technologies demonstrated in the relevant environments, time-phased
requirements, and demonstrated manufacturing or software deployment capabilities.
These capabilities can be provided in a shorter period of time, followed by subsequent
increments of capability over time that accommodate improved technology and allow full
and adaptable systems over time (USD AT&L 12 April 2002). The objective is to deliver
this incremental capability in 18 months or less. More than one increment may occur at a
given time. The lack of specificity and detail in identifying the final system capability
distinguishes EA from other incremental strategies. The system architecture defines the
partitioning of system components, flow of data, flow control, timing, and throughput
relationships, interface layering and protocol standards. A flexible architecture requires
long-term tolerance to change (Draft Evolutionary Acquisition Guide, 2002).
The result of an EA strategy will be a system that evolves incrementally toward
fulfilling its desired end-state with the flexibility to refine requirements and exploit
opportunities as they arise. The first increment of capability will meet many, but not all,
of the system’s desired operational requirements. Subsequent increments will incorporate
new technologies that have matured during the development and production of previous
increments. The Global Hawk and Predator unmanned air vehicles have been used with
great success in Afghanistan. These systems are good examples of initial increments that
will have increasing capability as technology improves (Senate Armed Services
Committee 2002). According to Secretary Aldridge in an April 2002 memo, EA and
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spiral development processes are the “preferred” approach within the acquisition process
(USD AT&L 12 April 2002).
The simple goal of an EA strategy is to deliver today’s technology to the warfighter
efficiently and quickly. The intent of a Spiral Development process is to get systems to
the users sooner, cheaper and at less risk. Use of an EA strategy will deliver a core
operational capability sooner by dividing a large, complex, single development effort into
many smaller developments or increments. EA allows systems to be deployed even
though they might not include every technology or capability that might possibly be
needed. EA permits a program to quickly respond to changing conditions by allowing
each increment to accommodate the following three activities: 1) develop new
capabilities supporting the operational requirements and goals of the system, 2) exploit
opportunities to insert new technologies that reduce cost of ownership or accelerate
fielding of new capabilities resulting from experimentation or technology demonstrations,
and 3) refine current capabilities based on user feedback, testing, or experimentation (AFI
63-123:3.2).
Evolutionary acquisition and spiral development will enable us to maximize benefits
from increased Science and Technology funding by providing available transformational
technologies to the warfighter much faster. Evolutionary acquisition differs from a PrePlanned Product Improvement (P3I) acquisition strategy in that future increments are not
definitively planned and baselined until the current increment is about to be executed
(AFI 63-123:3.1). Systems managed via spiral development will not be allowed to
languish in the pipeline until every possible bell and whistle has been hung on the frame.
Programs will now require the use of commercial, demonstrated technology where
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possible to speed development, while reducing costs and risk. Those systems will
however, be able to accommodate the new capabilities when circumstances call for it, or
technology makes it possible (Aldridge 2002).
Implementing the EA strategy requires tailoring of the traditional acquisition
milestones and phases in DoD 5000.2-R in order to accomplish program goals. To
successfully apply EA, several programmatic characteristics are deemed necessary. These
characteristics include a general description of the desired end-state capabilities of the
system, a concise operational concept of the full system, a flexible architecture that
accommodates change and incremental development and deployment, early definition,
funding, development, testing, fielding, supporting and operational evaluation of the first
increment capability followed later by the same for follow-on increments of operational
capability, and continual dialogue and feedback among users, developers, supporters and
testers (Draft Evolutionary Acquisition Guide 2002).
The traditional and evolutionary acquisition processes strive to deliver additional
capabilities in response to the warfighter’s needs. While these processes differ in the
acquisition approach taken, both tradition and evolutionary acquisition processes are
dependent on the funding and budget process.
Funding and the Budget Process
The funding and budget process for the entire defense department is regulated by the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). The PPBS coordinates planning
efforts at the national level of the civilian and military organization. The process
translates force requirements developed by the military into budgetary requirements that
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are then presented to Congress (Naval Post Graduate School 2003).
The purpose of the PPBS is to produce a plan, a program, and, finally, a budget for the
Department of Defense. The budget is forwarded in summary to the President for his
approval. The President's budget then is submitted to Congress for authorization and
appropriation.
PPBS is a complicated, arduous and heavily regulated process that requires significant
effort on the part of weapon systems planners to secure funding for their respective
programs. It is recognized that the PPBS process creates certain challenges in the
acquisition community that cannot be easily overcome due to statutory and regulatory
requirements.
A thorough analysis and explanation of the PPBS process is beyond the scope of this
research; however an understanding of the process may prove beneficial to the reader.
The Naval Post Graduate School’s Financial Management in the Armed Forces website at
http://pcc.nps.navy.mil/PPBS/ppbs.html provides a comprehensive overview of the PPBS
process. Additional information may be obtained in DoD Instruction 7045.7
“Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)”.
Suggestion for funding in an EA environment may differ from traditional methods due to
its incremental approach. Suggestions for funding an EA program can be found in AFI
63-123 Evolutionary Acquisition for C2 Systems Section 4.4.2 as well as in the Draft
Evolutionary Acquisition Guide Chapter 4.
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Traditional Contracting
An important part of any acquisition strategy is determining the contracting strategy.
FAR Part 16.104 provides specific factors that the contracting officer should consider in
determining the contracting strategy. These factors include price competition, price
analysis, type and complexity of the requirement, urgency of the requirement, period of
performance or length of the production run, contractor’s technical capability and
financial responsibility, adequacy of the contractor’s accounting system, concurrent
contracts, the extent and nature of the proposed subcontracting and the acquisition
history.
Under current FAR guidance, the contracting officer may select from two contract
types: cost reimbursement and fixed price. Variations of each type are available to fit the
requirements of an acquisition. These contract types may be combined to form hybrid
contracts that have different contract types associated with individual contract line items
(CLINS). A discussion of each contract type and their associated variations is provided
below.
Contract Types
Fixed-Price Contracts. Fixed-price types of contracts provide for a firm price or, in
specific circumstances an adjustable price. Fixed-price contracts providing for an
adjustable price may include a ceiling price, a target price (including target cost), or both.
Unless otherwise specified in the contract, the ceiling price or target price is subject to
adjustment only by operation of contract clauses providing for equitable adjustment or
other revision of the contract price under stated circumstances. The contracting officer
shall use firm-fixed-price or fixed-price with economic price adjustment contracts when
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acquiring commercial items (FAR 16.201). A complete description of the different types
of fixed-price contract types can be found in Appendix C.
Cost Type Contracts. Cost-reimbursement types of contracts provide for payment of
allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. These contracts
establish an estimate of total cost for the purpose of obligating funds and establishing a
ceiling that the contractor may not exceed (except at its own risk) without the approval of
the contracting officer (FAR 16.301-1). Cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable for use
only when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be
estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract. A cost type
contract may only be used when the contractor’s accounting system is able to track
applicable costs and the Government can provide the appropriate surveillance to ensure
that efficient cost and performance methods are utilized during performance. Cost-type
contracts cannot be utilized when acquiring commercial items (FAR 16.301-3). A
complete description of cost contract types is also provided in Appendix C.
Indefinite Delivery Contracts. There are three types of indefinite-delivery contracts:
definite-quantity contracts, requirements contracts, and indefinite-quantity contracts. The
indefinite-delivery contract may be used to acquire supplies and/or services when the
exact times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not known at the time of
contract award.
The various types of indefinite-delivery contracts offer advantages. All three types
permit Government stocks to be maintained at minimum levels and direct shipment to
users. Indefinite-quantity contracts and requirements contracts also permit flexibility in
both quantities and delivery scheduling; and ordering of supplies or services after
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requirements materialize. Indefinite-quantity contracts limit the Government's obligation
to the minimum quantity specified in the contract. Requirements contracts may permit
faster deliveries when production lead time is involved, because contractors are usually
willing to maintain limited stocks when the Government will obtain all of its actual
purchase requirements from the contractor. Indefinite-delivery contracts may provide for
any appropriate cost or pricing arrangement under FAR Part 16. Cost or pricing
arrangements that provide for an estimated quantity of supplies or services (e.g.,
estimated number of labor hours) must comply with the appropriate procedures of this
subpart (FAR 16.501.2). A complete description of indefinite delivery type contracts is
provided in Appendix C.
Other Contract Types. In certain instances it may be beneficial to utilize time-andmaterials, labor-hour, or letter contracts. These types provide the degree of flexibility
necessary to acquire supplies and services under unusual circumstances. A complete
description of these contract types is provided in Appendix C.
Business Arrangements
Other tools are also available to the contracting professional in the acquisition process.
Two such tools are agreements and Other Transaction Authority (OTA). A discussion of
each of these tools is provided in the following paragraphs.
Agreements. Agreements allow the contracting officer to establish and negotiate
contract language that may be incorporated into more than one contract. Three agreement
types apply to the acquisition of major systems: basic agreements, basic ordering
agreements, and forward pricing rate agreements.
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Basic Agreements. A basic agreement is a written instrument of understanding,
negotiated between an agency or contracting activity and a contractor, that contains
contract clauses applying to future contracts between the parties during its term and
contemplates separate future contracts that will incorporate by reference or attachment
the required and applicable clauses agreed upon in the basic agreement. A basic
agreement is not a contract. A basic agreement should be used when a substantial number
of separate contracts may be awarded to a contractor during a particular period and
significant recurring negotiating problems have been experienced with the contractor.
Basic agreements may be used with negotiated fixed-price or cost-reimbursement
contracts (FAR 16.702).
Basic Ordering Agreement. A basic ordering agreement is a written instrument of
understanding, negotiated between an agency, contracting activity, or contracting office
and a contractor, that contains terms and clauses applying to future contracts (orders)
between the parties during its term, a description, as specific as practicable, of supplies or
services to be provided, and methods for pricing, issuing, and delivering future orders
under the basic ordering agreement. A basic ordering agreement is not a contract. A basic
ordering agreement may be used to expedite contracting for uncertain requirements for
supplies or services when specific items, quantities, and prices are not known at the time
the agreement is executed, but a substantial number of requirements for the type of
supplies or services covered by the agreement are anticipated to be purchased from the
contractor (FAR 16.703).
Forward Pricing Rate Agreement. When cost or pricing data are required, offerors are
required to describe any forward pricing rate agreements (FPRA's) in each specific
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pricing proposal to which the rates apply and to identify the latest cost or pricing data
already submitted in accordance with the agreement. All data submitted in connection
with the agreement, updated as necessary, form a part of the total data that the offeror
certifies to be accurate, complete, and current at the time of agreement on price for an
initial contract or for a contract modification. Contracting officers will use FPRA rates as
bases for pricing all contracts, modifications, and other contractual actions to be
performed during the period covered by the agreement (FAR 15.407-3).
Other Transaction Authority (OTA). Other transactions is a term commonly used to
refer to transactions other than contracts, grants or cooperative agreements that are
entered into under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 2371. OTA provides tremendous flexibility
to negotiate terms and conditions, as other transactions are not required to comply with
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), its supplements, or laws that are limited in
applicability to contracts, grants or cooperative agreements.
The Department of Defense has temporary authority to award other transactions for
certain prototype projects that are directly relevant to weapons or weapon systems
proposed to be acquired or developed by the Department of Defense. This type of other
transaction is often referred to as a "Section 845 OT" because Section 845 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160) initially
authorized its use.
Prototype projects could include prototypes of weapon systems, subsystems,
components, or technology. With regard to Section 845 authority, a prototype can
generally be described as a physical or virtual model used to evaluate the technical or
manufacturing feasibility or military utility of a particular technology or process, concept,
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end item, or system. The quantity developed should be limited to that needed to prove
technical or manufacturing feasibility or evaluate military utility. In general, Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations will be appropriate for other
transaction prototype projects. Low Rate Initial Production quantities are not authorized
to be acquired under prototype authority (Other Transactions Guide 2000).

Evolutionary Acquisition Contracting
Sparse guidance is available concerning the best contracting strategy in an EA
environment. The appropriate contracting strategy depends on the particular requirement.
Both AFI 63-123 and the Draft Evolutionary Acquisition Guide recommend considering
modular contracting in accordance with FAR Part 39.103. Specifically 39.103(d) states
for each increment, contracting officers shall choose an appropriate contracting technique
that facilitates the acquisition of subsequent increments. Pursuant to Parts 16 and 17 of
the Federal Acquisition Regulation, contracting officers shall select the contract type and
method appropriate to the circumstances (e.g., indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity
contracts, single contract with options, successive contracts, multiple awards, task order
contracts). Each increment shall be contracted for separately and not obligate the
Government to purchase any increments beyond the initial capability.
Modular contracting breaks large acquisitions into smaller, more manageable modules
or in the case of EA, increments. Complex requirements can be addressed incrementally
in order to enhance the likelihood of achieving workable solutions today while allowing
for subsequent modules to take advantage of technological changes. Risk can be handled
incrementally, thereby making it easier to manage. As technology or threats change, the
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subsequent modules can be adjusted or modified to accommodate those changes. There is
no significant difference in the procurement techniques used between the “traditional”
method of contracting and the concept of modular contracting (Draft Evolutionary
Acquisition Guide 2000:50).
When appropriate, other nontraditional contracting approaches can be used to further
enhance efficient and effective development efforts. Other nontraditional contracting
approaches include Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRDA) under
the Domestic Technology Transfer program (AFPD 61-3) and “other transactions” (nonFAR contracts) authorized for certain Air Force research and prototype projects under
Section 845 of the FY 94 National Authorization Act, as amended by Section 804 of the
FY 97 National Defense Authorization Act. Quick and efficient implementation of the
selected contracting approach is key to successful execution of each spiral development
increment within the goal of 18 months or less. (AFI 63-123: 4.4.1)

Summary
Based on a review of relevant literature, I developed some preliminary conclusions
regarding the business arrangements and contractual documents necessary to implement
an EA strategy.
The primary purpose of the evolutionary acquisition process is to provide initial
capability to the warfighter in less time while enabling the insertion of technology over
time. No specific direction concerning contracting in an evolutionary acquisition
environment has been provided to the contracting community, only general guidance as
that found in AFI 63-123 and the Draft Evolutionary Acquisition Guide.
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The Federal Acquisition Regulation provides the contracting professional a variety of
tools and contractual arrangements to acquire weapons systems while also permitting a
great deal of flexibility in the use of these instruments. Each of the contract and
agreement types were reviewed and synopsized. Neither the relevant literature nor the
regulatory guidance concerning EA, revealed new tools or contractual arrangements. The
creativity of the contracting professional may determine the best contractual arrangement
for a given acquisition. A compilation of currently employed evolutionary acquisition
practices may prove of additional use.
The next chapter will describe the methodology used to discover the contracting
strategies currently being implemented in an evolutionary acquisition environment.
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III. Methodology
Overview
This chapter describes the methodology applied to acquire the necessary data for
examination in this study. In contrast to some research methods, the techniques utilized in
this research were not for the purpose of analyzing data, but rather for the creation and
collection of the original data necessary to explore the contracting challenges associated
with EA implementation. This chapter establishes why this methodology was selected
and also reviews the principals and pitfalls with its implementation. The chapter
concludes with a description of the research design.

Basis
With the mandatory implementation of Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) procedures in
Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition Programs, a new way of doing business has
been established for acquiring weapon systems. Core capabilities of weapon systems
must now be acquired rapidly while simultaneously planning for additional capabilities
that will be added as technology evolves. While this concept provides new capabilities to
the war fighter more rapidly than the traditional acquisition procedures, it also creates
new challenges for contracting personnel.
The contracting challenges associated with the implementation of Evolutionary
Acquisition procedures are difficult to assess through traditional statistical manipulation
or measurement techniques. To discover these challenges, it was necessary to look

27

beyond mere financial data, contract files and metrics. This study was more interested in
identifying the contracting challenges associated with implementing EA and how
contracting personnel are meeting these challenges. In order to achieve these goals, it was
necessary to rely on the data provided through the professional judgment, experience, and
opinion of contracting professionals.
Opinion is defined as the vast amount of information that lies between speculation and
knowledge based upon some evidence but not fact (Elsbernd 1974:7). Because opinion is
imperfect, fragmentary, and incomplete information, it is characterized by a broad range
of diversity among individuals (Elsbernd 1974:7). Consequently, judgments based upon
opinion will also vary considerably between different individuals (Dalkey 1967:2).
There is little correlation between verbosity and knowledge of the subject matter
under consideration (Uhl 1983). Even though anyone with a basic understanding of a
subject can provide opinion and discussion on a matter, this study required professional
experience and judgment concerning contracting for major acquisition programs. Since
this is the case, the discussion necessary to generate the data required was conducted
utilizing experts in the contracting field, specifically those involved in Air Force Materiel
Command “pathfinder” designated and “EA-like” programs. The selection criteria of
these individuals will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
In a situation where there are no historical records available, as is the case in
implementing the new EA processes, the obvious recourse is the efficient use of intuition
and judgment of a group of persons who are keen observers and have extensive
experience and knowledge in the subject area (Brown 1968:14). Rather than collecting
individual assessments and comparing data, as in a case study methodology, panel
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members prepared their positions based upon the fact they may have to defend their
position against opposing opinions of other contracting professionals in future rounds.
The approach adds validity to the responses gained during each discussion. The Delphi
technique is quite clever. Regardless of how high up the ladder you may think you are,
you are still forced to back up your position rather than rest on your laurels (Armstrong
1989).
Even though it is realized that input of multiple experts should produce a superior
result, the possibility exists for disagreement within the group. This possibility requires
the consolidation of inputs to achieve a group opinion. Although the results from a group
of experts can yield substantive and thought-provoking results, they may not be an
exhaustive nor all inclusive set of ideas. A study may yield a valuable source of
information; however, the value of the information is for the individual reader to decide
and is limited due to the constraints imposed by the panel selection, as well as the
backgrounds, experiences and biases of each member (Clayton 1997: 377).
Within the Department of Defense, group opinion is usually accomplished through
utilization of an Integrated Product Team (IPT), however; this could be better classified
as a compromise due to group pressure rather than the consensus required for this study.
Group discussion, while appearing to be problem-oriented is often irrelevant or biased, as
it is usually more concerned with individual or group interests than with problem solving
(Uhl 1983). In lieu of this, an alternative approach, the Delphi technique was employed.
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The Delphi Method
Delphi is the name that has been applied to a technique designed to elicit opinions
from a group with the aim of generating a group response. Delphi replaces direct
confrontation and debate by a carefully planned, anonymous, and orderly program of
sequential individual interrogations usually conducted by questionnaires. The series of
questionnaires is interspersed with feedback derived from the respondents (Brown et. al.
1969:1). Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group communication
process so that the process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to
deal with a complex problem (Clayton 1997: 375).
The Delphi method was originally devised “in order to obtain the most reliable
opinion consensus of a group of experts by subjecting them to a series of questionnaires
in depth interspersed with controlled opinion feedback” (Dalkey and Helmer 1962: v).
Delphi was developed in the 1950’s during an Air Force sponsored study at The RAND
Corporation to apply expert opinion in determining the number of atomic bombs needed
by the Soviets to reduce U.S. munitions output by a certain quantity (Dalkey and Helmer
1962: 1). The method was initially discounted to provide only event predictions, however
since its inception it has been used for a variety of situations to evaluate relationships,
options or any other situation requiring subjective judgment (Linstone and Turhoff, 1975:
4).
The uses of Delphi, to supply soft data in the social sciences and to provide decision
makers with ready access to specialized expertise, are of great potential importance
(Linstone & Turhoff 1975:xx). The Delphi procedure is one of the most efficient methods
for uncovering the implicit models that lie behind the opinions in the soft areas (Dalkey

30

1967:9). Evidence is mounting that systematic processing of expert opinion can produce
significant improvements both in accuracy and reliability (Dalkey 1967:8). If the
objective is the identification of content based on expert consensus, as is the case for this
study, then the Delphi technique is an appropriate choice as it may enhance the
significant contributions of the panel (Clayton 1997: 377). Judgmental forecasting
remains the dominant form of analysis employed not only by the financial community,
but also throughout the corporate planning rooms around the world (Armstrong 1989).
Moore (1987 p 15-17) provides four reasons why using a group of people rather than
an individual is more desirable in conducting applied social research: it is logical that if
you properly combine the judgment of a large number of people, you have a better
chance of getting closer to the truth, it is desirable to use groups in order to understand
social phenomena by obtaining the views of the actors, it is often beneficial to use groups
if you are concerned about the consequences of your research, and if your goal is to solve
a problem of a particular group, it is reasonable to believe that the group is more likely to
accept your advice (or research findings) if they have participated in the research process.
Complex, ill-defined problems often can be addressed only by pooled intelligence.
With Delphi, members of a group are questioned anonymously (in this case via email) several times. Between rounds of questioning, a summary of the group response is
provided to each individual to stimulate further thinking. Summaries of the group’s
comments on previous rounds may also be provided (Elsbernd 1974:1).
Under Delphi, there is no prescribed format for study conduction. Delphi collects and
organizes judgments in a systematic fashion. This technique gains input, establishes
priorities and builds consensus. Delphi organizes and helps focus dissent, turning this
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group effect into a window of opportunity. In short, Delphi cannot be overlooked as a
useful and potent tool when attempting to harness expert opinion for critical decisionmaking tasks (Clayton 1997: 377). The characteristics of the Delphi technique are
intended to overcome the drawbacks of conventionally structured groups such as the
influence of the dominant individual, noise, and the group pressure for conformity
(Elsbernd 1974:25). Throughout the literature on Delphi, there are three common
features: anonymity of panel members, iteration and controlled feedback, and statistical
group response (Dalkey 1969:16, Dalkey 1967:3, and Spinelli 1983:73).
The first common feature, anonymity of panel members, must be protected.
Anonymity means that a participant’s response and arguments are known only to the
administrator of the group and are not attributed to the individual. Anonymity eliminates
the influence of the dominant individual and reduces both noise and the pressure for
conformity (Elsbernd 1974: 25). This mode of controlled interaction among the
respondents represents a deliberate attempt to avoid the disadvantages associated with
more conventional use of experts, such as round-table discussions or other milder forms
of confrontation with opposing views (Dalkey and Helmer 1962: 2).
According to Dalkey, the Delphi method appears to be more conducive to independent
thought on the part of the experts and to aid them in gradual formation of a considered
opinion while reducing the effect of the dominant individual (Elsbernd 1974:26, Dalkey
1967:3). Spinelli adds that Delphi provides the opportunities for dissident respondents to
voice their opinions or disagreements in a reasonably unthreatening, non-face-to-face
environment (Spinelli 1983:73).
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Direct confrontation, on the other hand, all too often induces the hasty formation of
preconceived notions, an inclination to close one’s mind to novel ideas, a tendency to
defend a stand once taken or, alternatively and sometimes alternately, a predisposition to
be swayed by persuasively stated opinions of others (Dalkey and Helmer 1962: 2).
Although pressure for conformity still operates with Delphi, this pressure is reduced to an
internal and individual pressure (Elsbernd 1974:27).
Utilizing the Delphi technique in the past has found that the best ideas did not always
surface from the most experienced member of the team. As for those individuals who
were perceived to be the best according to reputation—they were forced to support or
conform. In an open group, the most experienced member would rarely be challenged
due to their reputation and stature (Armstrong 1989: 2).
The second common Delphi feature, controlled feedback, is a technique for
eliminating extraneous material and consolidating group responses by conducting
iterations of discussion separated by a summary of the previous session inputs (Dalkey,
1969: 16). Controlled feedback is a device to reduce noise and allows the researcher to
control the information given to the panel (Dalkey 1967:3). By systematically exploring
the factors which influence the judgment of the individual expert, it becomes possible to
correct any misconceptions that he may have harbored regarding empirical facts or
theoretical assumptions underlying those factors, and to draw his attention to other
factors which he may have overlooked in his first analysis of the situation (Dalkey 1962:
3). A skillful administrator removes all evidences of status, verbosity, emotionalism, and
pure speculation before feeding back the arguments (Elsbernd 1974:25). The purpose of
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feedback is to provide new information and to cause rethinking of the problem (Elsbernd
1974:27).
Finally, the third common Delphi feature, statistical group response, grants the
researcher the assurance that each respondent’s input is present in the final response and
reduces the pressure of group conformity by revealing the spread between varying
options (Dalkey 1969: 16). Statistical group response is used primarily to arrive at a
consensus while preventing group pressure for conformity (Elsbernd 1974:27).
Most studies require multiple iterations in order to reach a relevant group opinion.
The extent of the research problem will determine the number of iterations necessary for
a particular study. Within these broad guidelines, a large amount of latitude exists,
making Delphi flexible and adaptable for use in conjunction with other methods and
procedures (Elsbernd 1974:20).
Although Delphi does offer some potential advantages when the use of expert intuitive
judgment is appropriate, it is not a panacea and must be used with care (Elsbernd
1974:2). The technique is not without challenges and limitations. Some common
problems include the imposition of the researchers views by over specifying the problem
and not allowing other views of the problem, assumption that Delphi is the only form of
communication necessary for a particular problem, poor summation and interpretation of
the group response by the researcher, generation of an artificial group consensus by
ignoring disagreements, and underestimation of the demand placed upon respondents by
the technique (Linstone and Turhoff 1975:6).
It is possible that the researcher’s analysis of the results is not the only interpretation
that can be made and that some distortion may occur due to the researcher’s own biases
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(Clayton 1997: 377). If you question several different “experts” you will get a variety of
answers. This creates a problem for the policy maker in determining exactly how to use
this opinion. Dalkey warned that the expert’s responses are not always independent since
work assignments required some contact between the members. Dalkey also noted that
the posing of vague questions in the initial stages of the technique generally invite critical
comment of little value to the research (Dalkey and Helmer 1962: 17).
Due to both personal and professional obligations, panel members are often limited to
the amount of time each can dedicate to the decision-making process. This may
effectively reduce each member’s ability to consider and report on all dimensions under
investigation (Clayton 1997: 377). Delphi provides a communication medium whereby
individuals can participate without needing to travel to a group meeting place. Further,
individuals participate anonymously as a strict requirement of Delphi process. This
anonymity substantially reduces the social-emotional behavior often found when using
other methods, which allows participants to focus on task-oriented activities (Clayton
1997:374). The selection methodology of panel “experts” has been questioned (Ayers
2002). The selection of experts is an intricate problem even when the category is well
defined. Expertness can be judged by status, experience or by a myriad of other things
(Brown 1968:4). The Delphi technique has its share of critics. Sackman (1975), one of
the most ardent critics of the methodology, raises several concerns related to the scientific
nature of the Delphi process.
Although Sackman (p 33) poses several key questions relating to conventional Delphi,
the research performed later by Clayton discounted Sackman’s concerns (Clayton 1997,
376). Clayton addressed each of Sackman’s claims against the validity of Delphi. Clayton
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determined that Sackman’s claims were unwarranted as supported by literature and
common sense. The panelists should however possess an extensive knowledge of the
subject matter or be familiar with experiential criteria that would allow them to provide
valid input. Verifying this knowledge is somewhat difficult. The background and
experiences of each panel member, which may directly affect their decision-making, are
generally beyond the control of the Delphi study (Clayton 1997, 377).
Though arguments against the scientific validity of the Delphi technique exist, the
technique is an innovative way to gather expert judgments on critical issues while
mitigating the effects commonly caused by position and group influence. As presented
earlier, in a situation where there is no historical records available, the obvious recourse
is the efficient use of intuition and judgment of a group of persons who are keen
observers and have extensive experience and knowledge in the subject area (Brown
1968:14). It is inevitable that as questions to be answered get broader and more complex,
intuition and judgment must supplement quantitative analysis to an increasing extent
(Brown 1968:1).
The decision to use the Delphi technique should be based on the purpose or objective
of a research study which wishes “to obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a
group of experts” (Dalkey and Helmer 1962:458). The questions being asked during this
study were highly appropriate for Delphi in that they required a large degree of expert
opinion since no extensive experience with implementing EA exists. As suggested by
Elsbernd, no amount of fact gathering could have conclusively answered the questions
posed by this study (Elsbernd 1974:28). Judgmental forecasting remains the dominant

36

form of analysis employed not only by the financial community, but also throughout the
corporate planning rooms around the world (Armstrong 1989).
The principles of the Delphi technique will be employed to develop a research design
that effectively gathers the information required for this study. In addition, the data
gathered via the Delphi technique will be methodically assessed and theoretically sound.
Appropriate measures, such as question panel reviews, will be taken to ensure the
discussion is directed in a manner to prevent researcher bias as well as not misrepresent
the individual responses of the panel members.
One benefit of utilizing the Delphi technique in this study was the ability of panel
members to participate in a discussion over a period of time without any significant
impact on their daily work schedules. Delphi provides a communication medium
whereby individuals can participate without needing to travel to a group meeting place.
Further, individuals participate anonymously as a strict requirement of Delphi process.
Anonymity substantially reduces the social-emotional behavior often found when using
other methods, which allows participants to focus on task-oriented activities (Clayton
1997:374). This resulted in an increased the level of participation and generation of a
more reliable collection of responses.
Since respondents participated via e-mail, they did not have to travel nor attend any
formal meetings at a set time. Utilization of e-mail also resulted in a less costly and less
intrusive study by providing a high degree of flexibility in the response times without
location limitations. In addition, anonymity resulted in a discussion, free of the pressure
of conformance that led to a more in depth analysis prior to reaching group consensus.
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The avoidance of “group think” provided both candid and in depth individual responses
to the posed discussion questions that otherwise may not have been realized.

Research Design
Selecting Experts. Since EA is virtually uncharted territory, no specific criteria exist
to identify experts in this field. For the purpose of this research, it became necessary to
establish a set of criteria for defining the expert. In concert with the research sponsor, the
Air Force Materiel Command Contracting Directorate (AFMC/PK), a list of four criteria
was developed: 1) a minimum of five years contracting experience in systems level
acquisition programs, 2) currently warranted as a contracting officer, 3) involved in either
a SAF/AQ “pathfinder” designated program or a program implementing “EA-like”
processes, and 4) available to respond via e-mail from 8 July 2002 through 7 October
2002.
In addition to these minimum criteria, the sponsor also desired individual panel
discussions to be conducted at each of the three AFMC Centers to include the
Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC), Air Armament Center (AAC), and Electronic
Systems Center (ESC). Each Center has unique acquisition missions that might warrant
contracting and business arrangements applicable only to their respective situations. The
intent of this study is to capture these arrangements and share them across AFMC.
In determining the number of experts required for the study, some guidance was found
suggesting from five to nine experts (Meyer and Booker, 1991: 87). Depending on the
purpose of the study, the complexity and the expertise required, the panel might be large
or small and local, state, national or international. Group size theory varies, but some
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general rules-of-thumb indicate five to ten people for a homogenous population—that is,
experts coming from the same discipline and fifteen to thirty people for a heterogeneous
population, people with expertise on a particular topic but coming from different
social/professional stratifications such as teachers, university academics and school
principals (Delbeco et al., 1975; Uhl 1983; Moore 1987).
The initial Delphi study conducted by Dalkey and Helmer in the 1950s utilized seven
experts. In past thesis efforts six participants were selected however, attrition rates were
slightly higher than anticipated and therefore warranted selecting a higher number of
participants for this study (Tougaw 2001). In the sponsorship letter from AFMC/PK, five
to nine participants were requested from each Center. ASC provided seven participants,
AAC provided five, and ESC provided six that met the minimum criteria stated earlier.
To minimize the attrition rate, support was requested from each Center’s Director of
Contracting to encourage individual participation.
Question Formulation. No specific format or guidelines exist for questions
formulation in a Delphi study. The technique used to formulate questions is left up to the
researcher. In this case, it was necessary to avoid questions that could be answered with a
yes or no, or with short, non-descriptive phrases. The object of each question was to
generate meaningful discussions on the topic being addressed in order to gather as much
information as possible. Since contracting methods in an Evolutionary Acquisition had
never been researched before it was difficult to ascertain what questions would generate
data that would be of value to this study.
A panel approach was taken to formulate the questions sets. I first originated a list of
questions related to the research. This question set then was sent out to a panel of three
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members, each with different areas of expertise. The question set was revised based upon
the comments received from the panel. The question set was then released to the
participants.
Cycles of Discussion. Participants were solicited beforehand via a thesis support
request letter from AFMC/PK. This letter advised the participants of the purpose of the
study, and provided information concerning the procedures and their anonymity. Two
rounds of the Delphi technique were conducted as part of this study. Each round
consisted of three iterations, one for each participating Center. Because each Center has
unique missions, I believed that they might implement solutions tailored to their
organizations. The responses for each Center were collected separately to prevent crosscenter response contamination and to capture each Center’s responses individually. The
first round involved participants, at all Centers, submitting answers to an initial two
question set in order to assess the level of individual involvement with EA program
implementation and additionally to assess the contracting practices currently being
employed.
The second round consisted of unique question sets for each Center based upon their
responses to questions from the first round. ASC responded to a five-question set while
AAC and ESC responded to separate 6 question sets. The second round questions sets
were developed to further investigate constructs identified in the first round responses of
each Center.
Assessing Contracting Practices in the Evolutionary Acquisition Environment.
Following the completion of each round, I gathered the entire expert input and attempted
to determine a group consensus. The information was synopsized and sent back out to
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each panel with the next round of questions. From this information, I then compiled the
areas of agreement as well as disagreement in order to form a basic lessons learned and to
provide a roadmap for contracting directorates throughout the Air Force implementing
EA. The findings of the study follow in Chapter IV.
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IV. Findings and Analysis
Overview
This chapter provides a detailed account of the results of the research accomplished
under the design and methodology described in Chapter III. Prior to the Delphi rounds, I
provided each participant with a study overview and ground rules for the discussion. This
initial information is provided in Appendix B. This study included six iterations of
discussion within two distinct Delphi rounds. The results of the discussion are presented
below.
Delphi Round 1
Participants from all three Centers received the same two-question set for Round 1.
The response rates for the Air Armament Center and Electronic Systems Center were
both 100 percent. The response rate for the Aeronautical Systems Center was 87.5
percent (7 of 8 participants). The initial questionnaire is provided in full text in Appendix
B; a synopsis of specific responses is provided in Appendix D.
The first question focused on the constraints present in an EA environment.
Responses to this initial question provided a more comprehensive understanding of the
Government acquisition environment and some of the laws, regulations, and practices
that help shape that environment. The second question investigated the contract and
business arrangements that these contracting professionals are using within this
environment.
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Constraints in Evolutionary Acquisition Implementation. What constraints (statutory,
regulatory, business practice, financial etc.) exist in implementing EA and how can we
(or have you) overcome them?
Evolutionary acquisition is a relatively new concept that may conflict with existing
regulations, guidance, and processes. I asked this question to identify these potential
conflicts. In addition, the responses to this question provide insight on how each Center
has accommodated EA within these identified constraints. The participants identified five
main constraints to effective EA implementation. These constraints included the funding
process, small business set-aside requirements, competition requirements, internal review
processes and Government acquisition practices and procedures. The constraints are both
real and perceived barriers that acquisition professionals must overcome in order to
implement successful EA strategies.
Simmerman (1998) suggests that constraints can be interpreted as four different types
of barriers: mindset, paper walls, partitions, and brick walls. A mindset constraint is
formed by untested beliefs and perceptions and really doesn’t exist. The paper wall
constraint often looks impenetrable until tested; a common example is “getting
management approval.” Partition constraints are those that can be managed through time,
effort, additional resources, and team or management support. Brick wall constraints are
those that cannot be overcome and are considered unalterable. I grouped the responses for
this question according to these different barrier types in order to help make sense of the
problems experienced by the participants.
Mindset Constraints. The perception of the acquisition team, the end-users and the
contractor create certain constraints that may be overcome with a change in perspective.
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In certain instances, both the acquisition team and the end-user have a difficult time
accepting a contract that delivers a product that only meets eighty percent of their
requirements. They cannot visualize how this eighty percent solution will evolve into the
total end requirement. A perception change is the only thing necessary to overcome this
constraint.
Lack of specific guidance may also be included as a mindset constraint. Existing
Government regulations do not adequately cover EA specifics. Reviewers and other
acquisition team members find it hard to perform their respective jobs without the proper
regulatory guidance. Reviewers tend to look at new business arrangements with the old
regulations and methodologies even though these regulations do not prohibit them from
employing new tools to accommodate EA.
Paper Wall Constraints. As stated previously, paper walls are constraints that seem
impenetrable until they are tested. Submitted examples of paper walls are the need to
shift from being process-oriented to results oriented, the need to tailor contract data
requirements to what is actually required, and the desire to transfer Government
furnished property on long-term, sole-source contracts to the contractor instead of the
Government maintaining it. While all of these were submitted as barriers, action may
dictate that all can easily be accomplished.
Partition Constraints. With upper management assistance, partition constraints may
be overcome with a little effort, time and ingenuity. Participants submitted several
constraints that fall into this category. These include Competition in Contracting Act
requirements, Small Business set-aside requirements, the contract review and approval
process, Government involvement in performance and testing, and the restrictions
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imposed by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement and Air Force
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. Each of these constraints require some level
of added paperwork, reporting, or review that lengthen the acquisition cycle time. While
these constraints are real, time, effort, and additional help from teams and top
management can overcome them.
Brick Wall Constraints. The Government funding process was overwhelmingly
identified as one of the main constraints in implementing an evolutionary acquisition
strategy. The main roadblocks mentioned were the availability and timing of funds, the
color of money, and the affordability of the increments. Often, the approved funding level
actually dictates the requirements. Problems occur when the contractor’s spend plan
exceeds the approved funding level for the particular program. Sufficient and appropriate
levels of funding are essential to the success of an evolutionary acquisition. While
suggestions were made on how to improve this process, it should be considered a brick
wall constraint since only Congressional intervention will make any lasting change.
The constraints identified provide the preliminary framework of the operating
environment of the acquisition professional. Some of these constraints, such as the
mindset and paper wall constraints can be overcome simply through a change in
perception or a testing of the system. In contrast, brick wall constraints, such as the
funding process, are not easily, if at all, overcome. Partition constraints can be overcome
with extra effort, time, teamwork, and top management support. The following section
investigates the innovative practices being employed to overcome some of these partition
constraints.
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Contracting and Business Arrangements. What contracting/business arrangements do
you think worked (or will work) in supporting an evolutionary acquisition (EA)
strategy? Provide an example if possible.
I asked this question to determine what business strategies were being implemented by
each Center in response to the EA edict. Strategies may differ between Centers as well as
between programs within a Center. Responses to this question will help identify the
varying approaches being taken. These responses in turn provide the foundation for
formulating questions for future rounds.
No single business strategy emerged as the best way to implement the EA strategy.
Several themes, however, were echoed across the Centers. Participants from all three
Centers stressed the need to use business strategies that retain flexibility. Constructs
revealed that help ensure flexibility include robust business planning, pre-contract
agreements between the Government and the contractor, long-term relationships, and the
need to encourage teaming behavior. Participants from all three Centers were also
utilizing current contract types to accommodate an evolutionary acquisition. Multiple
contract types are being combined under one contract vehicle. Award and incentive fees
are being tailored to motivate specific contractor behavior such as technical performance
and teaming. The best strategy for an evolutionary acquisition may be a strategy that is
tailored to the specific requirement.
Robust business planning is a key to success in an EA environment. Advanced
planning involves identifying the complete requirement, defining specific increments,
agreeing on the acquisition approach, considering competition requirements,
acknowledging the differences between the traditional acquisition process and the
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evolutionary acquisition process from the start, and requiring early and continued
involvement by current and potential suppliers.
As part of the initial planning, three participants responded that it was necessary to
acknowledge the differences between the traditional acquisition process and the
evolutionary acquisition process from the start. Both the Government and contractor
personnel must recognize that there will be requirement changes and the high degree of
flexibility required to accommodate these changes. Early and continued involvement by
current and potential suppliers is required for an EA program to be successful. Taking the
evolutionary acquisition approach also requires warfighter buy-in. Convincing the
warfighter to initially accept a 75% to 80% solution may be a significant challenge.
The participants also identified some processes that warrant consideration in the
business-planning phase. Two distinct processes, Cost As an Independent Variable
(CAIV) and Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) were specifically
identified as being useful tools in accommodating an evolutionary acquisition. Both
CAIV and TSPR provide the Government and the contractor flexibility in reaching
program goals. A further explanation of each follows.
Cost As an Independent Variable is a requirements trade-off process that focuses on
cost-performance-schedule trade-offs in setting program goals. CAIV formalizes the
process for cost-performance-schedule trade-offs, and engages the warfighter, the
developer, and the supporter to facilitate meaningful trade-offs to arrive at an affordable
balance among performance and cost. These trade-offs will enable the warfighter to make
choices that will provide the best performance and schedule from the system within
available resources.
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Even though the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. James Roche, announced at the May
2002 Aerospace and Defense Investors Conference that TSPR was dead, programs are
evidently still utilizing the TSPR approach. Under a total system performance
responsibility approach, the contractor assumes responsibility for systems engineering
and life cycle management, functions usually performed by the Government. The benefits
of this arrangement include decreased product delivery time; reduced costs and data,
reduced program office manpower, fewer engineering change proposals, reduced total
ownership cost, and increased product quality and readiness. The Secretary believes that
TSPR abdicates to the contractor the Government’s inherent systems engineering
oversight responsibility. He does, however, support the contractor having Total System
Support Responsibility (TSSR) for life-cycle sustainment support of some programs.
Robust business planning in an evolutionary acquisition environment may not require
any new tools other than what is currently available. Participants from all three Centers
concluded that current acquisition processes could be used to acquire weapon systems
incrementally. These processes included use of engineering change proposals, preplanned product improvement concepts, independent research and development, special
rules for acquiring test and experimental systems, and commercial procedures found in
Part 12 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The key is deciding up front how these
tools will be utilized to acquire systems incrementally.
Pre-contract agreements compliment solid business planning. These agreements can
reduce the amount of time it takes to actually place an item on contract. Prior to receipt of
proposal and official negotiations, pre-agreement on acquisition planning and contract
posturing can be accomplished. This arrangement is essentially a "hand-shake" agreement
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prior to receipt of proposal that describes the task to be accomplished and the number of
hours required to accomplish that task. Then the Government and contractor counterparts
review, discuss, and reach an agreement on the number of hours required. Next the
contractor applies rates to these hours and submits their proposal. There should be “no
surprises” in the proposal and negotiations can be very swift to reach an agreement on
rates, factors, profit or fee and any areas where counterparts could not reach an
agreement. Other examples are long-term pricing agreements and forward pricing rate
agreements, agreements between the Government and the contractor on pricing for
specific elements that make up an acquisition. These elements may include labor rates for
specific skill levels, overhead rates for a specified period of time, and other elements that
can be defined and agreed upon with a great deal of certainty. As a result, proposals
primarily involve negotiation of labor mix and hours. Using a one-pass process,
differences are usually settled and efforts placed on contract quickly once the
requirements are known and funding is provided.
In the private sector, companies are pursuing long-term relationships and agreements
with suppliers to secure needed supplies and services for the long-term, with improved
quality, and reduced costs. These relationships in the private sector are pursued on both
the national and international levels. While current acquisition law, regulation, and
guidance prohibit certain long-term arrangements, it does permit the contracting
professional to be innovative within these constraints.
Two participants submitted an example of working within the constraints of the law.
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) requires that all acquisitions be subject to
full and open competition unless specifically waived. Within this constraint, these two
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participants described how they conducted an up-front competition with the intent to
establish a long-term relationship. The intent and expectations for the long-term
relationships were explicitly stated at the beginning of the competition. Only firms
willing to meet these expectations were permitted to compete. The result of this approach
is the formulation of a long-term relationship that meets the competition constraints.
Successful relationships require a commitment not only on the part of the contractor
but on the part of the Government as well. Participants provided a laundry list of
successful long-term relationship initiatives that were currently being used in their
programs. These initiatives include a results oriented payment procedure, a price-based
acquisition philosophy, an alternative dispute resolution process, a waiver from obtaining
cost and pricing data, specific program pricing models, and other price agreements for
specific items such as spares, technical support, and warranties. The majority of these
efforts are Government initiated and demonstrate the Government’s commitment to the
long-term relationship. Additional efforts such as commitment of funds for specific
production levels and allowing the contractor to capitalize on their strengths may further
facilitate these relationships.
Teaming arrangements can prove beneficial in an EA environment. Teaming is a
business approach that brings together a group of people to achieve a common purpose.
Teaming should not only occur with the contractor but also between programs and
services as appropriate.
Employing the teaming concept within the Government can lead to development of
common items for various services and programs through single process initiatives that
spread the development costs among these elements and thereby lower overall costs of
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each program. Successful teaming can also be accomplished in Joint Program Offices,
where the needs of several services are combined, as is the case with the Joint Strike
Fighter. Under this arrangement the cost of programs can be spread among the services
thereby reducing costs to each service while minimizing overhead.
The Government and the contractor can realize many benefits when teamed together.
Teaming with the contractor can produce time and cost savings. This arrangement
requires a significant level of trust between the parties, leaving behind the “us versus
them” mentality of the past. One promising teaming measure is electronic data sharing.
Electronic data sharing employs computer technology for granting access to the
contractor and the Government to financial, schedule, work-in-progress and planning data
for a program. This approach facilitates immediate access to pertinent data such as cost
and pricing models as well as costs incurred on a real-time basis. Electronic data sharing
streamlines the negotiation process by providing both parties the data required to reach a
fair and reasonable settlement. Teaming and long-term relationships are investigated
further in Round 2(a).
No single contract type can cover the broad requirements of an evolutionary
acquisition. Due to the ever-changing threat and technology environments, contracts
require a high degree of flexibility to adapt to this environment. Different levels of
associated risk and uncertainty may dictate utilizing different contract types line items
within a contract. Some of the participants identified overarching and omnibus contracts
as potential solutions for accommodating EA. Omnibus contracts are multiple award,
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts with a broad scope and are awarded for
multiple years with large ceilings. Overarching contracts are similar broadly scoped
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contracts that employ multiple contract types, each associated with a different contract
line item. These broad arrangements incorporate time and materials, cost plus award fee,
cost plus fixed fee, firm fixed price, and fixed price award fee types underneath one
umbrella contract. Both contract arrangements are hybrid indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity contracts that provide flexibility in quantity and schedule.
Depending on the requirement, it may also prove beneficial to have individual
contracts with a limited scope. One contract type that provides significant flexibility for
interim work is a Fixed Price Labor Hour contract. A Fixed Price Labor Hour contract
can accommodate post development spirals where cost contracts are impossible or
impractical. This arrangement provides for reimbursement of the fixed price rate for each
labor hour expended in specific labor categories. Another contract arrangement that
shows promise is a primarily Cost-Plus-Award Fee contract that allows for issuance of
technical task directives. The technical task directive defines specific technical tasks,
such as automation requirements for specific software applications, to be performed by
the contractor. Through a contract modification, the contractor is directed to perform a
specific numbered task that is already incorporated into the contract as part of an
attachment. These directives provide flexibility and quick contract modification when
requirements change or subsequent increments of capability need to be placed on contract
in a short period of time.
Incentive arrangements are appropriate when key elements of performance are
susceptible to qualitative measurement and subject to possible change over time.
Incentives permit the Government to reward contractors for exceptional performance and
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incentivize contractors to improve poor performance. It is up to the acquisition team to
determine the best incentives, if any, for a given acquisition.
In an evolutionary acquisition, long-term teaming may be an important element to
incentivize. At the Electronic Systems Center, the acquisition team has chosen to do just
that through a Cost-Plus-Award Fee contract with a base fee and teaming fee broken out
by fiscal year and obligated at the beginning of each fiscal year. This teaming fee is
subject to semi-annual reviews that provide feedback to the contractors relative to
teaming effectiveness. These reviews are accomplished prior to the release of the teaming
dollars for the fiscal year. The contractor in this situation is incentivized to take certain
actions that facilitate joint planning, cooperation, and communication. Failure to take
such action results in loss of the teaming fee. The Teaming Fee application and specifics
are investigated further in Round 2(c).
Cross-Center Comparison. Significant similarities exist between the Centers
concerning constraints. Members from all three Centers agreed that competition
requirements presented some roadblocks that were either time consuming or arduous to
overcome. Also, all Centers, in one form or the other, submitted that the existing
regulations and processes failed to adequately accommodate the move toward EA. These
regulations and processes included the Defense and Air Force Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplements, small business requirements and the contract review process.
Participants from all three Centers mentioned flexibility as a key component in an EA
strategy. Robust business planning and advance agreements between the contractor and
Government facilitate this flexibility. There is also general agreement that the contracting
strategy must be tailored to the specific acquisition. The Air Armament Center and
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Electronic Systems Center participants stressed the importance of teaming and partnering
with the contractor. The Air Armament Center accommodates this partnering through
long-term relationships while the Electronic Systems Center encourages teaming through
use of contractual incentives. Participants from all three Centers are using current
contract types to accommodate EA.
Delphi Round 2
Evaluation of Round 1 responses revealed that flexibility was a key factor to consider
when establishing contracting or business arrangements in an EA environment. The
validity of the “newness” of evolutionary acquisition processes was also questioned. Two
questions, identical for each Center, were asked to further investigate these constructs.
Additionally, each participant was asked a set of questions to further investigate concepts
revealed in Round 1 for their respective Center. These discussions were conducted in
Round 2a for AAC, Round 2b for ASC, and Round 2c for ESC.
Flexible Contract Arrangements. Flexibility was submitted as a requirement for
successful implementation of EA. If unconstrained by any other requirements and starting
with a clean sheet of paper, can you think of a totally new contract arrangement that will
facilitate flexibility? What are the advantages/disadvantages of your arrangement?
The Round 1 responses from all Centers revealed that the current regulations and
processes did not adequately accommodate the implementation of the EA edict. I asked
this question to discover what creative ways, if any, that the contracting professional may
consider in an EA environment. In addition, the responses may provide preliminary
insight on which regulations and processes are stifling the contracting process. This
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question was posed to all participants to gain a more complete understanding of the
approaches being taken across the Centers.
No “new” contract type or arrangement was identified in the responses to this
question. The general consensus was that current contract types could be used to meet the
objectives of an EA program. No “silver bullet” contract arrangement exists that meets all
the requirements of every EA program. Contracts must be tailored to the specific
acquisition. It is important to focus on the overall requirements of the program and then
decide on the contract arrangement that best fulfills those requirements.
Even though a new contract type may not be deemed necessary to accommodate EA, a
new approach in using the current contract types may prove beneficial. Thorough
planning must be accomplished concerning quantities, configuration, performance,
schedule, and production lots. Pre-contract partnering agreements with industry based
upon professional association recommendations may help solve problems up front before
the acquisition actually starts. Pre-agreement on labor hours, skill mix, and other items
that do not infringe upon statutory rules and appropriation law may also aid in reducing
the acquisition lead times.
The acquisition team may be forced to “rethink” how they contract for items. This
may involve teaming with the contractor and actually permitting the contractor to drive
the technology and performance criteria. The contractor should be fully empowered to
leverage their strengths instead of being dictated the appropriate course of action to take
when it makes sense. Team and personal incentives can be incorporated to motivate
contractor performance in key areas. An additional incentive based upon the end users
performance assessment may also warrant consideration.
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Another aspect that must be given more attention is total life cycle costs and program
results. The acquisition team must consider the effects that all parts of the system, both
known and unknown, have on life cycle cost and performance. The contract arrangement
must be evaluated against how well it helps meet the needs of the warfighter.
Consideration should be given to incorporating full warranty provisions that cover the
entire system for an extended period of time to reduce sustainment costs. Longer contract
performance periods of 10 to 15 years may further facilitate the management of total
system life cycle costs.
Two members submitted broader use of Other Transaction Authority. Other
Transactions for prototype projects provides the flexibility to depart from procurement
contracts imposed by statute or regulation and can help integrate the government and
commercial industry. Other Transactions for prototypes are based on commercial
practices and as such, are not required to comply with the Federal Acquisition Regulation
or any of its supplements, or those laws and regulations that are limited to procurement
contracts, e.g. Truth in Negotiations Act and Cost Accounting Standards. The major
drawback is that this authority is strictly limited to prototype projects and not granted to
even low rate initial production.
Individual Perspectives of Evolutionary Acquisition. We can trace EA back at least to
1993, and there have been comments that EA is just new packaging for an old idea. Do
you agree? If so, how will you accommodate incremental development in your contracts?
If not, what new ways will you use to contractually implement the EA emphasis?
During Round 1 it was suggested that EA was nothing more than a new package for
all the old processes. The majority of the participants in Round 1 did not directly express
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this viewpoint, however, responses indicated that this might be the case. I asked this
question to determine whether this is a lone sentiment or a more broadly held view.
Six of the fifteen participants submitted that EA is nothing new other than
accomplishing incremental development on purpose rather than by default. A wellworded acquisition plan that is prepared well in advance using the tools that we have will
still get the job done. Incremental development could be accommodated through use of
sound business planning and a high degree of common sense. Planning for phases or
including new technology when it becomes available can be accomplished by adding
scope.
Under one participant’s contract, they are using a combination of currently available
tools to introduce new configurations or new technology. These include using preplanned product improvement to incorporate new technology into the Firm Fixed Price
production contract; using pricing models; employing the Cost As an Independent
Variable approach; transitioning cost based development contracts into fixed price
production contracts; and using price based analysis to achieve a price without the use of
cost and pricing data.
Three of the remaining nine participants offered that EA does have its roots in and
some of the same characteristics of previous ideas like Preplanned Product Improvement
and phased technical approaches, but that it is not the same thing. One of these
participants added that if this were an old practice then we would not be having as much
trouble with the user regarding the concept of delivering something less than the 100%
solution to the field. An important distinction provided was the necessity to accommodate

57

upfront recognition and agreement and planning of future requirement changes that occur
over the life of the system.
Those that disagreed with the statement submitted that EA was giving the Government
the opportunity to lean forward and apply new ideas to the existing tools that are out
there. EA will involve getting people to think outside the box when implementing those
changes. Freezing of requirements at a point in time, a predictable stream of funds, and
some assurance that funds will be available for future increments were all submitted as
major improvements to the present acquisition processes.
Incremental development will be accommodated by first having incremental tasks that
are clearly defined and severable that can be implemented either in serial or parallel
tasks. These tasks can be defined in a technical requirements document that describes the
system specific technical aspects and is incorporated as an attachment to the contract.
Specific spiral or increment delivery dates may be included in the delivery schedule in
the contract.
AAC Specific Questions for Round 2(a). During the discussions conducted during
Round 1, it became apparent that long-term relationships and long-term pricing
arrangements were being used extensively at the Air Armament Center. Long-term
relationships and pricing agreements must be structured to comply with statutory and
regulatory requirements. I asked the following four questions to discover the specifics of
these relationships and agreements and to provide the reader a preliminary roadmap for
establishing such arrangements.
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Elements of a Long-Term Relationship. The panel generally agreed that long-term
relationships are required for success in an EA environment. What are the top three
things that you would include as part of this relationship and how would you implement
these relationships contractually?
Teamwork and trust are essential in the long-term relationship. The ultimate goal is to
establish a seamless integrated product team of both Government and Contractor
personnel where the lines between the two are blurred. Teamwork and trust may be
accomplished through the sharing of a long-term vision between the Government and the
contractor and agreement on the goals and strategies to make this vision a reality. Stable
funding will further enhance trust in the relationship. Teamwork and trust can only be
accomplished through a top down approach, with all the members of the team committed
to developing the relationship.
Flexibility was again suggested as important. The long-term agreement must be
flexible in both format and structure to meet the needs of all parties. Flexibility could be
enhanced through the establishment of performance based technical documents that
describe the acquisition philosophy and the entire system requirements and also through
some sort of advance or long-term pricing agreement.
Successful long-term relationship must also include incentives to industry. These
incentives are intended to be both positive and negative. The positive incentives reward a
contractor for cost saving and quality improvement through increased profitability and
reduced Government oversight. Negative incentives are tied to performance measures
under the contractor’s control and place the responsibility for meeting the performance
measures strictly on the contractor. A major incentive currently being used, but not
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favored by Secretary Roche, is Total System Performance Responsibility, which permits
more contractor control, configuration management responsibility, self-governance,
reduced government oversight, price based acquisition, and reduced data requirements.
These incentives are best implemented through a special contract clause that specifically
outlines the incentives and penalties associated with each performance measure.
Long-Term Relationship Decision Criteria. In addition to the top three things you
would include in these long-term relationships, how would you decide whom to establish
a long-term relationship with? How would ensure compliance with the Competition in
Contracting Act? What are your selection criteria/thresholds? Who would approve the
selection/arrangement?
Long-term relationships should not be established with every supplier. All five
members agreed that the best way to decide whom to establish long-term agreements
with was through initial competition. The initial competition would fulfill the
requirements of the Competition in Contracting Act. Being up front with the long-term
relationship intentions in the solicitation was necessary to form these relationships and
ensure proper competition.
Past Performance was offered as a key selection criterion. Four of five participants
submitted that the proposal that represented the best value for the Government in the
particular relationship would carry the greatest weight. Information gathered through
market research may also aid the selection process
Four of the five participants submitted that the approval authority for such an
arrangement should be the Source Selection Authority. The Source Selection Authority is
the individual responsible for determining who will ultimately receive a contract award.
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The remaining participant suggested using current Federal Acquisition Regulation
guidelines in determining who would be ultimately responsible. The decision authority
under these guidelines is based upon the dollar value of the acquisition.
Long-Term Pricing Arrangement Specifics. Three participants observed that LongTerm Pricing Agreements should be included in an EA strategy. What specific pricing
elements (labor, material, etc.) would you include in these arrangements and why? Which
ones would you not include and why? How would you negotiate such an arrangement?
Who would be responsible for maintaining the arrangement?
It is nearly impossible to negotiate all pricing elements for future increments when the
technology has yet to evolve. All five participants agreed that the long term pricing
agreement should include all cost elements that are finite and known at the time of the
agreement. These elements should include only those costs that are in the contractor’s
control. The pricing agreement should be flexible enough to include an agreement on the
inflation and other indexes that may affect the submitted prices. If accomplished in this
fashion, the agreement remains flexible enough to accommodate any changes since the
element of change has already been defined and agreed to.
Four of the five participants agreed that the long term pricing agreements should be
established through competition, however no specifics were given concerning how this
competition would be accomplished. Success of these arrangements hinges on openness
and honesty of both parties while using an open books approach. This approach permits
both the Government and contractor access to all the relevant data necessary to get to a
bottom line number that is acceptable to both sides.
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The group proposed that the maintenance of a pricing agreement would be the
responsibility of both the Government and the Contractor. Specifically, the Government
financial manager and the equivalent contractor counterpart would take the lead in this
area. Additional monitoring responsibility should fall to the procuring contracting officer
since he contractually incorporates the agreement.
Class Justification and Approval Specifics. One participant suggested obtaining a class
justification and approval for all production, sustainment, and development of a system
for a period of years. Would this work for your program? Why or why not? What are the
advantages and disadvantages of a class justification and approval? When would you
pursue this course of action and who would initiate it? How would the 50/50 law for
sustainment be addressed?
In certain instances, the contracting officer may find that only one responsible source
is available to provide a specific system. Two main reasons for soliciting only one source
are when it is likely that award to any other source would result in substantial duplication
of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition, or
unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency's requirements. In accordance with the
Federal Acquisition Regulation, a clear justification, explaining why competition is not
being sought, is required. A specific management level, determined by the dollar amount
of the acquisition, must approve this justification. Whenever a justification is made and
approved on a class basis, the contracting officer must ensure that each contract action
taken pursuant to the authority of the class justification and approval is within the scope
of the class justification and approval and shall document the contract file for each
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contract action accordingly. The class justification and approval, if written correctly, is
basically a blanket waiver for acquiring an entire system without competition.
Three of the five members suggested that this blanket waiver would work for most
major programs if it were broadly written to accommodate all anticipated aspects of a
program. A blanket waiver would be most effective when you have a large number of
like requirements or related requirements that will be purchased from a single supplier.
This blanket waiver would eliminate many of the delays associated with the Government
review and approval process. Further, the waiver would secure the sole source authority
for the program and simplify the approval and review process for the entire program.
The pursuance of a class justification and approval can be a lengthy and frustrating
process. Individual members submitted three disadvantages to a class justification and
approval. First, the combining of items under a class justification and approval may place
the program into a higher approval threshold and thus require another layer of review.
Second, this blanket waiver may limit competition and actually reduce the supply base.
Third, this waiver, in some instances, may reduce Government oversight and visibility
into cost and pricing data.
The Government team should initiate the class justification and approval process.
Specifically, the initiation should be a collaborative effort between contracting, the
integrated product team and the program manager during the acquisition planning stage
when limited or no competition is anticipated. The contracting officer should be
responsible for ensuring that all the requirements for the justification and approval are
met.

63

The management of system sustainment may become an issue when a class
justification and approval is pursued. Title 10 United States Code 2464 and 2466 (50/50
Rule) stipulates that no more than fifty percent of the funds managed by the Department
of Defense for depot (major overhaul) maintenance can be used for contractor depot
maintenance. One participant proposed that we are stuck with the 50/50 rule and would
just have to live with it. Early industry involvement may provide alternative solutions for
this sustainment issue.
One such alternative solution for addressing the requirements of the 50/50 Rule is an
all-inclusive warranty provided by the contractor. Two of the four participants suggested
including warranty of the product in the contract price. Sustainment is thereby minimized
and no 50/50 issues should arise. This warranty solution hinged upon the contractor
producing a quality product that meets the system specification and subsequent
fulfillment of the warranty obligations.
Another participant submitted that the current 50/50 rule is under discussion in
Congress but that his program operated under the Source of Repair Assignment Process
decision. This process assigned the specific components that would be repaired by the
Government and those that would be repaired by the contractor. The participant
submitted that without this decision, a waiver or exemption would have to be pursued or
a joint agreement would have to be reached defining those items that would be best
incorporated under contractor repair.
ASC Specific Questions for Round 2(b). Evaluation of the Round 1 discussion with
the participants at ASC revealed a couple key areas that required further investigation:
the impact of the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement rewrite and the
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application of both single and multiple award indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity
contracts. Three questions related to these areas and their subsequent responses follow.
Impact of the AFFARS Rewrite. What potential impacts will the Air Force Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (June 2002) rewrite have on your program? (Air
Force Federal Acquisition Regulation site link: http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffar1.htm).
In Round 1, the participants from ASC identified the requirements of the Air Force
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) as a constraint in implementing
an EA strategy. Subsequently, after the Round 1 responses were received, a significant
rewrite of the AFFARS was released. I asked this question to discover the impacts of the
rewrite and how the rewrite might have affected individual programs.
One of the significant impacts of the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement rewrite is the delegation of the Program Executive Officer /Designated
Acquisition Commander as the Head of Contracting Activity for Program Executive
Officer /Designated Acquisition Commander designated programs. The Program
Executive Officer is a flag rank military or civilian equivalent official who has primary
responsibility for directing several major acquisition programs and for assigned major
system and non-major system acquisition programs. The Air Force Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement rewrite resulted in less oversight on Program Executive Officer
/Designated Acquisition Commander designated programs and delegates authority to the
Program Executive Officer /Designated Acquisition Commander to establish the
thresholds and procedures for contract review and clearance. One member submitted that
they have already seen the delegation of authority for items such as Acquisition Strategy

65

Panel, Single Acquisition Management Plan, and undefinitzed contracting actions while
the justification and approval authority delegation remained unchanged.
A laundry list of literally hundreds of request for proposal and contract clauses has
been removed. The Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement no longer
specifies processes. Each program is now allowed to establish its own processes and
write unique clauses as needed.
On the downside, one member submitted that the rewrite only changes whom he is
required to brief and may only save a couple of days in the process. This member also
proposed that significant timesavings might only be achieved by focusing on the
requirements side of the acquisition cycle. Two other participants stated that the Air
Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement rewrite would have no impact on their
respective programs. This may be because of their involvement in classified programs.
Single Award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contract Specifics. Under what
conditions/circumstances would a single award indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity
contract arrangement benefit an EA strategy? How would you structure/price for future
increments under this arrangement?
Single award indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts are currently being used
for development through production. Many of these contracts are from 10 to 15 years in
length. Efforts currently under this contract arrangement include Interim Contractor
Support, Contractor Logistics Support, maintenance, and modifications. One member
submitted that this contract arrangement would not be appropriate in a program where
engineering, manufacturing, development, and production ran concurrently. This single
source arrangement is best suited where only one contractor can reasonably perform the
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work because of the uniqueness or highly specialized work or the tasks are so intricately
related that seeking competition would be considered unreasonable.
The second part of the question addresses how future increments would be
priced/structured in this arrangement. Flexibility was a common theme for four members.
The key was tailoring the pricing arrangement and contract structure to the particular
acquisition without locking in those items that were either unknown or not completely
defined. This could be accomplished by negotiating labor rates and skill mix; basing
future increments on the success of current increments; and structuring the contract to fit
the type of effort for each delivery order. Even though indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity contracts typically should have a priced effort, the current movement is to
reserve contract line items for future effort with either established ceiling prices or no
price limit at all.
Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contract Specifics. Under
what conditions/circumstances would a multiple award indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity contract arrangement benefit an EA strategy? How would you structure/price for
future increments under this arrangement?
It was unclear under what circumstances a multiple award indefinite delivery/
indefinite quantity contract arrangement would be the best choice. Two of the
participants were only familiar with sole source or single award indefinite delivery/
indefinite quantity contracts and could not think of a situation where this arrangement
might be appropriate. With the tight defense budget, a participant proposed that it was
highly unlikely that multiple sources could be afforded simultaneous funding.

67

Three of the participants did submit the multiple award arrangement would require
well-planned increments that are clearly defined and priced if possible. Tasks or
increments must be easily separated so that they can then be incorporated into a master
plan that defines the specifics to be delivered or the tasks to be performed under each
delivery order. A multiple award arrangement could expand the supplier base, increase
competition, lead to shorter performance periods and create program flexibility.
ESC Specific Questions for Round 2(c). Evaluation of the Round 1 discussion with the
participants at ESC revealed that further discussion was required in the areas of definition
and incorporation of increments in the contractual document, the teaming award fee
arrangement, and accommodating the requirements of the Competition in Contracting
Act. A series of four questions directly related to these discussion areas and their
subsequent responses follows.
The Increment Definition Process. The definition of increments or spirals was raised
as a concern in the EA arrangement. What processes/approach do you take to define each
increment? Who is involved in these processes? How do you define future increments for
unknown capabilities? At what point are these future increments definitions refined
further?
No single approach emerged as the best way to define increments. It was generally
agreed that increment definition should be accomplished up front as much as possible.
This definition process involves agreement on the time and method to follow along the
way. The approach must clearly define the beginning and ending points for each
increment and result in a well defined deliverable.
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Using a contract line item structure to define the first increment and then incorporating
options to accommodate future increments may accomplish increment definition.
Participants suggested that a Spiral Development Integrated Process Team could best
define each increment. In a competitive acquisition however, this responsibility fell on
the contractor through submittal of an increment plan during the bidding process.
The increment definition process may involve anyone in the acquisition team from the
end user to the contractor. A team approach tailored to the specific acquisition may make
the most sense. Under this approach, common sense dictates whether the program offices,
end users, or the contractor are the major players in defining the program increments.
Unknown capabilities pose their own set of unique challenges in the refinement of
future increments. These unique challenges require ongoing discussion between the
program office, user and contractor, as well as amendment of the Acquisition Plan,
contract, and funding as necessary to incorporate these increments. Increased reliance
may be placed on the requirements definition, risk analysis, and market research
processes. Tradeoffs may have to be made through the Cost As an Independent Variable
process. This process involves utilizing a capabilities matrix to determine tradeoffs
without affecting cost and setting key performance parameters based upon these
tradeoffs.
Contractual Inclusion of Increments. How do/would you incorporate all increments in
a contractual document? How would this appear in the contract document (contract line
item, clause, attachment, etc.)?
In order to place anything on contract it is necessary to be able to describe the
deliverable with a reasonable amount of clarity to ensure contract requirements are met.
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Difficulties may arise in trying to accomplish this task for unknown future increments.
The responses indicate that the documentation necessary to incorporate increments could
be included in the contract line item structure, as an attachment or by utilizing a special
contract clause. The incorporation method would be tailored to the specific requirement.
For example, the evolutionary acquisition plan and the technical requirements document
could both be incorporated as attachments to the contract; individual contract line items
could be developed to reflect and clearly define deliverables; and specific delivery dates
for the increments could be included in Section F of the contract.
Applicability of the Teaming Fee Arrangement. One participant presented the use of a
unique award fee plan that included a Teaming Fee. Would this arrangement work for
your acquisition? Why or why not? How would you define the evaluation criteria for
such an arrangement? Who would determine, evaluate, and approve these criteria?
In Round 1, a unique teaming arrangement was presented that incentivized the
contractor for how well they met the teaming expectations of the Government. Even
though the teaming fee arrangement is currently working well it has a way to go before
being deemed fully successful. Participants were not sure if this arrangement would work
or even be necessary in their respective programs.
This teaming award fee arrangement has worked in the both sole source and long-term
support and maintenance contracts for major systems. In the sole source situation,
however, the contractor may have heavily influenced the evaluation criteria. This
arrangement might also be considered for use in a fly-off or down select situation where
various teams are competing for the development effort.
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There was a group consensus that the acquisition team should define and evaluate the
criteria and might, in certain instances, partner with the contractor to accomplish this
task. Approval of these criteria should be the responsibility of the fee determining official
who is also ultimately responsible for reviewing the recommendation of the award fee
review board, considering all pertinent data, and determining the earned award fee
amount for each evaluation period.
A wide variety of evaluation criteria responses were received. The evaluation criteria
should include incentives for the contractor to work cooperatively with the Government
as a team. This is a subjective process that involves defining areas of risk that might be
mitigated by the inclusion of an appropriate incentive; formulating an esoteric
arrangement contingent upon legally binding arrangements and partnerships between the
contractor team and the Government acquisition strategy team; and defining the
importance of events that drive the award fee.
Accommodating Competition in Contracting Act Requirements. Two participants
observed that the Competition in Contracting Act was a constraint in an EA arrangement.
Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Why? How do/would you overcome the
Competition in Contracting Act requirements? Have you been successful in doing so?
The requirements of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) can be a constraint in
an EA environment, yet can be overcome through up-front planning. Acquisition teams
must start planning early and obtain buy-in from relevant stakeholders. Clearly
documenting the EA approach in the acquisition strategy panel, single acquisition
management plan, and contractual document may eliminate questions that arise about recompeting after each spiral or increment. Spirals (increments) must be clearly defined up
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front and competed as appropriate. In sole source situations this involves using the
justification and approval process.

Summary
This chapter described the qualitative data created through the Delphi discussion
conducted throughout this study. Each question asked of the expert panels was presented
along with a description of the responses provided by the participants. This chapter also
discussed my preliminary conclusions as the discussion process progressed. The next
chapter will discuss the overall conclusions drawn from the research.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Overview
This chapter concludes the research report by addressing and answering the research
questions presented in Chapter I, making recommendations based upon those answers,
and finally, discussing the limitations of this study and suggesting future research.

Conclusions
Research Question 1. What are the actual and perceived regulatory and procedural
roadblocks that are a result of the implementation of an EA strategy?
There was a general consensus across the panel members that funding, competition,
and small business laws and regulations as well as other outdated regulations and
processes pose significant challenges to the acquisition team implementing EA strategies.
The acquisition funding process places significant roadblocks in the way of the
acquisition team attempting to implement an EA strategy. Acquisition team members are
forced to deal with several different appropriations, and subdivisions of those
appropriations, within one contract. The program office cannot easily manage funds since
they ultimately have little control over the amount and timeliness of these funds.
Approved funding levels often fail to match the levels needed to sustain economical
production numbers. Congressional oversight places additional reporting burdens on the
acquisition team. These roadblocks are not easily overcome and often dictate the
requirement instead of the requirement dictating the funding level.
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Statutory requirements such as the Competition in Contracting Act and Small
Business Act also place additional reporting and coordination requirements on the
acquisition team. Proactive business planning can prevent these statutory requirements
from becoming a burden to the acquisition professional. This requires the entire
acquisition team to fully address competition, small business, and other requirements
early in the acquisition planning process in order to reduce the impact on acquisition lead
times.
The main roadblock identified from this research study is not one single event, but
rather a combination of Government processes that fail to add significant value to the
overall acquisition process. Regulations are often outdated and fail to adequately address
the latest acquisition practices. In turn, team members from the buyer to the reviewer are
forced to contend with meeting the requirements imposed by these outdated regulations.
In order to effectively implement EA, the Government must ensure that its practices and
processes, to include regulatory guidance, reflect the intent of the preference for EA
strategies. All acquisition processes should be tailored to accommodate this preference
instead of the EA strategies being tailored to our current processes.
Research Question 2. What innovative solutions are being implemented that minimize
the effects of these challenges?
A general consensus across the panel members was that proactive and innovative
business planning by the program team coupled with a long-term partnership with
industry helps to successfully implement EA strategies.
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Contracting professionals are placing increased emphasis on proactive business
planning. Being proactive requires the team to look beyond the next event. Proactivity
requires the team to view how all required actions affect the acquisition and how to
minimize the effects of these actions. Participants from all Centers reported how they are
currently tailoring their processes to accommodate EA strategies. In addition, the
acquisition teams are also implementing new processes that seem to be a good fit in the
EA environment.
Long-term relationships and pricing agreements are being established to accelerate the
acquisition process and aid in planning. Negotiations are shortened through use of preagreements on skill mix, labor hours, and rates and factors. Competition waivers are
being pursued for entire systems when it makes sense to do so. Adversarial relationships
between the Government and contractor teams are being transformed into teaming
relationships to further accelerate the acquisition process. Individually, each of the
aforementioned actions, only provide limited relief; combined they may provide the
solution to many of our problems.
Research Question 3. What contracting/business arrangements best support
implementation of evolutionary acquisition?
There was a general consensus across the panel members that no single contracting
type, action, or business arrangement emerged as the solution to implementing EA nor
are any radical new arrangements required. A combination of common sense, ingenuity,
and use of current contract arrangements and tools seem to be the necessary resources to
successfully implement an EA strategy. Each contract or business arrangement must be

75

tailored to the specific acquisition. Any attempt to apply a specific arrangement across a
broad range of programs and acquisition situations will likely prove to be
counterproductive.
Focus should be placed on how to best utilize current contract types. One area that
may produce significant results is incentives. Acquisition teams are in the very early
stages of discovering how to best incentivize contractor performance in an EA
environment. Increased attention must be placed on areas where the Government should
reward performance above the contract requirements and where we should reward the
contractor for being more proactive. Incentives should reflect value-added performance
or features that accelerate capability to our warfighters.
Once these areas have been identified, incentives then should be tailored to best
motivate the desired contractor performance. These incentives should be tied to areas of
cost savings, product improvement, increase in delivery quantity, and decrease in
delivery cycle time. Further areas for consideration are performance-based cash flows,
prize contracts, and share-in-savings incentives (Development of Innovative Contract
Incentives 2000).
We may need to go no further than the first aviation contract established with the
Wright Brothers on February 10, 1908. Paragraph 4 of this contract laid out the incentive
in a very understandable format as follows:
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“The flying machine should be designed to have a speed of at least forty miles per hour in
still air, but bidders must submit quotations in their proposals for cost depending upon the
speed attained during the trial flight, according to the following scale:
40 miles per hour, 100 per cent.
39 miles per hour, 90 per cent
38 miles per hour, 80 per cent.
37 miles per hour, 70 per cent.
36 miles per hour, 60 per cent.
Less than 36 miles per hour rejected.
41 miles per hour, 110 per cent.
42 miles per hour, 120 per cent.
42 miles per hour, 130 per cent.
43 miles per hour, 140 per cent.
44 miles per hour, 150 per cent.”
(Edwards 2002).
It may be beneficial for the acquisition community to learn from our acquisition past in
order to accommodate our current and future initiatives.

Recommendations
Common sense must dictate the actions taken during any acquisition. Long-term
relationships should be pursued with suppliers when it makes sense to do and is permitted
under the law. Contractors should be incentivized only for performance and actions that
are worth paying extra for. Performance incentives could motivate the contractor to
accelerate technology if structured correctly. The Government on the other hand, must be
willing to pay the contractor for the extra effort and not hinder the contractor from
achieving these higher performance goals.
Careful consideration must be given in developing any acquisition plan. A systems
engineering approach that considers all aspects of the acquisition from the beginning to
the end must be employed up front to reduce the impact on total life cycle costs and
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acquisition lead times. Early contractor involvement will aid in the planning phase.
Contractors should be included in all aspects of planning that are not directly related to
source selection decisions.
The acquisition professional will require a new set of skills. Team members must train
themselves to look outside their areas of expertise and take on a full systems view of the
acquisition. Decisions must be weighed against the impact they have on the entire
program rather than on the individual action. Contracting professionals must not only be
proficient and innovative at formulating contracts, but also at being effective business
advisors for the acquisition team.
Finally, as stated previously, we cannot forget the lessons learned from our past. The
Government has been reforming the acquisition process since the day the first Army
Quartermaster placed his order for muskets and gunpowder. The Government must take a
closer look at acquisition practices of the past. Not all was bad, in fact, some of the old
practices, if reintroduced today, may seem like the latest innovations. There is a lot to
learn from what we have already accomplished. The push for new must have the solid
foundation built in the past.

Limitations
This study only examined a relatively small cross section of Air Force acquisition
programs, consisting of a total of 18 participants from the Air Force Materiel Command
Product Centers and was conducted under strict time constraints. This research was based
on the relevant literature pertaining to the subject and conducted in accordance with the
principles of the selected method; the study does suffer from some limitations.
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The method, used to create the data for analysis in this study, required participants to
remain anonymous throughout the study. This method also limited the size of the
discussion groups in order to facilitate meaningful discussion. It appears however, that
determining sample size is not a cut-and-dried procedure. Despite a large amount of
literature on the topic, sample size determination involves seemingly in all cases an
element of informed judgment (Hill 1998). In this case, the sample size was determined
to be sufficient based upon the amount of agreement reached across all participants. The
results of this study have a limited external validity and any conclusions can only be
drawn within the panel of experts surveyed. The results of this study cannot be stated to
represent the opinion of all experts in the contracting career field.
Finally, it became apparent at different points during the discussions that the
experience level and familiarity with EA strategies affected the responses provided.
Evolutionary acquisition has not been widely implemented across the Air Force. The
respondents’ limited exposure to the processes necessary to effectively implement EA
may have directly affected their ability to share a specific lesson learned.

Recommendations for Future Research
The questions submitted to the experts in this study often generated more information
than could possibly be examined in one research study. This study identified processes
that individual programs are currently using to accommodate EA. These processes were
not investigated in-depth and require follow-up to determine the specific elements of each
of these processes that may be applicable across a broad range of programs. The
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limitations of this study and the responses generated from this study, led to the following
recommendations for future research:
The evolutionary acquisition approach requires the contracting professional to find
innovative ways to acquire systems in an incremental fashion in less time. Finding these
innovative solutions cannot be accomplished in a vacuum. It is recommended that future
research be conducted to determine what would motivate contractor performance and to
gain a further understanding of the demands that Government procurement regulations
place on the contractor. This research may best be accomplished through gathering input
directly from the contractors or trade associations and utilizing that input to tailor
Government processes where possible.
This study focused on the opinions of a few, albeit highly qualified, individuals
concerning the implementation of EA strategies. This study focused on the Air Force
Materiel Command Centers. All Department of Defense agencies are attempting to
streamline their acquisition processes, some more successfully than others. It would be
beneficial for future research to explore how the other services utilize innovative
techniques and processes, if any, to contractually implement evolutionary acquisition
strategies. Future research may determine that each Service may have best practices that
could be more broadly applied across the Department of Defense.
A final recommendation for future research born out of this study concerns the
difficulties created by outdated regulation and guidance. Once the Department of Defense
5000 (DoD 5000) Series and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions
(CJCSIs) regarding acquisition procedures have been revised and published to reflect the
evolutionary acquisition strategies, it is recommended that future study be conducted to
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determine which internal processes will require revision to comply with this guidance and
to identify areas requiring further revision to accommodate EA strategies.

Summary
This chapter discussed the conclusions drawn from the research described in the four
previous chapters, provided recommendations based on those conclusions, and offered
suggestions for future research on the subject.
Evolutionary acquisition techniques provide the framework for acquiring systems in
an incremental fashion while delivering warfighting capability to the end user in a shorter
period of time. These techniques are new to the acquisition team and require the
employment of robust business planning and flexible and innovative business
arrangements to make these techniques work. Challenges are being experienced in
implementing evolutionary acquisition, however, acquisition professionals are finding
innovative ways to use existing tools to overcome these challenges. Future studies are
required to ensure that these innovative practices are captured and shared across the
Department of Defense and that our regulations and business practices support the
implementation of evolutionary acquisition strategies.
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Appendix A: Expert Panel Membership

Air Armament Center (AAC)
1. Ms. Jeff Duval, GS-13
AAC/YV; Procuring Contracting Officer
2. Mr. Ronald Foskey, GS-13
AAC/AE; Source Selection Officer
3. Ms. Bridget L. Tuominen, GS-13
AAC/YAK; Procuring Contracting Officer
4. Mr. Jeffrey Cox, GS-12
AAC/WMGK; Contracting Officer
5. MSgt. Tony D. Roy Jr.
AAC/WMOK; Contracting Officer
Electronic Systems Center (ESC)
1. Ms. Sharlene Begley, GS-13
ESC/JSK; Contracting Officer
2. Ms. Claire R. Litalien, GS-13
ESC/SRK; Procuring Contracting Officer
3. Mr. Paul Canham, GS-13
ESC/ACK; Procuring Contracting Officer
4. Mr. Joe Zimmerman, GS-13
ESC/JSK; Contracting Officer
5. Anonymous, GS-13
6. Ms. Lisa Clark, GS-14
BMC3 Capabilities Systems, Director of Contracting
7. Mr. Bill Donaldson, GS-13
ESC/MCK; Procuring Contracting Officer
8. Ms. Elise Locker, Contractor BAE Systems
ESC/AWPC; AWACS Block 40/45 Program
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Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC)
1. Mr. Tony Armes, GS-13
ASC/YSKD; Procuring Contracting Officer
2. Mr. John Brannan, GS-14
ASC/PKC; Procurement Analyst
3. Mrs. Elizabeth Z. Gillespie, GS-13
ASC/RAKVG; Contracting Officer
4. Ms. Sue L. Tormey, GS-13
ASC/PKC; Contract Support Analyst
5. Mr. Kevin Vangsness, GS-14
ASC/FBX; Procuring Contracting Officer
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Appendix B: E-mail of Initial Information and
Delphi Round 1 Questionnaire to Participants

To: <Participant E-mail Address>
Subject: Thesis Participation Study

<Participant Name>,
I'm Lt. Gary Wellman at the AFIT Graduate School. I am conducting my thesis on
Contracting Issues Associated with the Implementation of Evolutionary Acquisition
Practices. The information gathered during this study will not only be used to complete
my thesis requirement but also in the development of a contracting specific EA course
that I will be teaching after graduation in March 03. Your participation will help
formulate the foundation of this lesson and provide a practical lessons learned to the
entire Air Force contracting community. I am being graciously sponsored by Col.
Parsons, AFMC/PK for this effort. Col. Parsons agrees that developing a roadmap for
implementation of EA in a contracting environment is extremely important.
Thank you for volunteering to participate as a panel member for my thesis research.
During the next couple of weeks, the group from <Center Name> will delve into the
contracting issues associated with implementing Evolutionary Acquisition. During this
time, I will act as a facilitator for the discussion as well as providing feedback and
steering questions for the group. The group members will remain anonymous and this is
considered a non-attributive environment. I will be as responsive as I can with feedback
from the group in order to keep the group discussion progressing. I realize this imposes
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additional time on your part and I thank you in advance for your timely responses to the
posed questions.
The study will continue until a group consensus is met on the pertinent contracting
issues associated with EA. If you have any questions along the way or need additional
time to formulate your response, please e-mail me so I can make changes as needed.
Please respond via e-mail to all questions. Again thank you for your participation,
without you this effort would be impossible.
Sincerely.
Lt. Gary Wellman
AFIT/ENV
5-7777 ext 3278
gary.wellman@afit.edu

Without further delay, here are the first questions:

What constraints (statutory, regulatory, business practice, financial etc...) exist in
implementing EA and how can we (or have you) overcome them?

What contracting/business arrangements do you think worked (or will work) in
supporting an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? Provide an example if possible.
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Appendix C: Contract and Agreement Types
Fixed –Price Contract Types
Firm-Fixed-Price. A firm-fixed-price contract is suitable for acquiring commercial
items (see Parts 2 and 12) or for acquiring other supplies or services on the basis of
reasonably definite functional or detailed specifications (see Part 11) when the
contracting officer can establish fair and reasonable prices at the outset (FAR 16.202-2).
Fixed-Price With Economic Price Adjustment. A fixed-price contract with economic
price adjustment may be used when there is serious doubt concerning the stability of
market or labor conditions that will exist during an extended period of contract
performance, and contingencies that would otherwise be included in the contract price
can be identified and covered separately in the contract (FAR 16.203-2).
Fixed-Price With Prospective Price Redetermination. A fixed-price contract with
prospective price redetermination may be used in acquisitions of quantity production or
services for which it is possible to negotiate a fair and reasonable firm fixed price for an
initial period, but not for subsequent periods of contract performance (FAR 16.205-2).
Fixed-Ceiling Price With Retroactive Price Redetermination. A fixed-ceiling-price
contract with retroactive price redetermination is appropriate for research and
development contracts estimated at $100,000 or less when it is established at the outset
that a fair and reasonable firm fixed price cannot be negotiated and that the amount
involved and short performance period make the use of any other fixed-price contract
type impracticable (FAR 16.206-2).
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Firm-Fixed-Price, Level of Effort. A firm-fixed-price, level-of-effort term contract is
suitable for investigation or study in a specific research and development area. The
product of the contract is usually a report showing the results achieved through
application of the required level of effort. However, payment is based on the effort
expended rather than on the results achieved (FAR 16.207-2).
Fixed-Price Incentive. A fixed-price incentive contract is appropriate when a firmfixed-price contract is not suitable; the nature of the supplies or services being acquired
and other circumstances of the acquisition are such that the contractor's assumption of a
degree of cost responsibility will provide a positive profit incentive for effective cost
control and performance; and if the contract also includes incentives on technical
performance and/or delivery, the performance requirements provide a reasonable
opportunity for the incentives to have a meaningful impact on the contractor's
management of the work (FAR 16.403).
Fixed-Price Incentive (Firm Target). A fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract is
appropriate when the parties can negotiate at the outset a firm target cost, target profit,
and profit adjustment formula that will provide a fair and reasonable incentive and a
ceiling that provides for the contractor to assume an appropriate share of the risk. When
the contractor assumes a considerable or major share of the cost responsibility under the
adjustment formula, the target profit should reflect this responsibility (FAR 16.403-1).
Fixed-Price Incentive (Successive Targets). A fixed-price incentive (successive
targets) contract is appropriate when available cost or pricing information is not sufficient
to permit the negotiation of a realistic firm target cost and profit before award; sufficient
information is available to permit negotiation of initial targets; and there is reasonable

87

assurance that additional reliable information will be available at an early point in the
contract performance so as to permit negotiation of either a firm fixed price or firm
targets and a formula for establishing final profit and price that will provide a fair and
reasonable incentive. This additional information is not limited to experience under the
contract, itself, but may be drawn from other contracts for the same or similar items
(FAR 16.403-2).
Fixed-Price With Award Fee. Fixed price with award fee provisions may be used in
fixed-price contracts when the Government wishes to motivate a contractor and other
incentives cannot be used because contractor performance cannot be measured
objectively (FAR 16.404).

Cost Contract Types
Cost. A cost contract is a cost-reimbursement contract in which the contractor
receives no fee. A cost contract may be appropriate for research and development work,
particularly with nonprofit educational institutions or other nonprofit organizations, and
for facilities contracts (FAR 16.302).
Cost Sharing. A cost-sharing contract is a cost-reimbursement contract in which the
contractor receives no fee and is reimbursed only for an agreed-upon portion of its
allowable costs. A cost-sharing contract may be used when the contractor agrees to
absorb a portion of the costs, in the expectation of substantial compensating benefits
(FAR 16.303).
Cost Plus Incentive. A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement
contract that provides for an initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula
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based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. A cost-plusincentive-fee contract is appropriate for services or development and test programs when
a cost-reimbursement contract is necessary and a target cost and a fee adjustment formula
can be negotiated that are likely to motivate the contractor to manage effectively (FAR
16.304).
Cost Plus Fixed Fee. A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract
that provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the
inception of the contract. A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is suitable for use when the
contract is for the performance of research or preliminary exploration or study, and the
level of effort required is unknown; or the contract is for development and test, and using
a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is not practical.
A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract normally should not be used in development of major
systems once preliminary exploration, studies, and risk reduction have indicated a high
degree of probability that the development is achievable and the Government has
established reasonably firm performance objectives and schedules. (FAR 16.405-1)
Cost Plus Award Fee. A cost-plus-award-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement
contract that provides for a fee consisting of a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at
inception of the contract and an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by
the Government, sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in contract performance.
The cost-plus-award-fee contract is suitable for use when the work to be performed is
such that it is neither feasible nor effective to devise predetermined objective incentive
targets applicable to cost, technical performance, or schedule; the likelihood of meeting
acquisition objectives will be enhanced by using a contract that effectively motivates the
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contractor toward exceptional performance and provides the Government with the
flexibility to evaluate both actual performance and the conditions under which it was
achieved; and any additional administrative effort and cost required to monitor and
evaluate performance are justified by the expected benefits (FAR 16.405-2).
Indefinite Delivery Contract Types
Definite Quantity. A definite-quantity contract provides for delivery of a definite
quantity of specific supplies or services for a fixed period, with deliveries or performance
to be scheduled at designated locations upon order. A definite-quantity contract may be
used when it can be determined in advance that a definite quantity of supplies or services
will be required during the contract period and the supplies or services are regularly
available or will be available after a short lead time (FAR 16.502).
Requirements. A requirements contract provides for filling all actual purchase
requirements of designated Government activities for supplies or services during a
specified contract period, with deliveries or performance to be scheduled by placing
orders with the contractor. A requirements contract may be appropriate for acquiring any
supplies or services when the Government anticipates recurring requirements but cannot
predetermine the precise quantities of supplies or services that designated Government
activities will need during a definite period (FAR 16.503).
Indefinite Quantity. An indefinite-quantity contract provides for an indefinite
quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or services during a fixed period. Contracting
officers may use an indefinite-quantity contract when the Government cannot
predetermine, above a specified minimum, the precise quantities of supplies or services
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that the Government will require during the contract period, and it is inadvisable for the
Government to commit itself for more than a minimum quantity. The contracting officer
should use an indefinite-quantity contract only when a recurring need is anticipated
(FAR 16.504).
Other Contract Types
Time-and-Materials. A time-and-materials contract provides for acquiring supplies or
services on the basis of direct labor hours at specified fixed hourly rates that include
wages, overhead, general and administrative expenses, and profit; and materials at cost,
including, if appropriate, material handling costs as part of material costs. A time-andmaterials contract may be used only when it is not possible at the time of placing the
contract to estimate accurately the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate costs
with any reasonable degree of confidence (FAR 16.601).
Labor Hour. A labor-hour contract is a variation of the time-and-materials contract,
differing only in that the contractor does not supply materials. A labor hour contract may
be used only when it is not possible at the time of placing the contract to estimate
accurately the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate costs with any reasonable
degree of confidence (FAR 16.602).
Letter Contracts. A letter contract is a written preliminary contractual instrument that
authorizes the contractor to begin immediately manufacturing supplies or performing
services. A letter contract may be used when the Government's interests demand that the
contractor be given a binding commitment so that work can start immediately and
negotiating a definitive contract is not possible in sufficient time to meet the requirement.
A letter contract should be as complete and definite as feasible under the circumstances.
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Appendix D: Synopsis of Responses for Delphi Round 1

Table 1. AAC Responses to Round 1/ Question 1
What contracting/business arrangements do you think worked (or will work) in
supporting an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? Provide an example if
possible. 6 of 6 panelists responding
Pushing technology-focused acquisitions through the contracting process faster is the
key to meeting the warfighters needs. We simply take to much time through our checks
and crosschecks to field products to the troops. By the time they are in the troops hands,
they are cost prohibitive and out of date. Suggest buying the 75 to 80% solutions,
performing an accelerated 1st article test and field the initial production units. Let the
troops using the product actually critique and suggest improvements to the product. It
gets necessary hardware in the troops hand in a timely manner. The Combat Support
Systems SPO AAC/WMO has purchased several products in this manner, the FFA 400,
the ARTS Platform, etc. I think the best example to this approach is the Predator
program. Limitations to the program would be items that blow-up such as rockets and
missiles, due to troop safety issues. All support type equipment should be considered for
EA.
I think a critical aspect of any successful business arrangement is that it involves
benefits for both parties (Government and Industry) over a sustained period of time.
Therefore, inherent in the EA process is the acknowledgement of ever changing
requirements/technology/sustainment over a specified period or LIFE of a system/item.
Establishing long-term relationships that will reward Industry for their ability to
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demonstrate greater creative flexibility through long-term commitments is a good start.
The Government needs to leverage off of competition to establish and promote this longterm relationship that can also ensure that during the EA process/changes, Industry
receives healthy/fair returns in profitability but it does not become a climate for
competitive buy-in with recoupment of potential early losses/low profits through the
requirements growth inherent in EA. Average unit affordability goals/requirements are a
method of establishing price goals that will establish parameters for both Industry and
Government to formulate the EA strategy for requirements implementation. If a
complete list of requirements equals a units price of $XXXX and a schedule of XXX
months/years; then EA merely divides the requirements into segments which grows the
price and schedule to the (traditional) end goal while providing early fielding of these
subset requirements/capabilities. The key will be allowing industry to determine the
subset of requirements they optimally can field in a given time/price and getting
Warfighter buy-in of industry’s planned implementation phases. Also it becomes
increasingly more important to obtain total system warranties to minimize the logistical
impacts this iterative fielding of configurations will have on the cost of the systems. We
must be flexible enough to allow industry to capitalize on their strengths so that each
competitor/offeror does not have to meet identical segments of requirements but uses a
Cost/Schedule as Independent Variable(s) to determine what requirements they can
implement during the perspective EA point/phase.
To do this effectively, I believe we need to carry our competitive efforts further
through the acquisition cycle to promote more accountability/competition to meeting
schedule and price commitments. Establishing Goals of average unit procurement prices
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for each EA Phase that is also contingent upon meeting schedule has been used in various
long-term pricing arrangements. These long-term pricing arrangements demonstrate the
Government’s ability to sign up to a long-term need/commitment while providing
Industry the ability to leverage off of commercial partnerships to meet our price/schedule
goals. The Government must be willing to commit funds to support XXX quantities of
each EA configuration to support Industry’s profitability and support cost responsibility
of production start-up, warranty, etc. Failure of the Government to make these
commitments upfront and keep them will make affordability/schedule goals difficult to
obtain from Industry. Competition increases the need for Industry to meet their
commitments to gain the benefits of a long-term business arrangement.
To me, the success of EA is dependent upon a stable, long-term relationship with the
supplier. At Eglin, we've been using long-term price agreements (LTPA) which is a
bilateral agreement between the Government and a prime contractor in which an
obligation is made from the Government to exclusively buy a supply or service from the
prime contractor in return for an obligation to meet long term price, quality/performance,
and schedule commitments. As used here, LTPAs are binding agreements enforced
through a contract clause that is structured with positive incentives to reward the
contractor for meeting his commitments. LTPA clauses include remedies in the form of
negative incentives if the contractor does not meet his LTPA commitments.
---Examples of positive incentives include removal of the requirement for certified cost
and pricing data, contractor configuration control, and contractor logistics support.
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--- Examples of negative incentives include requiring the contractor to qualify a second
source at his own expense, liquidated damages, or the re-establishment of certified cost
and pricing data.
Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) or Spiral Acquisition is more of a philosophy than a
defined process. It encompasses getting a needed, available capability fielded now in full
anticipation that improved capability will be available in the future. For example, the F18 and F-16 aircraft have far greater capability today than when they were introduced, as
do most weapon systems and support systems. EA has perhaps always been with us to
some extent. Implementation however, has had many incarnations. The most common
method of implementation is an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) for an existing
system. ECPs may be requested by the Government or submitted by the contractor. This
method has been fairly successful over the years, but is not particularly fast. Another
common method is a Pre-Planned Product Improvement Program (PPIP), wherein system
improvements are anticipated and a method for funding further development is in place.
The Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) is an example of this
method. The Small Diameter Bomb program intends to initially field a weapon that is
effective against fixed targets, and later add the capability to engage moving targets,
thereby getting some capability fielded sooner. Recognition of, and provision for,
Independent Research and Development Programs (IR&D) by defense contractors has
also yielded fair results. Early and continued involvement by current and potential
suppliers by any means is key. Rules providing for Acquisition for Test and Experimental
Purposes (AETP), wherein a test quantity of a given item can be immediately acquired
without competition, have aided in rapidly establishing military applications for
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commercial or other existing products, bypassing a lengthy development cycle. These
acquisitions sometimes result from market research or a suggestion only. Use of FAR
Part 12 rules for commercial acquisition can also quickly inject rapidly evolving
technology into the field.
With AMRAAM, we have a development and production team (contractor and
government) that work together as one unit to plan and implement new capabilities and
technological advances in the AIM 120 missile. I will step through some of the
contractual/business practice changes that we have undergone to get to where we are
today. I see no reason why some if not all of these practices can't/shouldn't be used to
implement EA programs.
In 1997 AMRAAM faced:
1. Shrinking US annual procurements
2. A massive infrastructure cost (only about a third of the budget went towards actual
purchases of missiles)
3. Mandated manpower reduction
4. Loss of Competition from AMRAAM producers
In 1998 AMRAAM responded by:
1.Consolidation of Development, production, and Repair at one Raytheon facility
2.Teamed with Raytheon to Implement Commercial Business Practices That
-Saved 28% ($590M)
-Reduced Manpower by 30% - 2 yrs early
-Reduced infrastructure costs - Over 75% of AMRAAM budget spent on missile
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purchases
-Established a 10 Yr Cost Control Strategy
Recently AMRAAM has again responded by
1. A results oriented payment Procedure - Performance Based Payments on all Firm
Fixed Price (FFP) contracts
2. A focus on Price Based Philosophy - a shift away from concentration on profit control
alone
3. Implemented a Price Based Acquisition for AMRAAM Production and CLS
Acquisition Integrated with Production (CAIP)
4. Became a PBA Test Bed Program
5. TINA Waiver - to waive the requirement to obtain cost or pricing data
6. Increased/Expanded Use of Long Term Pricing Agreements (LTPAs)
-02-07 Missile Pricing Model for various configurations (with various software
changes) and a large range (350 - 1200 missiles)
-02-07 Repair Pricing Model for any type of repair associated with the missile and its
missile related equipment.
-02-07 Non-Developmental Item Airborne Instrumentation Unit (NDI- AIU) Pricing
Model. This is a new sophisticated, missile telemetry development to replace existing
AIUs.
-02-07 Price Agreements for other items (spares, specific tech spt, warranties, offset
admin costs, etc.).
How'd we do this? We took a fresh look at how we conducted business, and began
"Vision 2000", instituting a Total System Performance Requirement (TSPR) type
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philosophy. In short, the contractor agreed to perform the tasks that he deemed necessary
and sufficient to develop, deliver, warrant, and support affordable combat capable and
readily available weapons systems; the government agreed to define and communicate
performance requirements, provide the requisite resources, support a long term pricing
strategy, and enable contractor activities.
Some of the Key Business Elements Are
1. Contractor Control and Verification of the Product
-To do this; we developed a system performance spec, and allowed the contractor
make all changes below the upper level spec (i.e. changes that do not effect
performance). A result of this was a reduction in govt. specs from 370 to 2.
-System Performance Spec Maps directly to the ORD.
- Conducted Task Designation Analyses In other words we sat down and identified all
of the tasks involved with the missile, then, with a TSPR approach in mind, decided
what made sense for the contractor to do and what would remain a govt. function
(task designations).
-

Contractor Responsible and Accountable, with Government as an Enabler.

-

NOTE: under our TSPR approach, the Government never abandons overall
authority/responsibility, and may change the agreement with respect to degrees of
authority/responsibility as needed.
- Contractor Takes Configuration Management

The shift to contractor control led to:
1. Raytheon synergy across the Tucson facility.
Pricing/Affordability
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LTPAs (previously discussed)
Price Commitments and a Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) process for the
P3I C7 missile. As production continued on FFP contracts priced contract with an
LTPA in place for the B version missile and the production C versions, the
development of the C7 went into place with a Cost Plus Award Fee CPAF contract.
The incentive portion involved a CAIV approach and a joint factory pricing model,
incorporating increased lethality and capability improvements while keeping within
the threshold requirements and the contractor's price commitment.
2. As we moved toward Price Based Acquisition (I'll discuss in detail later) we were
able to use the CAIV model and price commitment to help establish price
reasonableness for a FFP contract without the use of (certified) cost or pricing data
for the 02-07 production missiles. I see no reason why this approach would not work
in an EA scenario where functionality can be assessed; performance criteria used, and
as spirals are implemented, shift from FPIF or CPIF/CPAF arrangements to FFP
arrangements.
3. Incentives for Contractor
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) - The contractor was able to seek DCS instead of
FMS sales for missiles. However, the pricing model used on the AMRAAM FMS/US
contract would achieve a price benefit from such a sale.
4. Source of Repair - The contractor was determined the single source of repair, and
could thus achieve synergy/savings by having both repair and production in the same
facility.
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5. Self-Oversight - Working with DCM offices, we put Raytheon in charge of quality,
going to contractor self oversight. Essentially, when Raytheon felt that an item was
ready for delivery, they would conduct their own quality checks and self certify on
the DD250. This removed a layer of DCM oversight. This program has continued to
be very successful.
6. Flexible Contracts That Look at a Team Win-Win Approach
Review-Discuss-Concur (RDC) This is a method of negotiation whereby the govt.
and contractor jointly review a need or requirement, scope the requirements
(discussing all assumptions and issues, discuss task level cost/price as necessary, then
agree on a bottom line price prior to submittal of a proposal.
7. Flexible LTPAs The long term Production/Sustainment models discussed were put in
place to provide program stability, but also are written to accommodate for
configuration variations, quantity changes, as well as customers who come along after
the initial award of a production run. We can capture those additional requirements
and pass price reductions to all, enabling the US to buy more missiles within the same
budgeted dollars.
8. Performance Based Payments (PBPs) on all FFP Contracts A change from progress
payments to a focus on performance and value. Currently, we have developed
quarterly PBPs that are easily managed, which benefit us by less expiring funds issues
and closeout issues, require less Defense Contract Management Agency involvement,
and provide a larger, positive cash flow to the contractor.
9. Options
Expressed as part of a Package Deal. The option language is written to reflect that
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the options (which include the long term agreement) are part of a package deal
strategy; this, with shift to PBA, attempts to focus on each contract action as a part of
a larger negotiated agreement, not a series of individual actions, and individual profit
reports.
10. Established as a Clause, not a line item - Option language in a special clause of the
contract describes the LTPAs and all terms and conditions of the option.
11. Since options become line items only upon their exercise, the line items are less
confusing, less troublesome for finance, and lead to smoother/quicker closeout (line
items do not remain in the automated systems).
12. Exercise of options as either modification to the current contract or as a separate
contract. Exercise as a separate contract leads to smaller contracts, less line items, less
confusion with regard to payments, etc, which in turn leads to faster closeout.
13. Alternate Disputes Resolution (ADR) a process whereby a system is set up between
the parties to resolve disputes. AMRAAM has never had to use it, thanks to the
successful teaming we have experienced with Raytheon.
14. Electronic Data Sharing/Open Books - Raytheon and the government are very open
with regards to all data, and most of this data is shared electronically. The
government is able to be present at Raytheon meetings, and likewise Raytheon is
present at govt. meetings (Example: All Raytheon financial data is shared, JSPO
representatives can sit in on Raytheon business/financial meetings, Raytheon attends
JSPO Budget Control Boards, etc).
15. 10 Yr. Bumper-to-Bumper Warranty that is Rolled Forward - Clean simple language
that covers the missile excluding certain Acts of God or misuse; the warranty is then
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moved each year to the most current contract warranty accountability clause, so that
older contracts can be closed out.
16. Roll Forward of GFP - Same as warranty roll forward; Accountability of GFP is
transferred to the most recent contract so that closeout on older contracts can be
accomplished.
17. Simulation and Testing not contracted separately. Raytheon in charge, and
subcontracts simulation and testing, including any Govt. ranges or test facilities.
18. Price Based Acquisition
In 2000, AMRAAM was selected as one of 3 Price Based Acquisition Test Bed
Programs
19. Truth-In-Negotiations Act (TINA) Waiver - Using historicals and other pricing data
points, pricing techniques were put in place to price the existing missile
configurations, repairs and other production and Sustainment/CAIP items, as well as
the P3I C7 version. These pricing techniques were put forth in a waiver from the
requirement to obtain cost or pricing data, and approved by Ms. Druyun on 09 Jul 01.
20. Focus on the Package Deal - In the past, as the contractor was able to creatively save
money in any 1 year (negotiating better subcontracts, finding areas of product
improvements that saved money, etc) the following year's price reasonableness
assessments, profit reviews, or audits, etc, would effectively penalize the contractor
through reexamination of profit in option yrs, thus stifling funds that could be used
for improvements by the contractor. By focusing on price, and away from individual
cost elements and profit, negotiations are streamlined even further, and the
government still obtains a fair and reasonable overall profit which can then be
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assessed jointly in terms of the package deal. This allows the Raytheon Missile Group
to keep dollars and reinvest in AMRAAM instead of giving the dollars over to
corporate or having profits cut by the govt.
21. Justification and Approvals the Joint Systems Program Office has a Class J&A
approved for all production, sustainment/CAIP, technical support, and development
through 2007. I would strongly urge that any EA development linked with existing
(or soon be) program does likewise, so that multiple J&As are not sought.

Table 2. ASC Responses to Round 1/ Question 1
What contracting/business arrangements do you think worked (or will work) in
supporting an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? Provide an example if
possible. 5 of 5 panelists responding
Omnibus contracts, with broad scope spanning many years with large ceilings. My
particular experience has been with multiple award ID/ID contracts. These ID/IQ
contracts were awarded with both large and small businesses in the Training SPO. Use of
the fair opportunities clause allowed us to compete awards within a "limited pool of
competent contracts". This saved both time and resources. Terms and conditions were
also already approved and awarded - allowing CO to issue individual delivery orders for
each requirement. These contracts are called TSA1 and TSA II and more information
can be provided on these if need be.
We are currently in the process of putting in place a contract that will give the
capability to the program an overarching contract. This will enable the team to do EMD,
production enhancement, ICS, integration of known and unknown platforms into the
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Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS). This will include also efforts to add the
Panoramic Night Vision Goggles onto the helmet. We will cover configuration
management logistics, sustaining engineering; studies and analysis, to only name a few.
The contract supporting the JHMCS requirements will use multiple contract type
arrangements. This affords maximum flexibility for the JPO to tailor the contract type to
cost technical and schedule risks as appropriate for the specific effort to be performed.
There are plans to establish line items with cost plus award fee, cost plus fixed fee, firm
fixed price, fixed price award fee and time and material arrangements. Given the
requirements and future funding uncertainties, a hybrid ID/IQ contract will be awarded.
This will give us the greatest flexibility in both quantities and delivery scheduling which
is essential because we cannot determine the precise quantity or delivery of
upgrades/enhancements tasks that will be required during the contract period. Also
because we have many platforms (F-15, F-16, F/A-18, FMS and eventually F-22)
participating, there may be changes peculiar to a platform, therefore, we will only do a
D.O for that platform.
At the B-2 SPO we have a process called Diego. It is an iterative approach to the
acquisition process that front-loads much of the acquisition planning and contract
posturing prior to receipt of proposal; we would essentially have a "hand-shake"
agreement upon receipt of proposal. This process significantly reduces the contracting
lead-time to get the project awarded. This process has been in place prior to the current
thrust of Agile Acquisition.
My thoughts are initial; however, with spiral development, much more thought needs
to go into how we are going to enter into contracts for overlapping requirements. Those
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items which need careful scrutiny are funding, Earned Value Management Systems,
Contractor Performance Reporting, and how well equipped the contractor's accounting,
scheduling and managements systems work. It is too soon to measure the effectiveness
of contracting in a spiral development program.
I don't believe there are any specific examples of a "successful" EA business strategy -- It's too early yet. Additionally, there is really nothing "new" or "magical" about EA. It
is just a different packaging of the pre-planned product improvement (P3I) programs of
the past. Another way of viewing EA is as "pre-planned" program concurrency. There
aren't any new/radical business approaches required to implement EA. In my opinion, the
contracting/business strategy is driven by the requirements definition process --- i.e.
getting the user to plan/accept "incremental" steps/spirals in capability while working
toward a desired end-state. The single biggest contributor to the success or failure of EA
is still contractor performance, not the contracting strategy or business arrangement --we tend to forget that important fact in our rush to be "innovative".
We have used EA in numerous acquisitions, some by design, some by default. By
default, it has occurred when the ORD required far more capability than could be
procured for the budget. In those instances, the requirement was downsized and an initial
increment was procured to provide some minimum capability. The downside was that,
since it was EA by default, there wasn't a well thought out long-term strategy to achieve
full capability. In the last couple of years, more acquisitions have been using EA for their
long term planning and strategy. An example is the Large Aircraft Infrared CounterMeasure (LAIRCM) acquisition, procured through the GR program office. An initial
minimum capability was procured along with a minimum number of production units.
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Planning for incremental improvements and achieving full capability was part of the
process. A Fixed Price incentive type contract was used. Another example is the
Panoramic Night Vision Goggles (PNVG) acquisition. Initial capability will be for fixed
wing, non-ejection seat capability. A following increment will include ejection seat
capability, etc.
The common thread in all of these is competition up front to lay out the best overall
strategy and value for the Government, followed by the award of a competitive contract
that allows for maximum flexibility. For example, you don't want priced options for each
increment up front, because you don't yet know the results of the initial effort. Test
results, feedback, etc. must be part of the following increments.

Table 3. ESC Responses to Round 1/ Question 1
What contracting/business arrangements do you think worked (or will work) in
supporting an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? Provide an example if
possible. 6 of 6 panelists responding
Definition of the evolutionary increments, at least those well defined at time of award,
it necessary. For Global Transportation Network 21 (GTN 21), there are 2 incremental
deliveries of the system as well as a separate delivery of a data warehouse. Without this
strategy, the government would have to await a successful FOC before "turning off" the
currently fielded system. Under this strategy, a fieldable system has been defined as the
IOC increment and delivery of that system, well before FOC, will allow the government
to turn off the current GTN system and start to utilize the new technology. There will be
obvious savings in the area of support of the old system.
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The program I was on, which was initially designated (it is not now on the program) a
pathfinder program, has recently transferred to another PCO. Unfortunately, I will not
know the end result of the unique contracting approach this program has taken. This is
the most unique business arrangement I have seen in my career.
This contract was written as a "typical" Pre-EMD effort, Cost-plus Award Fee contract
except for one thing. The Award Fee Plan is far from "typical". The business arrangement
is as follows:
1) 3% Base Fee - $7.8M
2) 6% Traditional Award Fee - $15.3M broken out in six evaluation periods
3) 6% Teaming Fee - $5.3M - broken out by FY for four periods and obligated at the
beginning of each FY.
Item #3 is pretty interesting. The teaming fee is subject to semi-annual SAE/CEO
reviews - feedback to the contractors relative to teaming effectiveness. This is done prior
to the release of the teaming dollars for that FY. The teaming fee is tied to Milestone B
decision. "In the event the FDO distributes teaming award fee prior to Milestone B and
the subsequent decision at Milestone B is "Teaming Relationship Ineffective", the
Government and the Contractor agree that the teaming award fee distributed prior to the
decision shall be returned by the Contractor to the Government with interest." I am not
sure if this is the kind of thing you are looking for, but I do know this is getting a lot of
attention right now. Please let me know if this helps.
Single Process Initiatives - Development of common items for various services,
programs, etc. spreads development costs thereby lowering overall cost of the program.
There are numerous examples, try contacting DCMA for a few.
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Joint Program Offices - Again, this spreads the cost of programs among the services
thereby reducing costs to each service while minimizing overhead.
I am contracting officer on the Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS)
program, which uses an evolutionary acquisition (EA) approach. The contract is
primarily cost plus award fee (CPAF) and allows for issuance of Technical Task
Directives (TTD). TTDs provide for flexibility and quick contract modification when
requirements change or subsequent increments of capability need to be placed on
contract. The contractor (Lockheed Martin) has Forward Pricing Rate Agreements
(FPRA) in place, as a result proposals primarily involve negotiation of labor mix and
hours and, using a one-pass process, are usually settled and placed on contract quickly
once requirements are known and funding provided. This has proven to be a flexible
contract vehicle - and flexibility is essential in an EA environment.
There are many possible ways to contract for EA depending on how well you can
define your requirement. Software development lends itself to this process. Software
usually is developed in increments or blocks and can be defined in functional terms.
Contracts can be designed with multiple priced options for incremental delivery of added
functionality. Time and Material or Cost type level of effort contracts often lends
themselves to this type of acquisition. Cheyenne Mountain upgrades were initially
contracted for in predetermined blocks and phases. It was recognized that software is
always being debugged/maintained or improved and is a perfect candidate for EA.
Planned drops are now contracted for to continually improve the system. Hardware can
be more difficult to contract for under EA. Planned ECPs, P3I or other strategies can be
utilized. If we were attempting upgrades with production dollars we would have to
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negotiate fixed price ECPs or upgrades on a preplanned basis. It would be difficult to
have pre-priced options with many unknown variables.
What we wanted to do was to provide as much flexibility as possible in the contract,
so that we could go back and define the future evolutions as we learned more about what
they should be, without having to continually go through the initial acquisition cycle of
internal approvals through the acquisition strategy process (acquisition plans, justification
for sole source, etc) We wanted to be able to start right in working with the selected
contractor to begin each new cycle (evolution) as soon as we had enough information to
begin discussions. The problem is that you have a general idea of where to go, but only
specific information about the first part. We needed a contract scope broad enough to
cover future known unknowns. For example, on one contract, we needed to eventually
incorporate a list of 200 developmental items, but we only knew what the first 20 or 30
would look like and which ones they should be. We needed contract flexibility to
continue adding future items from the list (the known part), but without knowing which
ones would be next or what they would be like (the unknown part). So we added the
entire list of 200 items, defined those we were starting with (price, delivery dates,
technical requirements, etc), and added language that would allow us to work the rest of
them later. This made all 200 part of the scope of the contract, but the details would be
worked out along the way.
Aside from flexible contractual documents, I found that we had to look at contract
types in a different way. On Joint STARS (the program that Carol is referring to), we
used Fixed Price Labor Hour to accommodate post development spirals (where cost
contracts would be impractical). Performance milestones are also key to ensuring a
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usable deliverable when not using a classic contractual setup where FFP means a firm
deliverable and FPLH may not. I found that you have to write the vehicle in such a way
that you ensure a deliverable, yet allows the contractor to continually incorporate spirals.
The contractual vehicle worked very well in the JSTARS program and we were able to
field software that benefited from using an adaptable contract. Selling a broadened
outlook on the contract types and writing the vehicles in such a way that you were able to
realize the deliverable was a tougher sell through the Government that through the
contractor, who actually flourished under spiral enhanced contract vehicle.

Table 4. AAC Responses to Round 1/ Question 2
What constraints (statutory, regulatory, business practice, financial etc.) exist in
implementing EA and how can we (or have you) overcome them?
6 of 6 panelists responding
The Government is it's own worse enemy. We all want to implement EA, but in the
constraints of the old way of doing business. We need changes in the review processes,
more flexibility to team or partner with industry concerning new technology exploitation
(maybe relaxing set-aside and competition requirements in these type programs).
Budgeting and other financial issues always end-up driving the type of procurement. We
should allow FM folks, at the local level, additional flexibility to fund programs and
innovations in a more timely manner. If a program using EA is progressing well, reward
the program with additional money to speed up the production buy and/or approach a
100% solution. Put the decision making process down at the Base level to the extent
practicable. Too many chiefs in the approval process. Give the lowest levels, from the
PM on down, the flexibility to be more innovative. I believe the Logistics functions are
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still too wrapped-up in the old processes. Meeting MIL STDs, TOs, and data CLINS are
great on weapon systems and platforms (from a safety standpoint), but for support
systems and equipment, I feel that these things can be relaxed more than they are now. In
acquisition, we have focused to buy everything in a "commercial" manner using part 12,
or combined 12 & 15, procedures. We need to realize that one size fit all approach doesn't
work that well. If the item is clearly military in nature, don't try to force a commercial
solution. Chances are, you will only end-up with a mess to administer. The Gov't needs to
clean up the DFAS problem. Contractors are not being paid timely, thus creating
additional contingency fees in future efforts and in some cases actually limiting
competition (from contractors refusing to do business with the feds).
One of the biggest challenges any acquisition office faces is sufficient and appropriate
funding for executing the approved EA strategy. Therefore, given the inherent nature of
concurrent development/production that will be ongoing in the EA process and the need
to have greater flexibility to accommodate contractor’s changes; the Government needs
to rethink appropriation laws and provide a total FY budget that is authorized for the EA
Program without specificity of type of funds (i.e. R&D, Production, O&M). The funding
could still carry a year designation, and measure obligation/expenditure of funds, but
specific use of the funds would become the responsibility of the PM based upon
successfully executing the program against the stated milestone/objectives in the APB.
Additionally, the area of individual accountability must be increased so that
programmatic success and ultimately customer satisfaction is the goal of everyone that
influences the outcome of the program (DCMA, DFAS, Air Staff, program office,
industry, etc.). Use of personnel performance reports/incentives/pay and Industry’s
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personnel rating/performance incentives/pay to demonstrate individuals’ success being
dependent upon program/mission success is needed. This will encourage more
empowerment to the lower levels and encourage members of both industry and
Government to find solutions to constraints that are mutually beneficial.
The biggest obstacle we found to evolutionary acquisition came not from the Air
Force, nor from regulatory or statutory constraints - the biggest obstacle we have
encountered is the using command. The Small Diameter Bomb program is in the Concept
and Development phase of acquisition. We sold a fixed price contract concept to OSD
(AT&L) by showing that the risk to the contractors was minimized due to a draft ORD
with only two key performance parameters, and that all other requirements were tradable.
Our program was structured to get the 80% solution to the war fighter in a very short time
(41 months from award of the CAD contract to the time the first LRIP units were
fielded), with a well-defined spiral laid in for the subsequent production lots.
Unfortunately there were personnel changes at ACC between the time the ASP was held
and right after contract award. With the change in personnel, all previously agreed-to
strategy for spiraling capability went out the window. Although ACC has accepted some
trades, they have come right out and said that they don't agree with spiral development
because they want all the capability up front, and, to make matters worse, they have
actually added requirements. This isn't unique to our program.
Statutory, regulatory, business, and financial constraints to any kind of Government
acquisition abound. This is not all bad because, unlike a business, our Government must
serve many masters, not always with a profit motive. That said; let's look at the most
common constraints in Government acquisitions.
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FINANCIAL: The appropriation, budgeting and accounting process is long, uncertain,
and complicated. Funds have restraints as to what they can be used for and their useful
life has limits. Stable funding and broader permissible use of available funds would be a
good start in adding flexibility to the evolutionary acquisition process. Spiral
development, by its nature, is uncertain in its ultimate outcome. We must embrace this
uncertainty as an opportunity to field new capabilities as they become available and need
maximum flexibility in the use of funds.
STATUTORY: The Competition In Contracting Act (CICA), The Small Business Act,
and the yearly appropriations and authorization acts most commonly affect the
Government acquisition process, although statutes by the hundreds come into play. The
above-mentioned statutes can (1) Determine what you can buy, how much, when, and
sometimes the sources; (2) Require delay in acquisition to advertise requirements and
seek competition; and (3) Require the Government to consider and assist certain category
businesses.
REGULATORY: The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) implements statutes,
codifies policies, and otherwise prescribes how the Government will acquire goods and
services. This is a necessary and good idea. It provides order and sets expectations for all
parties in the acquisition process. It may, however, be too much of a good thing. In any
case, it is plenty sufficient without any supplements to further restrain the process. As
with most regulations, it’s a one-size fits all proposition. Specific language limits
flexibility in execution. Among the most onerous, yet I suppose necessary, regulations
encountered involve reviews and approvals. This is perhaps THE most time consuming
and counterproductive administrative burden in the whole acquisition process. The end
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result is always different, but not necessarily better. I advocate no more than one
intervening level between the worker and the final approval authority - ever.
The legal and regulatory ease of protesting - and stopping - a contract action is
something with which businesses simply do not have to contend. There is nothing that
can be done about these constraints at the working level, but they are deserving of a
closer look at the legislative, and executive levels.
BUSINESS PRACTICES: The Government must become more results oriented and
less process oriented. This applies to both administrative and technical aspects of
acquisitions. For instance, the Government probably doesn't need any data not already
produced by a contractor in the course of his business - and his format is likely to be
acceptable, so why not simply accept whatever is provided to commercial customers or,
in the case of a defense contractor providing a weapon system or other military specific
item, have a data accession list delivered and get copies of whatever on that list is
desired. As for performance and testing, the Government should provide any Government
specific facilities (test ranges, etc) required, witness demonstrated performance, and that's
all.
Maximize use of FAR Part 12 in and the simplified acquisition process in acquisitions
J&A. However, there is no reason why these J&As cannot be streamlined into a 1 or 2
page document, since they are limited in how they are able to vary.
DT with OT One of the biggest challenges
Acquisition Strategy Panels/Acquisition Plans - AMRAAM has a Program level
SAMP that is comprehensive so that no AP is required; the ASPS are structured so that
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the team develops the strategy, with the program manager and contracting officer as the
focal point.
Subcontracting Plans. The need for individual subcontracting plans is suspect.
Raytheon is part of a Test Program that does not require individual gathering/reporting of
subcontracting information by individual subcontracting plan.
GFP - Still progress needs to be made on why, for long term sole source
production/development the government insists on keeping/maintaining gov’t property.
An arrangement by which the contractor could take possession of GFP seems in the
government's best interest.
Funding
-Concentration on the collapsing of certain related fund cites into one so that funds can be
administered easier.
-Types and Use of Funds (3400 vs. 3020, 3010 etc) and funds availability. We have been
compelled to look at phased type funding for some of the requirements within
AMRAAM, whereby we identify a portion of a body of work or deliverables that are of
tangible use to the government, and the contractor accomplishes this work in phases.
One Stop Shopping
Two major themes need to be addressed. CICA and Small Business regulation.
With one stop shopping, a contractor can be in control of his/her own destiny. Working in
a good teaming environment, he will seek to make those business arrangements with
quality, competent subcontractors who can ensure the viability of his product in the
marketplace. In theory, he will still employ small, small disadvantaged, and woman
owned businesses that serve him well. The problem is that this drives down prime
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competition percentages and prime subcontract goals for the Air Force. Perhaps the key is
to allow such reporting at the subcontract level as well, and provide Large Businesses
more incentive dollars to develop and contract with Section 8A/SDB/SBs.

Table 5. ASC Responses to Round 1/ Question 2
What constraints (statutory, regulatory, business practice, financial etc.) exist in
implementing EA and how can we (or have you) overcome them?
5 of 5 panelists responding
Number one in my opinion would have to be contract-financing issues. - Not only
availability of funding, but timing issues as well as colors money. It has been my
personal experience that many times the government takes the time and effort to compete
and or negotiate fair and reasonable prices, only to be unable to execute due to funding
constraints. A close second would be changing requirements. How often have we priced
something only to have to reprice due to changes.
Finally, I would close with CICA, fair opportunities clause and small business issues.
Right now we are working with the IPT (Boeing, Subcontractor and JPO) to get all
potential issues on the table. Once we have determined issues we will engage JAG to
review the potential issues. At this time I am not aware of any statutory issues that will
impact our strategy, however, we are waiting to get guidance from the PEO office as to
what the rewrite of the AFFAR will have on us.
We face multiple constraints on the Radar program. The two primary barriers are
affordability and the lack of obtaining the Congressional New Start. (a) The affordability
issue is being addressed on multiple fronts but we are running out of valuable time due to
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a future need date for operational availability. The SPO/Northrop Grumman have pricing
options on the table but the lesser ($) of the two gives the user lesser operational
capability. Component breakout (DFARS Appendix D) to Raytheon in the System
Development and Demonstration Phase is another option that is being considered for cost
reduction. (b) Before any contractual authority can be given to the contractor to execute
this program, a New Start must be issued. This has tied our hands somewhat for proposal
preparation and planning. Upon receipt of the New Start authority, we will be postured
to award the Radar contract; a sooner than later New Start would greatly benefit the
program's ability to effect a quicker contract award thus safeguarding the operational
need date. (c) One streamlining initiative the B-2 has submitted as a time-saving measure
that supports the Transformation tenants is redesignating the B-2 Radar Pathfinder
Program from an ACAT ID to ACAT IC with Milestone Decision Authority redelegated
to the PEO.
The initial contracting method of Other Transactions can be useful to attracting
competition and expediting concepts; however, one must guard against teams believing
that subsequent contractual actions will not be FAR based, or may not know what FAR
based contracts require. Transitioning from one type of contracting (OTA) to FAR based
contracting is somewhat of a cultural change. I believe some education would/should
have been accomplished in the transition. One caveat: I'm looking back with 20/20
vision. Those involved did not and do not now have the luxury of time for this type of
insight.
The biggest constraint we have to effectively implementing any approach is the
financial/statutory hurdles tied to funding. We could do a lot of unique/different business
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arrangements if our current funding constraints were reduced/eliminated. Some
recommended changes include:
a.

Fund by Spiral --- That means any activity required in that spiral (i.e.
development, long lead, production or sustainment effort) is all funded by one (1)
type of money --- i.e. 1 fund cite.

b.

Provide greater flexibility in use of incremental funding --- allow program office
to decide when incremental funding is appropriate.

c.

Extend the time that funds are available for expenditure prior to going into
"cancelled" status.

Funding in the most difficult constraint. Often times there is not enough in the budget
for the requirement and the yearly budget doesn't match the contractor's spend plan.
Again - flexibility is important.
Long term contracts are often mentioned as beneficial to EA, however, contractors
tend to perform better when they know they must compete for follow on effort.
Therefore, incentives such as award fees are extremely important to encourage the
contractor to deliver results. Another tool often used up front is to award contracts to two
offerors for the risk reduction effort. This helps generate creative solutions and energizes
the contractors to be proactive in developing a successful long-term strategy.

Table 6. ESC Responses to Round 1/ Question 2
What constraints (statutory, regulatory, business practice, financial etc.) exist in
implementing EA and how can we (or have you) overcome them?
6 of 6 panelists responding
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I suspect that there may be some issues relating to defining an end item, which the
Government could pay for, which could at times impact an EA strategy. There may be
some resistance to defining certain increments as such. I have not had that experience.
Nor have I experienced a business practice thus far that couldn't be overcome. Financial
issues can be the bigger problem. This isn't an issue specific to EA though. Too often a
budget dictates our requirements or strategy when the budget should support the
requirements with a strategy complimenting it. Unfortunately, we are often constrained
by the budget, whether it is total dollars, annual appropriations or type of funds.
I have a hard time answering the second question. I was not there in the beginning of
this acquisition. I believe Ms Druyun played a strong role in the creation of this business
arrangement. The team includes Northrop El Segundo, Northrop Baltimore and Northrop
Melbourne and Raytheon. I don't believe there were any statutory issues. The only
“financial" issue is the return of funds should the contractor fail - which I cannot imagine
happening - guess we will wait and see.
Layers of approval - USAF ORD process is cumbersome. It can often increase the
time lag from concept development to fielding a system. In many cutting edge technology
systems, the edge can get "dull" if it takes too long to field.
Color of money is always a problem, however it seems that recently, the
reprogramming process has grown more user friendly.
There are many constraints - here are a few. Need to regularly negotiate labor
rates/request Defense Contract Audit Agency audits can be overcome when FPRAs are in
place. Funding issues - both "color" of money and fund type - are constraining. CICA is
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an issue and must be addressed at program commencement when writing the Single
Acquisition Management Plan and the basic contract. There still is a bureaucratic-risk
aversion mentality prevalent, which leads people to want
all requirements known and all risks mitigated before proceeding. It is difficult to get EA
programs budgeted due to out-year requirement uncertainty and this leads to constant
funding challenges.
The main constraint that I can think of is CICA. EA can be construed as a method of
avoiding new competition. Open system architecture makes a good case for re-competing
future evolutions, which could introduce fresh ideas. In order to comply with CICA, a
program office may have to process Justifications for Sole Source based on the
proprietary nature of the existing data. This could possibly be avoided if the original
synopsis/competition/J&A/Acq. Plan or SAMP properly addressed the EA approach.
The difficult part would be structuring the contract with special clauses, CLINs etc. to
accommodated this approach.
The main constraint I ran into was the typical lack of knowledge of, or delay in
incorporating, something new. The statutes are issued at a high level without a lot of
detail, and when I was doing this; the regs hadn't gotten around to figuring out what that
detail should be. Under general guidance, the team wrote up a program they thought
would suit their needs, but there were constant roadblocks throughout the review process
due to the lack of specific regulations to follow. Many reviewers would look at existing
regs and say we weren't in compliance. It was a constant battle, and compromise, from
those directing us to do something new, with those reviewing what we were doing
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without updated regs to match. We ended up with a mixture of new stuff under some old
rules. A little awkward, but workable. I can't answer about how things are progressing
now that the regulations have caught up some.
The main constraint was the inability of our own staff to grasp something that was
new and see how EA would actually realize a deliverable. I have found that allowing the
contractor to work with less constraints actually produced a better product and working
relationship.
Electronic weapons demand EA in order to be successful and capitalize on the latest
technology. I believe the more of us who have worked with EA the easier it will be to
grasp when trying to explain an acquisition strategy that incorporates classic contracting
aspects in creative ways so to accommodate spirals and EA.
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Appendix E. Delphi Round 2(a). AAC Question Set

What contracting/business arrangements do you think worked (or will work) in
supporting an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? Provide an example if
possible.
Four out of five respondents stated that stable, long-term, relationships with the
supplier is a key to success in an EA environment. Early and continued involvement by
current and potential suppliers was submitted by three members as a key to success.
There were several suggestions that should be included as part of these relationships:
1) Three respondents submitted using Long-Term Pricing Arrangements (LTPAs) as
part of an EA acquisition. These LTPAs are bilateral agreements between the
Government and a prime contractor in which an obligation is made from the
Government to exclusively buy a supply or a service from the prime contractor in
return for an obligation to meet long-term price, quality/performance, and
schedule commitments. They also suggested establishing goals of average
procurement prices for each EA Phase in the LTPAs that are also contingent upon
meeting schedule. These agreements are enforced through a contract clause that is
structured with positive incentives to reward the contractor for meeting his
commitments and remedies in the form of negative incentives if the contractor
does not meet his commitments. Two members noted that these arrangements
must be flexible to accommodate configuration and quantity changes.
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2) Two respondents remarked that the Government must allow industry to define the
subset of requirements that they optimally can field in a given time/price and
getting the warfighter’s buy-in of the industry’s proposed implementation phases.
3) Another respondent noted similarly that the relationship must allow industry to
capitalize on their strengths so that each competitor/offeror does not have to meet
identical segments of requirements but uses Cost/Schedule as Independent
Variables (CAIVs) to determine what requirements they can implement during the
prospective EA point/phase.
4) One respondent suggested using a Total System Performance Requirement
(TSPR) Philosophy. This philosophy encompasses a two-part arrangement. The
contractor agrees to perform the tasks that he deemed necessary and sufficient to
develop, deliver, warrant, and support affordable combat capable and readily
available weapon systems; the government agrees to define and communicate
performance requirements, provide the requisite resources, support a long-term
pricing strategy, and enable contractor activities. Key attributes of TSPR that
were submitted are:
a.

Contractor control and verification of the product based upon a system
performance specification developed by the Government

b.

A system performance specification that maps directly back to the ORD

c.

Sitting down and identifying all of the tasks involved with the system and
then deciding what makes sense for the contractor to do and what would
remain a government function
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d.

Contractor responsible and accountable with the Government remaining as
the Enabler and maintaining overall authority/responsibility

e.

Contractor controlling Configuration Management and quality

f.

Freely sharing data between the contractor and the government,
electronically where possible.

5) One respondent defined the relationship as one that would reward industry for
their ability to demonstrate greater creative flexibility while benefiting both
parties (Government and Industry) over a sustained period of time. This
relationship must acknowledge the ever-changing
requirements/technology/sustainment over a specified period or life of a system.
This relationship has the development and production teams work together as one
unit to plan and implement new capabilities and technological advances.
Besides long-term relationships other business arrangement suggestions were also
submitted. The suggestions include:
1) Two respondents suggested using FAR Part 12 rules to quickly inject fast evolving
technology into the field.
2) One participant submitted leveraging off of competition to establish and promote a
long-term relationship while ensuring that industry receives healthy/fair returns in
profitability. This involves carrying our competitive efforts further through the
acquisition cycle to promote more accountability/competition to meeting schedule
and price commitments. The submitted benefit is competition increases the need for
industry to meet their commitments to gain the benefits of a long-term arrangement.
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3) Obtain a Class J&A for all of production, sustainment, and development of a system
for a period of years to avoid continually going through the J&A process for each
increment.
4) Obtain total system warranties to minimize the logistical impacts this iterative
fielding of configurations will have on the cost of the systems.
5) Roll warranty and GFP forward to the most recent contract to allow easier contract
closeout.
6) Commit the funds to support XXX quantities of each EA configuration to support the
profitability and support cost responsibility of warranty, production set-up, etc…
7) Perform accelerated 1st Article tests and field the initial production units for 75% to
80% solutions. Let the end user critique and suggest improvements. Limit to
programs where troop safety is a major concern. Include all support equipment under
EA.
8) Use rules for Acquisition for Test and Experimental Purposes (ATEP) wherein a test
quantity of a given item can be immediately acquired of a given item can be
immediately acquired without competition have aided in bypassing a lengthy
development cycle.
9) Obtaining a Truth In Negotiations Act (TINA) Waiver from the requirement to obtain
cost or pricing data.
10) Instituting a Price Based Acquisition that focuses on price and away from individual
cost elements and profit, negotiations are streamlined even further, and the
Government still obtains a fair and reasonable overall profit can then be assessed
jointly in terms of a package deal. This would avoid penalizing the contractor for
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cost saving measures and reinvesting the savings back into the program. Using a
Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) model and price commitment to help
establish price reasonableness without the use of certified cost or pricing data on Firm
Fixed Price (FFP) contracts.
11) One participant suggested that EA has always been with us to some extent even
though its implementation has had several incarnations. The most common method
of implementation has been the Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) which is not
particularly fast. Pre-Planned Product Improvement Program (PPIP) is another
method wherein system improvements are anticipated and a method for funding
further development is in place. Recognition of, and provision for, Independent
Research and Development Programs by defense contractors was also submitted as
yielding fair results.
12) Use Performance Based Payments on all Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts that are
based on results and value.
13) Shift from Cost and Incentive type contracts to FFP contracts once functionality can
be assessed, performance criteria can be used, as spirals are implemented.
14) Treat options as part of a larger negotiated deal, not as individual contracting actions.
Exercise these options as either modifications or as separate contracts to speed up the
closeout process. As part of this process, establish a comprehensive options clause
that outlines the terms and conditions of the option as well as the LPTAs that are
incorporated.
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15) Utilize the Review-Discuss-Concur team negotiation approach whereby the
government and contractor jointly review a requirement, define the scope, terms and
conditions, and agree on a bottom-line price prior to the submission of the proposal.

What constraints (statutory, regulatory, business practice, financial etc.) exist in
implementing EA and how can we (or have you) overcome them?
Four of the five participants replied that funding was a constraint. Members submitted
that the responsibility/authority for the control of funds should be placed at the Program
Office level to create flexibility for a program. In addition, three members mentioned
that the color of money complicated things and that one fund cite would speed up the
process. Two respondents noted that sufficient and appropriate levels of funding are
essential to implement an EA strategy.
Three out of five participants submitted that the set-aside requirement for Small
Business impacted their programs. The validity of requiring subcontracting plans was
questioned. One possible solution submitted was incentivizing large businesses to
develop/utilize small businesses. Another respondent suggested giving the prime
contractor the flexibility to use those small businesses that have proven to be valuable
partners.
Three out of five participants identified the review process as a barrier. Too many
approval layers, as well as cumbersome processes, were presented as problems. One
person suggested that our current review process is a counterproductive administrative
burden. The suggestion was made to never have more than one intervening level between
the worker and the approval authority.
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Three respondents also identified the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) as being
a barrier.
Two participants responded that the government’s involvement in performance and
testing was counterproductive. The suggestion was made for the government to provide
the testing facilities and equipment as necessary and observe the test and nothing else.
Singular responses also included:
•

Allowing more flexibility in teaming/partnering with Industry

•

Ensuring contractors are paid on time

•

Make it more difficult to protest and stop an acquisition

•

Increase individual accountability by tying program performance on both
sides to individual performance reports, compensation, and bonuses

•

Increasing the cooperation of the using command (turnover at using
command causes continuity challenges and changing of prior agreements)

•

Eliminate the DFARS and AFFARS because they are too restrictive

•

Change the government from being process oriented to results oriented

•

Require only the data that commercial customers would receive

•

Transfer GFP on long-term, sole-source contracts to the contractor instead
of maintaining it ourselves

•

Revamp the J&A process to permit class deviations when it makes sense

Questions:
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1) The panel generally agreed that long-term relationships are required for success in an
EA environment. What are the top three things that you would include as part of this
relationship and how would you implement these relationships contractually?

2) In addition to the top three things you would include in these long-term relationships,
how would you decide whom to establish a long-term relationship with? How would
ensure compliance with CICA? What are your selection criteria/thresholds? Who
would approve the selection/arrangement?

3) Three participants submitted Long-Term Pricing Arrangements (LTPAs) be included
in an EA strategy. What specific pricing elements (labor, material, etc.) would you
include in these arrangements and why? Which ones would you not include and
why? How would you negotiate such an arrangement? Who would be responsible for
maintaining the arrangement?

4) Flexibility was submitted as a requirement for successful implementation of EA. If
unconstrained by any other requirements and starting with a clean sheet of paper, can
you think of a totally new contract arrangement that will facilitate flexibility? What
are the advantages/disadvantages of your arrangement?

5) One participant suggested obtaining a class J&A for all production, sustainment, and
development of a system for a period of years. Would this work for your program?
Why or why not? What are the advantages and disadvantages of a class J&A? When
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would you pursue this course of action and who would initiate it? How would the
50/50 law for sustainment be addressed?

6) We can trace EA back at least to 1993, and there have been comments that EA is just
new packaging for an old idea. Do you agree? If so, how will you accommodate
incremental development in your contracts? If not, what new ways will you use to
contractually implement the EA emphasis?
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Appendix F. Delphi Round 2(a). AAC Question Set
What contracting/business arrangements do you think worked (or will work) in
supporting an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? Provide an example if
possible.
Four out of five respondents stated that stable, long-term, relationships with the
supplier is a key to success in an EA environment. Early and continued involvement by
current and potential suppliers was submitted by three members as a key to success.
There were several suggestions of what should be included as part of these relationships:
1) Three respondents submitted using Long-Term Pricing Arrangements (LTPAs) as part
of an EA acquisition. These LTPAs are bilateral agreements between the Government
and a prime contractor in which an obligation is made from the Government to
exclusively buy a supply or a service from the prime contractor in return for an obligation
to meet long-term price, quality/performance, and schedule commitments. They also
suggested establishing goals of average procurement prices for each EA Phase in the
LTPAs that are also contingent upon meeting schedule. These agreements are enforced
through a contract clause that is structured with positive incentives to reward the
contractor for meeting his commitments and remedies in the form of negative incentives
if the contractor does not meet his commitments. Two members noted that these
arrangements must be flexible to accommodate configuration and quantity changes.
2) Two responses remarked that the Government must allow industry to define the subset
of requirements that they optimally can field in a given time/price and getting the
warfighter’s buy-in of the industry’s proposed implementation phases.
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3) Another respondent noted similarly that the relationship must allow industry to
capitalize on their strengths so that each competitor/offeror does not have to meet
identical segments of requirements but uses Cost/Schedule as Independent Variables
(CAIVs) to determine what requirements they can implement during the prospective EA
point/phase.
4) One respondent suggested using a Total System Performance Requirement (TSPR)
Philosophy. This philosophy encompasses a two-part arrangement. The contractor agrees
to perform the tasks that he deemed necessary and sufficient to develop, deliver, warrant,
and support affordable combat capable and readily available weapons systems; the
government agrees to define and communicate performance requirements, provide the
requisite resources, support a long-term pricing strategy, and enable contractor activities.
Key attributes of TSPR that were submitted are:
a) Contractor control and verification of the product based upon a system
performance specification developed by the Government
b) A system performance specification that maps directly back to the ORD
c) Sitting down and identifying all of the tasks involved with the system and then
deciding what makes sense for the contractor to do and what would remain a
government function
d) Contractor responsible and accountable with the Government remaining as the
Enabler and maintaining overall authority/responsibility
e) Contractor controlling Configuration Management and quality
f) Freely sharing data between the contractor and the government, electronically
where possible
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5) One respondent defined the relationship as one that would reward industry for their
ability to demonstrate greater creative flexibility while benefiting both parties
(Government and Industry) over a sustained period of time. This relationship must
acknowledge the ever-changing requirements/technology/sustainment over a specified
period or life of a system. This relationship has the development and production teams
work together as one unit to plan and implement new capabilities and technological
advances.
Besides long-term relationships other business arrangement suggestions were also
submitted. The suggestions include:
1) Two respondents suggested using FAR Part 12 rules to quickly inject rapidly
evolving technology into the field.
2) One participant submitted leveraging off of competition to establish and promote
a long-term relationship while ensuring that industry receives healthy/fair returns
in profitability. This involves carrying our competitive efforts further through the
acquisition cycle to promote more accountability/competition to meeting schedule
and price commitments. The submitted benefit is competition increases the need
for industry to meet their commitments to gain the benefits of a long-term
arrangement.
3) Obtain a Class J&A for all of production, sustainment, and development of a
system for a period of years to avoid continually going through the J&A process
for each increment.
4) Obtain total system warranties to minimize the logistical impacts this iterative
fielding of configurations will have on the cost of the systems.
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5) Roll warranty and GFP forward to the most recent contract to allow easier
contract closeout.
6) Commit the funds to support XXX quantities of each EA configuration to support
the profitability and support cost responsibility of warranty, production set-up,
etc…
7) Perform accelerated 1st Article tests and field the initial production units for 75%
to 80% solutions. Let the end user critique and suggest improvements. Limit to
programs where troop safety is a major concern. Include all support equipment
under EA.
8) Use rules for Acquisition for Test and Experimental Purposes (ATEP) wherein a
test quantity of a given item can be immediately acquired of a given item can be
immediately acquired without competition have aided in bypassing a lengthy
development cycle.
9) Obtaining a Truth In Negotiations Act (TINA) Waiver from the requirement to
obtain cost or pricing data.
10) Instituting a Price Based Acquisition that focuses on price and away from
individual cost elements and profit, negotiations are streamlined even further, and
the Government still obtains a fair and reasonable overall profit can then be
assessed jointly in terms of a package deal. This would avoid penalizing the
contractor for cost saving measures and reinvesting the savings back into the
program. Using a Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) model and price
commitment to help establish price reasonableness without the use of certified
cost or pricing data on Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contracts.
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11) One participant suggested that EA has always been with us to some extent even
though its implementation has had several incarnations. The most common
method of implementation has been the Engineering Change Proposal (ECP),
which is not particularly fast. Pre-Planned Product Improvement Program (PPIP)
is another method wherein system improvements are anticipated and a method for
funding further development is in place. Recognition of, and provision for,
Independent Research and Development Programs by defense contractors was
also submitted as yielding fair results.
12) Use Performance Based Payments on all Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contracts that
are based on results and value.
13) Shift from Cost and Incentive type contracts to FFP contracts once functionality
can be assessed, performance criteria can be used, as spirals are implemented.
14) Treat options as part of a larger negotiated deal, not as individual contracting
actions. Exercise these options as either modifications or as separate contracts to
speed up the closeout process. As part of this process, establish a comprehensive
options clause that outlines the terms and conditions of the option as well as the
LPTAs that are incorporated.
15) Utilize the Review-Discuss-Concur team negotiation approach whereby the
government and contractor jointly review a requirement, define the scope, terms
and conditions, and agree on a bottom-line price prior to the submission of the
proposal.
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What constraints (statutory, regulatory, business practice, financial etc.) exist in
implementing EA and how can we (or have you) overcome them?
Four of the five participants replied that funding was a constraint. Members submitted
that the responsibility/authority for the control of funds should be placed at the Program
Office level to create flexibility for a program. In addition, three members mentioned
that the color of money complicated things and that one fund cite would speed up the
process. Two respondents noted that sufficient and appropriate levels of funding are
essential to implement an EA strategy.
Three out of five participants submitted that the set-aside requirement for Small
Business impacted their programs. The validity of requiring subcontracting plans was
questioned. One possible solution submitted was incentivizing large businesses to
develop/utilize small businesses. Another respondent suggested giving the prime
contractor the flexibility to use those small businesses that have proven to be valuable
partners.
Three out of five participants identified the review process as a barrier. Too many
approval layers, as well as cumbersome processes, were presented as problems. One
person suggested that our current review process is a counterproductive administrative
burden. The suggestion was made to never have more than one intervening level
between the worker and the approval authority.
Three respondents also identified the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) as being
a barrier.
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Two participants responded that the government’s involvement in performance and
testing was counterproductive. The suggestion was made for the government to provide
the testing facilities and equipment as necessary and observe the test and nothing else.
Singular responses also included:
•

Allowing more flexibility in teaming/partnering with Industry

•

Ensuring contractors are paid on time

•

Make it more difficult to protest and stop an acquisition

•

Increase individual accountability by tying program performance on both sides to
individual performance reports, compensation, and bonuses

•

Increasing the cooperation of the using command (turnover at using command causes
continuity challenges and changing of prior agreements)

•

Eliminate the DFARS and AFFARS because they are too restrictive

•

Change the government from being process oriented to results oriented

•

Require only the data actually needed to the same data that commercial customers
would receive

•

Transfer GFP on long-term, sole-source contracts to the contractor instead of
maintaining it ourselves

•

Revamp the J&A process to permit class deviations when it makes sense
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Questions:
1) The panel generally agreed that long-term relationships are required for success in
an EA environment. What are the top three things that you would include as part
of this relationship and how would you implement these relationships
contractually?

2) In addition to the top three things you would include in these long-term
relationships, how would you decide whom to establish a long-term relationship
with? How would ensure compliance with CICA? What are your selection
criteria/thresholds? Who would approve the selection/arrangement?

3) Three participants submitted Long-Term Pricing Arrangements (LTPAs) be
included in an EA strategy. What specific pricing elements (labor, material, etc.)
would you include in these arrangements and why? Which ones would you not
include and why? How would you negotiate such an arrangement? Who would
be responsible for maintaining the arrangement?

4) Flexibility was submitted as a requirement for successful implementation of EA.
If unconstrained by any other requirements and starting with a clean sheet of
paper, can you think of a totally new contract arrangement that will facilitate
flexibility? What are the advantages/disadvantages of your arrangement?
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5) One participant suggested obtaining a class J&A for all production, sustainment,
and development of a system for a period of years. Would this work for your
program? Why or why not? What are the advantages and disadvantages of a
class J&A? When would you pursue this course of action and who would initiate
it? How would the 50/50 law for sustainment be addressed?

6) We can trace EA back at least to 1993, and there have been comments that EA is
just new packaging for an old idea. Do you agree? If so, how will you
accommodate incremental development in your contracts? If not, what new ways
will you use to contractually implement the EA emphasis?
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Appendix G. Delphi Round 2(c). ESC Question Set.

What contracting/business arrangements do you think worked (or will work) in
supporting an evolutionary acquisition (EA) strategy? Provide an example if
possible.
Four of six panel members replied that definition of the evolutionary increments is
important. The best way to set up the contracting arrangement depended largely on how
the increments were defined. It is difficult when you have a general idea of what you are
contracting for but only specific information about a small part.
A Cost-Plus-Award Fee contract with a Base Fee and Teaming Fee broken out by
Fiscal Year (FY and obligated at the beginning of each FY). The Teaming Fee is subject
to semi-annual SAE/CEO reviews that provide feedback to the contractors relative to
teaming effectiveness. This is accomplished prior to the release of the teaming dollars
for the FY. The Teaming Fee is tied to the Milestone B decision. Specific wording
includes: “In the event the FDO distributes teaming award fee prior to Milestone B and
the subsequent decision at Milestone B is "Teaming Relationship Ineffective", the
Government and the Contractor agree that the teaming award fee distributed prior to the
decision shall be returned by the Contractor to the Government with
interest."
Single Process Initiatives - Development of common items for various Government
and Commercial services, programs, etc. spreads development costs thereby lowering
overall cost of the program.
Joint Program Offices - spread the cost of programs among the
services thereby reducing costs to each service while minimizing overhead.
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A primarily Cost-Plus-Award Fee (CPAF) contract that allows for issuance of
Technical Task Directives (TTD). TTDs provide for flexibility and quick
contract modification when requirements change or subsequent increments of
capability need to be placed on contract.
Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRA) in place that define labor categories and
their associated rates. As a result, proposals primarily involve negotiation of labor mix
and hours and, using a one-pass process, are usually settled and placed on contract
quickly once requirements are known and funding provided.
Two members responded that flexibility in the arrangement was a key to success. One
suggested using a multiple priced option for incremental delivery might work well.
Another proposed incorporating the entire requirements list into the contract vehicle,
defining price, delivery dates, technical requirements, etc. for the known part and adding
language that would permit definition of the other items in the future.
One respondent explained that they have used a Fixed Price Labor Hour (FPLH)
contract to accommodate post development spirals where cost contracts were impossible.
Performance milestones became critical to ensure a usable deliverable since this
arrangement may not have a firm deliverable like a Firm-Fixed-Price arrangement might
have.
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What constraints (statutory, regulatory, business practice, financial etc.) exist in
implementing EA and how can we (or have you) overcome them?
Three of six panel members mentioned that finance issues, to include color of money,
availability, and type of money were constraints. One member suggested that the budget
actually dictates the requirement. One respondent observed that reprogramming requests
seem to be processed more quickly lately.
Selling a broadened outlook on the contract types and writing the vehicles in such a
way that you were able to realize the deliverable was a tougher sell through the
Government than through the contractor, who actually flourished under spiral enhanced
contract vehicle.
Defining an end item for certain increments was mentioned as possibly causing some
resistance.
Two respondents observed that the Competition in Contracting Act is an issue that
must be addressed at program commencement when writing the SAMP/Acq. Plan/ or
J&A in order to accommodate EA programs.
The USAF ORD process was identified as a constraint. The respondent stated that it
was cumbersome and required too many layers of approval.
Finally, lack of experience and knowledge of our reviewers and team members.
Existing regulations don’t cover EA specifics, which causes roadblocks in the review
process due to interpretation issues. Reviewers tend to look at new business
arrangements with old regulations. The respondent observed that our staff tends to have
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an inability to grasp something new and see how EA would actually realize a deliverable.
It has been their experience that allowing the contractor to work with fewer constraints
actually produced a better product and working relationship.
Questions:
1. The definition of increments or spirals was raised as a concern in the EA
arrangement. What processes/approach do you take to define each increment? Who is
involved in these processes? How do you define future increments for unknown
capabilities? At what point are these future increments definitions refined further?
2. How do/would you incorporate all increments in a contractual document? How
would this appear in the contract document (CLIN, clause, attachment, etc.)?
3. One respondent presented the use of a unique award fee plan that included a Teaming
Fee. Would this arrangement work for your acquisition? Why or why not? How would
you define the evaluation criteria for such an arrangement? Who would determine,
evaluate, and approve these criteria?
4. If unconstrained by any other requirements and starting with a clean sheet of paper,
can you think of a totally new contract arrangement that will facilitate flexibility? What
are the advantages/disadvantages of your arrangement?
5. Two respondents observed that CICA was a constraint in an EA arrangement. Do
you agree or disagree with this statement? Why? How do/would you overcome the CICA
requirements? Have you been successful in doing so?
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6. We can trace EA back at least to 1993, and there have been comments that EA is just
new packaging for an old idea. Do you agree? If so, how will you accommodate
incremental development in your contracts? If not, what new ways will you use to
contractually implement the EA emphasis?
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Appendix H: Synopsis of Responses for Delphi Round 2(a)—AAC Specific Questions
Table 7. AAC Responses to Round 2(a)/ Question 1
The panel generally agreed that long-term relationships are required for success in
an EA environment. What are the top three things that you would include as part of
this relationship? 5 of 5 panelists responding
The top three actions/things needed for a successful long-term relationship is: 1)
Incentives to Industry for keeping the agreement that addresses the contractor's ability to
maximize profitability (through controlled costs/ management of obsolesce) and reduced
oversight or government regulations that drive costs and infrastructure; and penalties if
contractor doesn't meet commitment based upon issues within contractor's control. 2)
Legislative or other coverage under Defense authorization Act that ensures stable
funding. 3) Flexibility of format/structure to leverage off industry's willingness to offer
prices for a range of quantities/prices/based upon timeframe need.
Long term requirement in which the contractor can invest/Measurable product
quality/reliability/Fair and reasonable prices - set in advance to the extent practical.
First, lets not get Contractor/Government Teaming, Long Term Pricing Agreements
and pricing models confused. The first is a business philosophy of jointly managing a
win-win approach to a program much like that in a commercial arrangement. One of the
tools used is to enter into long term pricing agreements, which may include prices, which
may or may not have a pricing model associated with them. For example, AMRAAM
implemented a Vision 2000 teaming approach, currently with a long term agreement for
both production and sustainment through 2007 expressed in a contract that includes a) a
missile pricing model, b) a repair pricing model, c) a telemetry unit model, and firm
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prices for various other items (spares, warranties, limited technical support, FMS Offset
administration costs, etc). With this understanding, I believe the three most important
things are 1. Teamwork and Trust achieved through 2. The sharing of a long-term vision
and 3. A goals and strategies to get there.
Without these, an LTPA is an agreement that will struggle and face a great chance of
becoming a bludgeon document instead of one that is flexible and meets the needs of the
parties involved.
The number one thing in my mind is stable funding, but unfortunately the program
office has little control over how Congress and the services parcel out the money. When
funding is in doubt, the contractor is hesitant to enter into long-term relationships with
suppliers, and without these relationships in place, there is no hope of a long-term
relationship between the government and the prime. Very few prime contractors
manufacture the bulk of the parts that go into a weapon system – most are assembly
houses that are dependent upon parts supplies by subcontractors.
The second is a long-term pricing agreement. There are many aspects to an LTPA that
have nothing to do with the actual price. These are the carrots and sticks to either reward
the contractor for meeting the LTPA or punish the contractor for busting the LTPA.
Among the carrots are TSPR, configuration management responsibility, self-governance,
reduced oversight by DCM, price based acquisition, reduced data requirements. On the
other side, the sticks can include increased government oversight, government
configuration management, tech data package submittal, second source qualification, and
submission of cost and pricing data.
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The third thing would be to foster an environment of trust with the ultimate goal of
establishing a seamless IPT with the contractor. By seamless, I mean that the lines are
blurred between contractor and government. Government employees attend contractor
internal meetings and for all intents and purposes, are used by the contractor as their own
employees. There are neither secrets nor surprises. When a problem arises, the
contractor is not adverse to picking up the phone and calling the government counterpart
to discuss the problem because there is no fear of the problem being blown out of
proportion.
Develop a partnering agreement between industry professional organizations and the
Government IPT. Let the industry professional affiliations help drive the solution and to
help locate and find associated sources of supply (similar to an Architect & Engineering
effort) consider this advanced market research. Then, develop partnering agreements with
the firms most likely to produce the required needed items.

How would you implement these relationships contractually?
5 of 5 panelists responding
Contractual implementation can be done through special contract provisions that
outline the incentives and penalties, address the types of costs to be included in the
prices, and timeframe and quantity that prices are based upon. The provision can address
any and all aspects of the agreement needed to ensure that the parties understand what the
business arrangement is, but a word of caution as to making the agreement so specific as
to remove flexibility for future use given unknown or unforeseen needs.
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Implemented by award term/dollar incentive arrangements/advance pricing
agreements.
Most of these are done without a contract, and MUST be pushed from the top down.
Contractually, I would implement these by making a performance based technical
document (SOO or SOC) describing the philosophy and the requirement. Negotiations
would be on a Review, Discuss, Concur basis, and I would express the long-term
agreement in option language in a clause of the contract to be exercised as separate
contractual vehicles when deemed necessary. I would institute a Total System
Performance Responsibility (TSPR) approach, lay out all tasks and then determine those
to be under the control of the contractor, then place then in a task destination document to
be signed by both parties. The SOO/SOC and clause language would include the basic
TSPR philosophy agreement.
Of these three things, the first is not a contractual matter. Although it is the most
important, it is the one item that the program office has the least control over. The
second item is incorporated into the contract through a special clause. The third item is a
philosophy that must start from the top and move down to the lowest layers of the
organization. It isn’t something that can be dictated or measured for an award fee.
Contractually, 1st develop basic partnering pre-contract operating agreements between
industry and the Government; 2nd, make decisions regarding who will do design &
research & prototype vs. who will test the products, vs. who will own the rights, etc.; 3rd
develop into IDIQ's (preferably FFP) with the best suppliers/manufacturers from
recommended industry association groups; 4th, push Small Business participation down
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to the major suppliers/manufacturers (strongly enforce and strengthen subcontracting
plans if large business concern).
Table 8. AAC Responses to Round 2(a)/ Question 2
In addition to the top three things you would include in these long-term
relationships, how would you decide whom to establish a long-term relationship
with? 5 of 5 panelists responding
The competitive environment encourages industry to offer their most favorable prices,
and generates more willingness on industry's part to accept reasonable risk. Additionally,
the long-term agreement, protects the government from an initial "buy-in" threat, since
there is less opportunity for industry to "get well" after the initial procurement is over and
a sole source environment has been assured. However, if the government lacks the time,
knowledge and skill, to determine upfront the needs of the user for the life of the longterm agreement, then the buy-in threat is greater, since industry will assume that changes
in requirements will open up the long-term agreement.
Past performance and reasonableness of proposal to determine if the supplier is
reliable.
It would depend in large part upon where you were in your process. If you were just
starting out in your development and acquisition planning, market research is your key to
understanding how wide your market is for the product or service you expect. You would
likely perform a source selection based upon best value, and be very up front about your
intentions to make the relationship long-term. This would be a strong "criteria" in your
best value selection. If you were already in a dual source type arena, a similar approach
could be employed.
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In AMRAAM, we were in a competitive arena prior to end of '97 (with 2 ongoing
suppliers) until Raytheon bought Hughes. A Justification and Approval 10 USC
2304(c)(1) has been our CICA exception ever since. With regards to sustainment, we
achieved a single source of repair approval (also called a SORAP decision) from the
Defense Depot Management Council, which allowed Raytheon to go sole source. When
entering into a teaming arrangement, you need to consider what will give the contractor
the most synergy, reduce infrastructure costs, provide the maximum ability for the
contractor to be responsible for the product, etc., then weigh that against vendor breakout
at lower levels of sustainment of the product or components and decide whether to fold
that into the exception. AMRAAM currently has competition of some sustainment spares
and component parts.
As much care should be taken to choose a contractor, as a person uses when choosing
a mate because the program is choosing its partner ‘for life’ in a long-term relationship.
Past performance should, in most cases, bear the most weight as a factor. How a
contractor will perform on the new program is best illustrated by how he/she performed
in the recent and relevant past. If the contractor had a good system engineering process,
for example, it is unlikely that the system engineering process will change for the new
program. But, not all areas of past performance are relevant or worthy of review.
Based on professionally recognized industry associations (recommendations as experts
in the field), past performance under Gov't and commercial past efforts, capabilities,
preaward surveys, financial data, FAR Part 9 criteria, etc.

How would ensure compliance with CICA? 5 of 5 panelists responding
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The most effective method for obtaining a long-term agreement is through
competition.
Compete initially with award term options.
A competitive source selection would satisfy the CICA requirement.
As to CICA, as long as the source selection is full and open competition, there is
compliance with CICA.
CICA is the tough one. A competitive process may be made prior to a partnering
agreement being established and/or source selection procedures similar to Architect &
Engineering Selections, or other proven commercial practices, etc.

What are your selection criteria/thresholds? 5 of 5 panelists responding
If evolutionary acquisition approach is used, this means that there has to be a greater
emphasis on validating the proposed phasing of requirements and ensuring user
agreement that the proposed phased capability is acceptable over the long-term
agreement and is not to be taken lightly.
I would only select suppliers who have been determined reliable through evaluating
past performance.
The selection criteria would be based upon the value you wanted to achieve. For
example, performance would be a strong consideration, as well as management, if you
wanted a company serious about a long-term relationship with a good reputation of
contractually fulfilling promises. Of course, technical areas are inherent.
If this question pertains to a new program, the decision is made through a source
selection whose criteria consist of those things important to the program. It makes sense
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that the source selection only look at those areas that are important to the success of its
program, such as systems engineering, schedule control, vendor control, or program
management. The other factors and the weight given to them are, once again, dependent
upon the program. If the schedule for fielding a weapon system is important – and in an
EA environment it should be – then risk may be the next most important factor.
Certainly mission capability (performance) and cost/price (or affordability) must also be
considered, since if it doesn’t work, or if it is too expensive, it doesn’t matter how fast a
weapon system can be fielded.
Selection would be based on the best overall integrated assessment to the Government,
"Best Value" considering all things including recommendations from professional
organizations, price (broken-down into who provides design and testing, best options,
etc.), past performance, capabilities, partnerships with small business concerns, etc...
Thresholds should be $10M or less Contracting Officer (CO) approval, $25M or less
Chief of the Contracting Office (COCO), $50M or less Buying Office Contracting
Official (BOCO), Greater than $50M the Designated Acquisition Commander (DAC).
Current SAT thresholds should move to $200K; Synopsis thresholds should move to
$100K; Review thresholds $500K or less, the CO (and limited advisors); above $500K,
policy review and clearance procedures would apply. Partnering agreements same
thresholds based on aggregate procurement amounts.

Who would approve the selection/arrangement? 5 of 5 panelists responding
The approval authority for this should be the Source Selection Authority or MDA and
should address the impacts of changing requirements.
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The approval authority should be the Source Selection Authority.
Selection would be the Source Selection Authority, in accordance with prescribed
regulatory levels.
The source selection authority makes the final decision.
Thresholds should be $10M or less CO approval, $25M or less COCO, $50M or less
BOCO, Greater than $50M the DAC. Current SAT thresholds should move to $200K;
Synopsis thresholds should move to $100K; Review thresholds $500K or less, the CO
(and limited advisors); above $500K, policy review and clearance procedures would
apply. Partnering agreements same thresholds based on aggregate procurement amounts.

Table 9. AAC Responses to Round 2(a)/ Question 3
Three participants submitted Long-Term Pricing Arrangements (LTPAs) be
included in an EA strategy. What specific pricing elements (labor, material, etc.)
would you include in these arrangements and why? 5 of 5 panelists responding
The costs proposed and evaluated under the LTPA should be all costs necessary to
produce, deliver, and field the end item. This includes all production tooling,
capitalization, non-recurring, and recurring cost inherent in the end item design. Only
then can you ensure that in a competitive environment you are comparing "apples to
apples" and that your incentive structure properly rewards the contractor for the
assumption of controlling their costs.
What I intended by stating that "all cost necessary to produce the end item" is included
in the LTPA, is that all costs known and reasonably anticipated - the same that a
contractor would have to forecast and include in a Firm Fixed Price Option for out year
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prices. Here is some language out of LTPA provision that addresses the costs that are to
be included:
The procurement price is a composite of recurring and non-recurring costs that
includes all fully burdened contractor production costs incurred in the manufacture of a
usable end item (Flyaway); the equipment and materials required to support it (Weapon
System); and initial spares. It includes the contractor's cost associated with the prime
mission equipment (hardware and software), systems engineering, program management,
containers, first destination transportation costs, special tooling and test equipment
(which shall not be amortized), peculiar support equipment, acceptance tests, warranty,
contractor caused engineering change proposals and award fee/profit.
Cost drivers - most impact.
To avoid confusion between terms described in my response to question 1, I will be
speaking within the confines of a long term pricing agreement. First of all lets look at the
pricing model. The model should be as flexible as possible to accommodate any
configuration and quantity (within reason). You would need to agree on those elements
that are finite, and not those that are subject to swing or change a great deal over time.
For example, you would not agree on a fixed degree of inflation to apply, you'd instead
agree on an inflation index to use and have that made part of the model. That way, the
bottom line price could change, yet still be considered a negotiated FFP because the
element of change was defined.
LTPAs should include all the recurring/nonrecurring cost/price known at the time of
contract award, and should only be renegotiated when a significant requirements change
drives an increase in price. In an EA environment, an LTPA would probably only be
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valid until the next spiral is incorporated into the technical baseline because increased
performance generally translates into increased cost. However, in this case, you would
probably have an argument in favor of only getting cost/pricing data on that portion of
the weapon system that changed since, once again, all the rest was obtained under
adequate price competition.
Depends on the procurement and the stage it is in. Time and Materials (labor &
material costs), Overhead rates and G & A costs are okay for limited efforts, but you
should have a long-term roadmap to go FFP no later than production execution.

Which ones would you not include and why? 4 of 5 panelists responding
Do not include strategic materials or other over which there is little control.
You would not include those elements that are subject to swing or change a great deal
over time. For example, you would not agree on a fixed degree of inflation to apply,
you'd instead agree on an inflation index to use and have that made part of the model.
That way, the bottom line price could change, yet still be considered a negotiated FFP
because the element of change was defined.
If an LTPA is considered as part of the source selection, and there is adequate price
competition, I would offer that you probably wouldn’t have insight into the discreet cost
elements since you are prohibited from requiring cost and pricing data.
Cost of Money, Extended Overhead rates, basic costs with doing business over and
above normal overhead rates; this is because if the firm is already in business and a
recognized professional industry, these costs have already been accepted. The doors will
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likely remain open regardless of winning this contract effort. The company should look
for future security/business as a major profit incentive.

How would you negotiate such an arrangement? 4 of 5 panelists responding
Emphasize controllable costs/arrangement proposed by offerors in competitive
proposals if possible.
Developing a good model has to do with openness with your contractor. You MUST
be able to be honest in your cares and have open books to get to a bottom line number
that is acceptable to both sides.
The arrangement is captured in a special clause of the contract that details the terms of
the LTPA, and the carrots for meeting the LTPA, and the sticks for not meeting it.
Negotiate a pre-contract teaming arrangement as described before, who pays design
cost, who assumes testing costs, who gets patent rights, who gets data/design rights, etc.
and put a value to those intangibles as incentives to industry. Take the best negotiated
overall "deal" for the Government including considering cost, performance, and delivery
and sustainment issues.

Who would be responsible for maintaining the arrangement?
4 of 5 panelists responding
Responsibility for the arrangement is both the Government's and Industry. The
government must adhere to buying according to the parameters of the agreement and
industry must adhere to providing a quality product at the price and schedule they agreed
to.
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The Government and the Contractor are equally responsible for maintaining
agreement.
The Government Financial Manager and Contractor equivalent are key players, along
with your PCO and contractor equivalent. Once the model is in place, it should be
available by both parties for use. In AMRAAM, the government financial manager is the
responsible point of contact. However, the model is available on an electronic database
for FM and PK personnel (Contractor and Government).
The entire IPT Team collectively, the Contracting Officer as the lead with industry.
Table 10. AAC Responses to Round 2(a)/ Question 4
Flexibility was submitted as a requirement for successful implementation of EA. If
unconstrained by any other requirements and starting with a clean sheet of paper,
can you think of a totally new contract arrangement that will facilitate flexibility?
5 of 5 panelists responding

The key to being successful is to intensely leverage industry's strength. Therefore to
maximum extent possible, they should drive the quantity ranges based upon the most
economically favorable price breaks, they should identify the configuration/performance
the items will have in each production lot/timeframe based upon their technology risk
assessment, they should provide a full product warranty that ensures the item will
perform in the manner/environment it is intended for, and they should be rewarded based
upon the User's assessment of performance and satisfaction with the product once it is
delivered.
No - Existing contract arrangements will suffice if freed of constraints.
For a major acquisition, I think that one contract may not be optimal. The key is a
coordinated solid approach that considers life cycle costs, all "parts" of the program,
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known unknowns, and most importantly, the results. The focus should never be on the
contract; it is merely a vehicle to facilitate and to document communication. Instead, one
should look at the situation, understand what needs to be done, and then decide how to
articulate it into a document (contract). For example, AMRAAM has implemented a
long-term partnership, starting with Vision 2000, that incorporated a TSPR philosophy
and a team approach to the product (AMRAAM). The outcome in terms of contract was
1) a FFP production and sustainment contract, with pricing negotiated through 2007 that
included 3 pricing models as well as other items negotiated without use of pricing
models, 2) a CPAF development contract with the award fee portion as a CAIV effort
(the contractor commits to a price and the CAIV approach keeps pushing to goal above
threshold), 3) a minimal time and materials contract for quick look, fast turnaround
studies/analyses, etc., and 4) a small number of component parts competed.
This kind of depends on what stage the program is in. Although not a ‘totally new
contract arrangement,” the most flexible vehicle I know of is a Section 845 Other
Transaction, assuming you are entering Component Advanced Development (CAD) or
System Development and Demonstration.
Yes, the pre-contract partnering agreements with industry based upon professional
association recommendations. The Government can tap into industry professionals for
solutions to long-term requirements. Put the industry into the equation early in the
process, get the brightest minds working on the solution and contract with the forefront
industry professionals.
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What are the advantages/disadvantages of your arrangement?
4 of 5 panelists responding
The disadvantage to leveraging industry’s strength is that it creates a more difficult
assessment of what is best value to the government since there may be a broad range of
approaches proposed. It also means the government needs to be willing to "rethink" how
we contract for these items and approach it from the standpoint that we must allow
industry to drive the train with respect to technology/performance, and not dictate what
we must have/ and when we must have it. This is going to create a strong resistance to
accept industry's input as the basis for when/and how we could have a product.
A coordinated solid approach that considers life cycle costs, all "parts" of the program,
known unknowns, and most importantly, the results has the advantages of one-stop
shopping (except for #4 above) low infrastructure, and high synergy. The contracts are
well defined in purpose and thus easier to administer than one super contract with mixed
types. There are several acquisition excellence initiatives built into the contract to make
them easy to follow and much easier to close out. The disadvantages might be in the
discipline to keep them well understood and tasks/costs well identified/segregated.
When using an OT, both parties truly begin with a blank piece of paper. It is not a
FAR contract, nor does it use FAR clauses. Everything is negotiated – from data rights to
both parties having the right to terminate the other. The contractor brings his/her own
share of investment to the table, much like investing IR&D.
Pre-contract partnering agreements with industry based upon professional association
recommendations probably means more contracts to larger firms, better solutions, quicker
deliveries, faster total lead times, better products, etc. The disadvantages are less
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Government oversight, less competition, fewer small business goals being met by the
Government (push more stringent SBA requirements down to industry to foster SB goals)
may cost a little more initially (long-term should save money).
Table 11. AAC Responses to Round 2(a)/ Question 5
One participant suggested obtaining a class J&A for all production, sustainment,
and development of a system for a period of years. Would this work for your
program? Why or why not? 5 of 5 panelists responding
A Class J&A would be needed to narrow the field of competitors down to two or more
for the early development phase (and focus on full and open competition after restriction
of sources).
A Class J&A would work for most major programs - if it can be written broadly
enough.
Since I suggested this, it obviously works for my organization.
A class J&A certainly goes a long way to creating and maintaining a long term
relationship, and yes, it will work for our program as well. Small Diameter Bomb is an
evolutionary acquisition, and, although the warfighter has deferred any spirals until
outside the FYDP, we do intend to go sole source for the life of the program after this
two-year competition is ended. I am pursuing a waiver for a J&A on the basis that we
have a SAMP coordinated through SAF and signed by OSD that approves our acquisition
strategy of limited competition after the initial rolling down select, and then sole source
for the remainder of the program as long as Congress passes no specific law mandating
competition for this phase, the contractor offers prices that the Government finds are fair
and reasonable, the contractor produces a quality product that meets the system
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specification and fulfills his warranty obligations, the contractor continues to perform in
accordance with the terms and conditions of his contract, funds are available, and the
chosen contractor has not been suspended or debarred.
Yes, a Class J&A would work for my program. It would allow management buy-in
earlier in the process.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of a class J&A?
5 of 5 panelists responding
Narrowing the competitive field down enables industry to mature the design/costs of
the product before having to finalize the prices offered for the LTPA and yet maintain the
competitive environment for obtaining those long-term prices.
A Class J&A eliminates delays.
Since the class J&A speaks in broad program terms, changes as to items within the
broad terms (categories of supplies/services) can take place, and dollars within them, so
long as the changes meet the overall definition, description, and total dollar amount
approved.
A class J&A certainly goes a long way to creating and maintaining a long-term
relationship.
Advantages include a simplified process and quicker response to the warfighter needs.
Disadvantages include limited competition and reduced oversight.

When would you pursue this course of action and who would initiate it?
5 of 5 panelists responding
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The Acquisition Strategy may take the approach to gradually narrow your competitive
field to the most highly competitive and carry these sources through an early
prototype/development stage.
The Government should initiate if the class J&A is written broadly enough to
accommodate your program.
You would pursue a class J&A when you have a large number of like requirements or
related requirements that will be purchased from a single supplier. The alternative would
be to pursue an individual J&A for each supply or service (separately) and having to
essentially re-create the same J&A over and over and keep having to get coordination and
approvals to get to the same result. A class J&A secures your authority to go sole
source/limited sources for everything so that this (approval) concern is removed; program
planning/implementation can continue unabated. I suppose the only problem would be
that combining items might take you to a higher visibility (approval) threshold; however,
this should not be a valid concern to a good acquisition approach.
A J&A is generally a collaborative effort between program management and
contracting, and should be initiated as soon as the acquisition strategy includes limited or
no competition.
Pursue on all long-term arrangements (over one year in length) during Acquisition
Planning and partnering with industry. The IPT Team and Program Manager specifically
would be responsible for the initiation.

How would the 50/50 law for sustainment be addressed? 4 of 5 panelists responding
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If the warranty of the product is included in the price, then sustainment is minimized
and no 50/50 issue arises.
Still stuck with the 50/50 law so far as I know - just have to live with it.
With regard to the 50/50 rule, the latest info I have says this is currently under
discussion in Congress. However, AMRAAM operates under the SORAP decision. I
would suppose that a waiver or exemption would have to be reached for those without
such a decision document. The only other alternative would be to discuss with the
contractor about a plan whereby you could reach joint agreement on those items that
would be most effectively incorporated into contractor repair.
Address the 50/50 law through industry early involvement to possible requirement
solutions.

Table 12. AAC Responses to Round 2(a)/ Question 6
We can trace EA back at least to 1993, and there have been comments that EA is
just new packaging for an old idea. Do you agree? 5 of 5 panelists responding
I believe that EA as defined today is not the same as the approaches in the past with
one distinct difference. It requires upfront recognition/agreement and planning of future
requirement changes that occur over the life of a system.
Yes.
EA does have its roots in many previous ideas (block changes, Preplanned product
improvements {P3I}, phased technical approaches, etc.), but it is not quite accurate to say
that all is old. The determinant is how we build on the old, and to what degree the ideas
are promoted and fostered within the Defense Department.
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Although other acquisition reform initiatives appear to have some of the same
characteristics as evolutionary acquisition, I don’t believe they are the same thing.
Yes.

If so, how will you accommodate incremental development in your contracts?
2 of 5 panelists responding
Plan for phases or include new technology when it becomes available by adding
scope.
With the current environment in a state of high flux (new AFFARS, etc.) unsure. Try
to use smart sound business practices and keep common sense in the forefront.

If not, what new ways will you use to contractually implement the EA emphasis?
3 of 5 panelists responding
In formally recognizing the need to plan a structure/business arrangement that is based
upon a known set of requirements, the government can more effectively budget, manage
and field a system that meets the users' expectations. It also affords the government the
advantage of obtaining a stronger commitment to quality, schedule, and price at the
beginning of a procurement that may be maintained instead of addressing needs on an asneeded basis, with little leverage to encourage industry to work with the government to
obtain the most mutually beneficial arrangement.
In my contracts we are using our P3I development contracts to introduce new
configurations or new technologies into our FFP production contract. Through use of
pricing models and a CAIV approach in the CPAF development contracts, the agreement
is already well established and can easily transition into the production FFP contract. This
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year we used the results of our P3I model/contract to fold the C7 missile configuration
into the production B and C5 model and achieve a price using price based analysis
(without cost or pricing data). The total value of the contract was 2.3 billion dollars - this
would have been unthinkable without use of this EA approach.
If this were an accepted way of doing business (whatever it was/is called), then we
wouldn’t have so much trouble with the user regarding the concept of delivering
something less than the 100% solution to the field.
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Appendix I: Synopsis of Responses for Delphi Round 2(b)—ASC Specific Questions

Table 13. ASC Responses to Round 2(b)/ Question 1
What potential impacts will the AFFARS (June 2002) rewrite have on your
program? (AF FARSite link: http://farsite.hill.af.mil/vffar1.htm)
6 of 6 panelists responding
As a Procurement Analyst, I support numerous SPOs as well as Base Operational
Support and National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC). The AFFARS rewrite is having a
tremendous impact on the way we do business. The most significant change is that the
PEO/DAC is now Head of the Contracting Activity. What this means is that each PEO
and DAC can establish whatever thresholds and procedures they choose for contract
review, clearance, etc. For years, industry has been lobbying for consistency in our
processes, including our Requests for Proposals and contracts. The AFFARS and AFMC
rewrite no longer specifies processes (each program establishes it's own processes and a
laundry list of literally hundreds of RFP and contract clauses have been removed). The
net effect will be each program will establish a process for that acquisition and write
unique clauses as needed. This will be a challenge for contractors, procurement staff, and
lawyers.
It will allow the single manager to meet already tight schedules in execution of his
program. In today’s environment of acquisition streamlining this is a very important
factor. However, one can only hope that in making his/her decision he/she will include in
that decision input from the business side of the team (i.e. JAG, CO) as well as the lead
functionals of his/her team. Working under a PEO on our program we have already
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experienced the level of delegation on such items as ASP, SAMP and UCA’s. The J&A
delegation did not change with the AFFARS.
Biggest single change: more empowerment, less oversight for PEO/DAC programs.
Major impact of AFFAR rewrite is PEOs/DAQs are now designated HCAs (Head of the
Contracting Activity) for PEO/DAC programs.
Impact will be minimal as far as time saved. The changes are welcome but essentially
just changed who has to be briefed or who approves the clearance, RFP etc. For
example: A clearance in the past that had to go to SAF/AQ can now be done by the PEO.
The work to put the briefing together and coordinating with the appropriate functional
offices in the SPO is still there, the only change is that I have to brief one (1) less
person/office --- in this example SAF/AQ. As far as cycle time reduction, it may save me
a couple of days. If you want to get true significant cycle time reduction, start pounding
on the requirements side of the acquisition cycle. We have beat to death the 6-month
timeframe from RFP release to contract award. No one seems to be looking at the 3+year average that it takes to get an ORD finalized.
None.

Table 14. ASC Responses to Round 2(b)/ Question 2
Under what conditions/circumstances would a single award ID/IQ contract
arrangement benefit an EA strategy? 5 of 6 panelists responding
There is a flurry of ID/IQ contracts at ASC. They are being used for everything from
buying aircraft to ICS, CLS, maintenance, modifications, development, etc. Many of
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them are 10 to 15 yrs in length. They could be used to support evolutionary acquisition
and are in some cases.
It would support the spiral development of the system the System Program Director
(SPD) is executing. If you are in the latest stages of a new development under a single
ID/IQ, the SPD has the capability to more efficiently manage the development while
transitioning to Full Rate Production (FRP). On the other hand, if during FRP the
program requires new or more developing of the design of the system, the SPD has the
capability of placing that change on the existing contract. That helps his/her manage the
workload for the team, benefits the close out procedures with each D.O. that in the long
run potentially saves costs to the program. The costs associated with each D.O. would be
obligated at the time of the award of the D.O. This allows the SPD only to award the
D.O. if funds are available.
A single award ID/IQ contract is best where only ONE contractor can reasonably
perform the work because of uniqueness or highly specialized work or the tasks are so
intricately related.
For obvious reasons, a single award would be most cost efficient in terms of
eliminating multiple decision reviews/briefings, multiple documents and reduced
travel/TDY expenses.
None. EMD and Production running concurrently. Single award wouldn't help.

How would you structure/price for future increments under this arrangement?
5 of 6 participants responding

Future increments are not being priced, however. Even though ID/IQ contracts typically
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should have priced effort, the current movement is to reserve CLINs for future effort with
either NTE prices or no price limit at all.
Each D.O. would be structured to fit the type of effort it is, i.e. development which
would most likely be cost type contract and for production effort it would be fixed price
of some sort.
Bottom Line: you want Total System Perform Responsibility (TSPR) - I call it one
belly button to push. I wouldn't lock myself into one pricing structure. I would keep it
flexible. You would want to have Cost and FFP clause, T&M, etc. You might be able to
negotiate labor rates and leave the skill mix and number of hours open to be negotiated
with each delivery/task order. I would preprice whatever made sense, BUT not lock
myself in. The key here is to be able to change with the requirement.
You can’t price future increments until you know the requirements for the future
spiral(s). Our program is in this situation now --- we have just finished pricing and
contractually incorporating Spiral 1. We have a top-level idea of what we want for Spiral
2 but haven’t set the requirements and can’t even begin to price this next spiral. A lot of
what Spiral 2 turns out to be will depend on the Contractor’s PERFORMANCE in Spiral
1. An ID/IQ contract doesn’t really buy you anything unless the requirements are
PRICED.
See our ASP briefing for phasing/pricing of future increments and spirals.

Table 15. ASC Responses to Round 2(b)/ Question 3
Under what conditions/circumstances would a multiple award ID/IQ contract
arrangement benefit an EA strategy? 4 of 6 panelists responding
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I am not familiar with multiple ID/IQ contract arrangements, therefore, I cannot
comment on this one.
Multiple award contracts work best where individual tasks or increments of task can
easily be separated and then be incorporated into the master plan. Plug and play
requirements. One contractor makes the table legs - one makes the tabletop, etc. Key
issue here is who will be the integrator? Is it something the government wants to take on?
These would typically be competed each time, so they have to be distinct and not so
interrelated as to need one point of contact (basically the reverse of the situation in
number 2 above). Major benefit: enjoy competition and larger business base. Major
challenge: who will integrate and how do you avoid finger pointing when something goes
wrong.
It is highly unlikely you would continue to fund multiple sources for an EA/spiral
development activity --- You can’t afford it. Normally, a source selection is conducted
and a single source is selected. Also, an ID/IQ contract doesn’t really buy you anything
unless the requirements are PRICED. Knowledge of the requirements and the risks in
meeting those requirements drives the business arrangement --- not vice versa.
Incorporating EA does NOT require any new/unique business arrangements --- just slight
“adjustments” to existing contract strategies.
None. Sole source contracts.

How would you structure/price for future increments under this arrangement?
3 of 6 panelists responding
Future increments should be well planned, clearly defined, and priced if possible.
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Same pricing strategy would apply as above, with the exception of competitive actions
where you will look at price, not costs.
Multiple award documents phased over the traditional acquisition milestones
compliment ID/IQ contracting by delivery orders. Delivery orders were intended to
contract for shorter periods of time and succinctly definable requirements. Prolonged
periods of performance defeats the purpose of D.O.s. (i.e. DFAS will lose scope of the
multitude of ACRNs that will accumulate during the life cycle of a prolonged periods of
performance). As with the B-2 Radar Pathfinder Program, we intend to phase the
program by the following delivery orders:
CAD Phase 1
CAD Phase 2
SDD
Production Kits
Installs

F33657-99-D-0012, D.O. 0017
Mod to DO 0017
Separate D.O. (#TBD)
Separate D.O.
Separate D.O.

CPAF
CPAF
CPAF
FFP
FFP

Table 16. ASC Responses to Round 2(b)/ Question 4
If unconstrained by any other requirements and starting with a clean
sheet of paper, can you think of a totally new contract arrangement for an
EA environment? 6 of 6 panelists responding
I don't believe there is any "silver bullet" or new contract arrangement for EA.
EA has been around in various formats for a long time. Virtually every major program
has gone through the process-though many not successfully. The problem is in the
upfront planning and management of the acquisition. The CO has an endless variety of
tools and techniques to support an effective and executable plan. But that's
the key - the entire effort must be planned and it must be executable.
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I would like to see more of the Other Transactions philosophy used within AFRL or at
least adapted to the to fit the System side of the procurement.
It would have to be something that contractors would buy into. It cannot be so risky
that no one contractor bites on the arrangement. This would be something that I might ask
industry. Are you asking anyone from industry these EA questions? I would be interested
in their perspective. Bottom Line: use multiple contract arrangements in your basic
contract: Far Part 15 and commercial, cost and firm-fixed price. Then you could pick the
specific arrangement you need for each spiral. Key here is to keep it flexible with lots of
choices - yet not so complicated that it becomes a nightmare to administer. Bottom Line:
broad scope, multiple contract types, LONG period of performance (10 -15 years), so
something can actually get close to completed before you have to start over.
See previous comment. EA is just a re-packaging of P3I from the old days. We didn’t
use any “new and unique” business arrangements for P3I --- we don’t need to re-invent
the wheel for EA either.
The B-2 SPO has a streamlined process call “Diego”. It exists on the close teaming of
the program office and the contractor.
Current contract types available should work in an unconstrained environment.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of your
arrangement? 5 of 6 panelists responding
Too often, significant issues are "kicked down the road" for someone else to deal
with.
Advantages of the Other Transactions philosophy would include the openness among
the team members, government, prime and subcontractors. Even though we use IPT’s
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within the Program Offices, we don’t use them to the extent we could if we were able to
form consortiums within the government and the contractor. I know the FAR dictates
“privity of contract” between the prime and subcontractors; however, we usually end up
discussing things with the subcontractor. If we were to form consortiums all parties
would be able to voice their concern or ideas in front of everyone working the project.
From my experience when we discuss issues with the Prime our concerns do not always
get passed to the Subs the way they were intended causing confusion on the government
side as well as on the contractor side. This has been a big issue on many programs I have
worked over the years. With a consortium every one on the team makes his/her
contributions and the ideas or fixes that come out of that discussion knows whether it will
be implemented, revised or cancelled. The OT agreement is written by all members
involved and signed by all members indicating they will honor that agreement. Although
this type of agreement does not fall under the Federal Acquisition Regulations there are
some areas that the FAR is still used as a guideline. (i.e. technical data, patent rights etc).
I think of a menu, you want enough choices to keep your customers coming back, but
not so many you can't cook/manage them decently. You can't make it a management
nightmare for the government OR the contractors. Simple with choices.
Without infringing upon statutory rules (laws) such as appropriation law and new start
authorization, the current process is about as streamlined as it can be.
The spiral acquisition and complexities that accompany this type of acquisition are
constraints in themselves. It's the constraints that drive the acquisition community to seek
new arrangements.
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Table 17. ASC Responses to Round 2(b)/ Question 5
We can trace EA back at least to 1993, and there have been comments that
EA is just new packaging for an old idea. Do you agree? 6 of 6 panelists responding
Incremental development has always been available and some have used it effectively.
Most of the time, however, the development has been incremental by default, due to
insufficient funding, poor planning, immature technology, and many other reasons.
When the program manager is forced into EA by default, it works very poorly and
no one is a winner.
No, I do not agree. I think the acquisition process has seen many new changes. I have
been in contracting for 20 years and over those twenty years I have seen, some post 1993
and some pre-1993 changes that would be classified as old ideas in new packages. But I
think there have been some real strides forward in implementing changes that are a
cultural change. For example, I think we are using an existing contract type, ID/IQ to
further enhance the procurement side of giving the SM the tools he/she needs to
implement EA. People may say it’s an old idea and that may be the case in some
programs or functionals, however, there is nothing wrong with creating new ideas to old
tools.
Yes, I agree.
Personally, I think EA is just new packaging of an old idea. I do like the idea of giving
the warfighter SOMETHING (60%) solution and then following it up with incremental
improvements. Kind of like - giving them a car to drive first, then increasing the speed,
and then the range, number of occupants, adding on automatic, AC, radio, CD, sunroof.
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You get the idea. In the past we have waited so long for the car to be developed that it is
old technology by the time we actually "get behind the wheel".
I was on the leading edge of streamlining during my years with Big Safari (now in the
ASC/RA SPO) and C-17 during the production buyout period in the early 90’s. We’ve
gotten a lot smarter by teaming with the contractor as a vested partner rather than the
attitude of “them & us”.
No, I do not agree.

If so, how will you accommodate incremental development in your contracts?
3 of 6 panelists responding
Bottom Line: you want Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) - I call it
one belly button to push. I wouldn't lock myself into one pricing structure. I would keep
it flexible. You would want to have Cost and FFP clause, T&M, etc. You might be able
to negotiate labor rates and leave the skill mix and number of hours open to be negotiated
with each delivery/task order. I would preprice whatever made sense, BUT not lock
myself in. The key here is to be able to change with the requirement.
EA is just a re-packaging of P3I from the old days. We didn’t use any “new and
unique” business arrangements for P3I --- we don’t need to re-invent the wheel for EA
either.
I would accommodate incremental development by first having INCREMENTAL
tasks that are clearly defined and severable that can be implemented either in serial or
parallel tasks. I would also want SOME assurance that funding profile was available for
future tasks. Bottom Line: we have to have some idea of what we want to incrementally
development. We can't just say we want something and we want it fast.
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If not, what new ways will you use to contractually implement the EA emphasis?
4 of 6 panelists responding
The "new" part of EA is that we are finally acknowledging we can't buy the system we
really want to do what we want in the time we want.
We are being given the opportunity to lean forward and apply new ideas to the
existing tools that are out there. I believe any change is hard to implement and get people
to grasp the changes to where they can think “out of the box” in implementing those
changes.
I have no plan to contract any differently than the acquisition strategy set out in our
plan as provided in question 2.
No year money and a predictable stream of funds would go a very long way in
removing work arounds that make this type of contracting difficult. Freezing
requirements at a point in time is another that would be a major improvement.
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Appendix J: Synopsis of Responses for Delphi Round 2(b)—ESC Specific Questions

Table 18. ESC Responses to Round 2(c)/ Question 1
The definition of increments or spirals was raised as a concern in the EA
arrangement. What processes/approach do you take to define each increment?
5 of 7 panelists responding
There is a Spiral Development Integrated Process Team (SDIPT) that meets
regularly to discuss these issues.
Have seen the increments both defined by the Government up front or defined by the
contractor based upon Government requirements. Might be a combo of the above,
Government defining certain increments with contractor allowed to define others.
Sometimes in a competitive action, a plan is required from the contractor. When
Government defines increments reliance is placed upon requirements and requirements
definition process as well as risk analysis and market research processes.
The approach is to clearly define the beginning and ending points, or more
specifically, a well defined deliverable.
My initial thought on what a contract document would look like could be just a basic
CLIN with the first increment and possibly priced options. I believe funding would be an
issue - limits how much we can do and limits how many increments we get. What gets
the minimum amount of capability out to the warfighter first and how many increments
do we need to get to the desired level of performance.
The best way to describe this EA is a strategy to deliver capability in an incremental
fashion. Spiral Development is a process to develop capability in an iterative, risk
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reduction fashion. The first delivery out of EA is called "Initial capability", and each
delivery after that is called an "Increment". Spiral development occurs within the
development of either the initial capability or each subsequent increment.

Who is involved in these processes? 4 of 7 panelists responding
Both the program office and users are represented on the SDIPT.
There is a combination of Government and Contractor involvement.
The using community usually dictates the need for the spiral, coupled with the
program's funding profile (Is the spiral budgeted for?; In what fiscal year(s)?)
The normal acquisition process applies within either the initial capability or each
increment i.e. the Integrated Product Team that develops the product (consisting of the
SPO, ALC, and user).

How do you define future increments for unknown capabilities?
3 of 7 panelists responding
Future increments for unknown requirements are often provided with general
boundaries.
You amend the Acquisition Plan and contract respectively as needs develop and are
funded - unless you have some kind of crystal ball that can tell you what your unknown
unknowns and future requirements are.
All capabilities are addressed in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and
that is what you build your program around. As other requirements arise, then tradeoffs
can be done through Cost As An Independent Variable (CAIV) to determine whether or
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not to pursue that new requirement. A capabilities matrix is developed starting with the
ORD requirements. The goal is to meet the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), and
then the requirements are further broken down into thresholds and objectives. For
example, a KPP could be speed, and the objective could be 120 MPH, with a threshold of
100 MPH. The initial capability could deliver 80 MPH, and then the first increment could
deliver 100 MPH, with the final increment delivering 120 MPH.

At what point are these future increments definitions refined further?
3 of 7 panelists responding

Agreement is reached on processes and time for further refinement.
Refine them when you have a good degree of confidence they will be funded otherwise you might be wasting a great deal of time.
The program strategy (i.e. future increments) are laid out at the beginning of the
program with cost, schedule, and performance requirements in mind.

Table 19. ESC Responses to Round 2(c)/ Question 2
How do/would you incorporate all increments in a contractual document?
4 of 6 panelists responding
Increments are defined primarily the Technical Requirements Document (TRD) which
is a contract attachment.
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Increments that are deliverables would be either individual CLINs or well defined
within a CLIN deliverable. If there are undeliverable increments they are probably best
defined in an EA plan included in the contract.
The particular need will define the contract vehicle. All tools in the contracting
toolbox are available to you (e.g. Other Transaction, UCA, Contract Replan,
Supplemental Agreement, and so on). How these requirements translate into a legally
enforceable document is dependent upon the specific acquisition.
Clauses - not sure what would make sense here- I can't think of any special clauses
except maybe "Total System Responsibility".

How would this appear in the contract document (CLIN, clause, attachment,
etc.)? 4 of 6 panelists responding
The TRD is incorporated as an attachment. In some cases we have delineated
specific spiral delivery dates in section F of the contract.
These would appear as a CLIN, attachment or a clause.
Basically, your assumption is correct; CLINs, Contract Attachments, and clauses will
most likely be the places to capture the added requirements.
A special clause may be most appropriate as long as it made sense to use it.

Table 20. ESC Responses to Round 2(c)/ Question 3
One respondent presented the use of a unique award fee plan that included a
Teaming Fee. Would this arrangement work for your acquisition? Why or why
not? 3 of 6 panelists responding
Not sure.
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A Teaming Fee used in the author's context was probably part of a "Fly-off" or "down
select” where various teams competed for the development effort. Then one team or
contractor would be chosen for follow on efforts. This is a highly esoteric arrangement
contingent on, among other things, the legally binding arrangement or partnership
between members of the contractor team and the acquisition strategy. In most ESC
contracts such an arrangement is not necessary, but never say never!
Well the Award Fee arrangement I sent you last time was unique and was determined
at a very high level. The contract is just over a year old and the teaming arrangement has
a ways to go before it is deemed fully successful.

How would you define the evaluation criteria for such an arrangement?
2 of 6 panelists responding
What is/is not positive "teaming" is subjective. The Theater Battle Management Core
System award fee criteria do include incentives for the contractor to work cooperatively
with the Government as a team to attain important program objectives.
We usually define items to be incentivized in AF plans as areas of risk that we think
might be mitigated by inclusion of an appropriate incentive or other areas that the Gov
might have special interest in. Of course, in a sole source situation, contractor may
strongly be influencing the evaluation criteria in an AF plan. I have seen AF plans with
incentives for teaming, sometimes effective teaming with Government entities. On
several long-term support/maintenance contracts for major systems, where contractors
were taking over work the Government had long done, we have incentivized the
contractors based upon their work, including transition, with Government entities.
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Who would determine, evaluate, and approve these criteria?
2 of 6 panelists responding
Evaluation criteria are usually defined by the acquisition team but final determination
and approval of the criteria, and evaluation after award is up to the Fee Determining
Official (FDO).
The FDO, normally, would be the one that approves the Award Fee Plan. The
language in the plan would involve many people and would probably include feedback
from the contractor(s). I have a program that has a traditional award fee arrangement but
is event driven. In this they arranged the award fee pools to be consistent with the
importance of the event(s). This seems to work well and they also have TSR Clause.

Table 21. ESC Responses to Round 2(c)/ Question 4
If unconstrained by any other requirements and starting with a clean sheet of paper,
can you think of a totally new contract arrangement that will facilitate flexibility?
3 of 6 panelists responding
Can't think of a totally new contract arrangement for this at this time.
The example of the commercial world, especially the IT industry, needs more
attention. Specifically, the mindset/culture surrounding it. Cost plus contracts are not
incentives. Today's young worker responds to team and personal incentives, it is the way
Microsoft has thrived.
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The written words are only important in that they capture a meeting of the minds. You
know what you expect and the contractor delivers what you expect. Second, this meeting
of the minds must be captured in a legally binding document. (The U.S. Supreme Court
stopped doing contract law cases years ago because of this simple concept.) This is an
age-old question that looks for a way around the bureaucracy. Bottom line is you need
the meeting of the minds, an enforceable vehicle, and consideration exchange. Whatever
the latest beltway spin is, there's no getting around these in government contracting. An
ideal vehicle has these three items and is presented in a simple, clearly understood
contractual document.
I guess the most flexible; least complicated arrangement is just one basic Cost Plus
(AF/IF/FF) CLIN.

What are the advantages/disadvantages of your arrangement?
3 of 6 panelists responding
They also don't mind fielding something at 80% and working the bugs out later, a bit
more risky in the defense business.
The contractual vehicle is kept simple and clearly understood.
The key is flexibility.

Table 22. ESC Responses to Round 2(c)/ Question 5
Two respondents observed that CICA was a constraint in an EA arrangement. Do
you agree or disagree with this statement? Why? 4 of 6 panelists responding
Agree.
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If you can define some of your spirals up front and compete them, this shouldn't be an
issue.
I agree with the statement that CICA is a constraint, however this question hurts. As a
warranted contracting officer, my job is to comply with the law, its spirit and intent.
(Prisons are filled with folks who try to get around laws.) CICA has exceptions and ways
to work them.
I am not sure I understand the CICA issue - The initial program should have been
competed in the beginning. Systems type contracts seem to be going more towards sole
source - the multiple mergers of large companies are also playing a role limiting
competition.

How do/would you overcome the CICA requirements? 3 of 6 panelists responding
Need to document EA approach very clearly in the ASP briefing, the SAMP and the
contract itself to demonstrate that an EA approach was approved at program initiation.
This helps to respond to questions arising about re-competing at every spiral.
A down select process, if adequate funds are available, with several contractors thru an
initial phase and then a limited competition for the balance, yes a J&A would be needed,
can also be beneficial.
The work-arounds or legal exceptions are quite cumbersome, but since CICA is law,
Congress or in some situations the Courts are the only folks who can give relief. There
are exceptions to CICA (e.g. sole source contracts) that are workable. Trick is to get an
early start - I cannot stress this enough - and get buy-in from all the stakeholders and roll
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up your sleeves and work it. It's that simple and until the law is changed that's what must
be done.

Have you been successful in doing so? 0 of 6 panelists responding
No responses provided.

Table 23. ESC Responses to Round 2(c)/ Question 6
We can trace EA back at least to 1993, and there have been comments that
EA is just new packaging for an old idea. Do you agree? 4 of 6 panelists responding
I think it's largely a new concept.
Strategies like P3I sure sound like EA and date back much further than 93.
In my opinion EA is, as you state, new packaging of an old idea. The root of EA is the
Acquisition Plan, if you want to trace the lineage further back, you need to revisit the
budgeting process - appropriation, allocation, PMDs, etc.
While EA does seem like other initiatives, the main difference that I see is the
emphasis on identifying at the start of the program, which future increments will have
what capabilities and getting buy in from the user on the delivery strategy. Depending on
the program, however, this is very hard for the warfighter to accept because funding is
always cut, and if they agree to something less in the initial capability than what is
documented in the ORD, they might never receive the future increments that give them
the full ORD capability they are really after.

If so, how will you accommodate incremental development in your contracts?
4 of 6 panelists responding
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Contractual implementation discussed in response to question 2.
Place emphasis on identifying at the start of the program, which future increments will
have what capabilities and getting buy in from the user on the delivery strategy.

If not, what new ways will you use to contractually implement the EA emphasis?
4 of 6 panelists responding
In my nearly 20 years experience, myself and the teams I have served on always found
a way to acquire what we needed. Granted, some ways are easier than others, but it
always happened. Best advice is to get the MDA to buy into a well-worded Acquisition
Plan; one that allows flexibility in the process so you do not always have to go to flaglevel to get a decision on an evolution. This is much easier than it sounds but the bottom
line is the better your preparation, the easier your program will be in the long run.
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